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INTRODUCTION 
wo distinct experiences shape America’s nearly four decades of 
environmental endeavor: a steady awakening to the urgency of 
the environmental agenda1 and a vacillating governmental response.2  
As many early predictions of environmental damage have turned into 
present realities,3 ecological “facts on the ground” teach that the 
nation will need to alter significant aspects of modern civilization to 
avoid a twenty-first century dominated by regional conflict over 
water, food, and fuel.  By contrast, government initiatives to address 
environmental concerns have waxed and waned at the federal level4 
 
1 See News Release, The Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Environment, 
Immigration, Health Care Slip Down the List: Economy, Jobs Trump All Other Policy 
Priorities in 2009, at 3 (Jan. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Pew Policy Priorities], available at 
http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/485.pdf (tracking top domestic priorities for President 
Obama and Congress and showing the percentage of people who consider “protecting the 
environment” a “top priority” to be 44% in 2002, while trending up to 57% in 2006 and 
2007).  In the 2008 presidential election, candidates John McCain and Barack Obama did 
not debate whether or not climate change was a reality.  Instead, both candidates advanced 
plans to cap and trade emissions.  They differed only on the amount and time frame for 
reductions.  President Obama called for “reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 80[%] 
below 1990 levels by 2050,” while McCain called for “a 60[%] reduction below 1990 
levels in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.”  Bina Venkataraman, Campaigns Push 
Energy Issues to the Forefront, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 30, 2008, at A14; see also Matthew 
C. Nisbet & Teresa Myers, The Polls—Trends: Twenty Years of Public Opinion About 
Global Warming, 71 PUB. OPINION Q. 444, 446 tbl.1 (2007) (showing an increase in 
awareness of the “greenhouse effect” from 39% in 1986 to 91% in 2006). 
2 Compare Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 44,354 (proposed July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1) (stating the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator under the Bush administration 
proposes not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act), with 
Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (proposed Apr. 24, 2009) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1) [hereinafter EPA Endangerment Finding] (stating the EPA 
Administrator under the Obama administration proposes to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions under the Clean Air Act). 
3 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT 30 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ 
ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf (summarizing observed environmental changes including increases in 
global surface temperature, increases in tropical storm intensity and precipitation, 
decreases in snow and ice, and rises in sea level). 
4 The major media-based regulatory statutes were created during the administrations of 
Presidents Nixon and Ford, but neither they nor their administrations were serious about 
implementation.  Republicans and many Democrats in Congress counted on underfunding 
to ensure that the early laws would remain largely aspirational.  The Carter administration 
made serious advances, especially in the new fields of energy and hazardous waste, but the 
effort was cut short by a single-term presidency hobbled in its final year by the Iran 
hostage crisis.  The Reagan presidency not only slowed or stopped progress, but also 
consolidated control over the nation’s political vocabulary, both rendering it difficult or 
T 
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and have shown great variability in the states, where some, largely the 
coastal states, have embraced environmental policy experimentation.  
Many other states, reflecting the sustained success of the conservative 
drive to reduce government as a tool for the implementation of social 
policy,5 regulate air and water pollution at, or below, the minimum 
requirements of federal law and do not seriously address energy 
efficiency or the use of alternative energy.6 
 
impossible to contemplate, or undertake, serious use of government to address 
environmental issues and creating an atmosphere where market-based solutions were 
presumed to be superior to governmental solutions.  Some progress was made under 
George H.W. Bush, but the basic neglect of governmental capabilities and the resulting, 
programmatic atrophy continued.  The Clinton administration readdressed environmental 
concerns in an era during which the steady rise of understanding and crisis made the issue 
more urgent than during the Carter years.  Although the effort made significant strides, its 
success was both cabined by the need to proceed within the confines of a continuing 
antigovernment tenor in the political discussion and, subsequently, slowed by the Clinton 
impeachment and the conservative Republican victory in the 1994 congressional elections.  
During the presidency of George W. Bush, the nation lost ground as Europe moved to 
tackle global warming.  See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW, at xi–xiii (2004) (providing an account and analysis of the past three decades of 
environmental law); see also Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and Future of Electricity 
Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 435, 437, 466–67 (2002) (discussing President George H.W. 
Bush’s National Energy Policy). 
 The effect of vacillation at the congressional level is illustrated by the timing of changes 
in policy regarding levels of installation of wind power capacity in the United States.  The 
American Wind Energy Association tracks annual installed capacity, which shows 
conspicuously large drops in installed wind power capacity in 2000, 2002, and 2004, 
aligning with the expiration of federal production tax credits.  AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, 
WINDPOWER OUTLOOK 2009 (2009), http://www.awea.org/pubs/documents/Outlook 
_2009.pdf.  According to the report, “[e]xpirations of the federal production tax credit (in 
1999, 2001, 2003) wreak havoc on industry planning and cause drops in new installations 
(2000, 2002, 2004).”  Id. 
5 See Bob Davis et al., Unraveling Reagan: Amid Turmoil, U.S. Turns Away from 
Decades of Deregulation, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2008, at A1 (“The housing and financial 
crisis convulsing the U.S. is powering a new wave of government regulation of business 
and the economy.”). 
6 In 2007, Forbes ranked all fifty states on a scale of environmental orientation.  Brian 
Wingfield & Miriam Marcus, America’s Greenest States, FORBES.COM, Oct. 17, 2007, 
http://www.forbes.com/2007/10/16/environment-energy-vermont-biz-beltway-cx_bw_mm 
_1017greenstates.html.  The “Greenest” states were Vermont, Oregon, Washington, 
Hawaii, and Maryland.  Id.  The least green states were Kentucky, Mississippi, Louisiana, 
Alabama, Indiana, and West Virginia.  Id.  Forbes “ranked each state in six equally 
weighted categories: carbon footprint, air quality, water quality, hazardous waste 
management, policy initiatives and energy consumption.”  Id.  Forbes used the American 
Lung Association’s 2007 State of the Air Report to assess air quality, a 2007 water 
assessment by the Public Interest Research Group to assess water quality, 2005 data 
generated by the EPA to assess hazardous waste management, and the American Council 
for an Energy-Efficient Economy’s 2007 scorecard to assess energy efficiency.  Id.  
Forbes reviewed several factors—such as vehicle miles traveled—to assess energy 
consumption.  Id.  Forbes also assessed various miscellaneous criteria such as LEED 
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Now, the climate-driven rise of environmental understanding 
combines with a new political context to create a qualitatively distinct 
situation for the environmental endeavor in this country.  No 
presidency prior to the Obama administration has enjoyed such 
receptivity both to the environment as an issue and to the use of 
government to address it.  Although the population of the United 
States as a whole continues to rank the environment and global 
warming lower than other concerns such as the economy,7 awareness 
of ever more apparent environmental degradation and climate change 
continues to grow, notably among an increasing range of social and 
economic leaders, entering significant elements of the business and 
financial community,8 the labor movement,9 and some conservative 
religious groups.10  Understanding of the need to accelerate the 
development of renewable energy and energy efficiency and to reduce 
oil consumption has become more widespread.  While economic 
downturns in the past have put the environmental movement on the 
 
certifications and alternative fuel requirements.  Id.; see also infra notes 210–14 and 
accompanying text (discussing the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy 
(ACEEE) ranking of states by investment in energy efficiency). 
7 See Pew Policy Priorities, supra note 1, at 2 (ranking the public’s “top priority” 
concerns; showing energy at sixth after the economy, jobs, terrorism, social security, and 
education; and further displaying that the environment is sixteenth and global warming is 
twentieth).  Relative ranking aside, the levels of concern for the environment shown in the 
poll are quite high, with 60% of the respondents ranking energy as a top priority and 41% 
ranking the environment as a top priority.  Id.  Environmental issues are apparently well 
established in the minds of the larger public.  Even more, it appears the public recognizes 
the issues as immediately pressing. 
8 See Clifford Krauss & Kate Galbraith, Climate Bill Splits Exelon and Chamber of 
Commerce, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at B1 (reporting both the plan of Exelon, the 
country’s largest operator of nuclear power plants, to leave the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce because of the Chamber’s stance against climate change legislation and the 
plan of Pacific Gas & Electric and PNM Resources to withdraw); Kate Galbraith, Nike 
Quits Board of U.S. Chamber, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2009, at B2 (reporting the same for 
Nike); see also WORLD BUS. COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEV. & WORLD ECON. FORUM, 
CEO CLIMATE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO G8 LEADERS: JULY 2008, at 4 (2008), 
available at http://www.weforum.org/documents/initiatives/CEOStatement.pdf (stating 
that “over 80 chief executive officers of leading global companies” urge G8 leaders to take 
action on climate change). 
9 See Darren Samuelsohn & Ben Geman, House Dems Prepare to Gamble on Climate 
Bill Vote, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/06/26/ 
26climatewire-house-dems-prepare-to-gamble-on-climate-bill-36514.html?pagewanted 
=all (“The AFL-CIO, the nation’s largest labor organization, urged lawmakers to vote 
‘yes’ on the [Waxman-Markey] bill in its own letter yesterday . . . .”). 
10 See generally ELIZABETH ALLISON, GARRISON INST., RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 
TAKING ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2007), available at http://research.yale.edu/ 
environment/climate/wp-content/uploads/2007/04/religioncc0107.pdf (listing religious 
organizations with programs addressing climate change). 
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defensive,11 the recession of 2008–2010 has created a political 
climate somewhat more receptive to the use of government as a 
solution to environmental problems.12 
This Article addresses opportunities and obstacles facing the 
environmental community in its attempt to use this historic 
confluence to address the carbon emissions issue.  In fact, the nation 
has a unique opportunity for necessary policy formulation, especially 
at the federal level,13 but this Article proposes that implementation 
will pose more daunting problems rooted in decades of neglect toward 
the capacity of government, especially at the state level. 
Before addressing the obstacles, it is essential to understand that 
much can be done to reduce the nation’s carbon footprint by 
addressing sources that are susceptible to easy identification and 
abatement through processes that involve relatively familiar and 
centralized administrative effort.  Slightly less than one-third of our 
carbon emissions originates from cars, trucks, and other mobile 
sources.14  Without minimizing the political obstacles and economic 
impacts, nationwide adoption of both CO2 standards similar to those 
 
11 See infra notes 123–32 (discussing physical and social realities leading to the 
postponement of attainment deadlines for the Clean Air Act). 
12 See Davis et al., supra note 5. 
13 In the first six months of the Obama administration: 
(1) the EPA approved the California CO2 standards for mobile sources, see 
Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for 
California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744, 32,744 (proposed July 8, 2009), available at 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-15943.pdf; 
(2) the EPA proposed to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Water Act, 
EPA Endangerment Finding, supra note 2; 
(3) the House of Representatives passed a cautious, if complex, approach to 
reducing carbon emissions from the electricity sector, American Clean Energy 
and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009); and 
(4) the EPA proposed rules to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.  Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 57,126, 57,126 (proposed Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
nsr/documents/GHGTailoringProposal.pdf; see also John M. Broder, E.P.A. 
Proposes New Regulations on Industry Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2009, at A1 
(citing the reason for the EPA’s proposed action as an “unwilling[ness] to wait 
for Congress to act”). 
14 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
AND SINKS: 1990–2007, at ES-16 tbl.ES-7 (2009) [hereinafter EPA EMISSIONS 
INVENTORY] (charting U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2007 allocated by economic 
sector and further showing 28% of emissions resulted from the transportation sector, 34% 
from the electricity sector, and 19% from the industry sector). 
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of California15 and stricter fleet mileage requirements similar to the 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, enacted by 
Congress in 1975,16 will substantially reduce carbon emissions 
through relatively straightforward legislative and agency action.  
Additionally, though somewhat less centralized, the power sector, 
which contributes another third of our carbon footprint, features 
similarly “low hanging fruit.”17  Some fifty power plants in the 
United States—mostly older, inefficient coal plants—contribute 30% 
of all the carbon emissions from the power sector.18  The act of 
closing those plants and replacing them with low-carbon or no-carbon 
options, such as combinations of natural gas plants and efficiency 
services, would constitute a major step forward. 
Such results, however admirable, would constitute only the 
beginning of a serious climate effort.  A frequently stated climate goal 
calls for limiting the rise of average global temperature by two 
degrees Celsius, a target increase considered to be near or at the limit 
society can absorb without severe socioeconomic dislocations.19  
Attainment of this 2% target would require overall carbon emission 
reductions estimated to be 80% or less than emissions in various 
historic base years.20  The above-described efforts would reduce the 
 
15 See Assem. B. 1493, 2001–2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2002) (directing the California 
Air Resources Board to adopt regulations beginning in 2009).  The EPA has now taken 
action to adopt CAFE standards.  Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 
Fed. Reg. 49,454, 49,454 (Sept. 28, 2009). 
16 The Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and 49 U.S.C.), added Title V, 
“Improving Automotive Efficiency,” to the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings 
Act, Pub. L. No. 92-513, 86 Stat. 947 (1972), and established CAFE standards, 49 U.S.C. 
§§ 32902–32919 (2006). 
17 See EPA EMISSIONS INVENTORY, supra note 14, at 2–17 (charting electricity as the 
cause of 34% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions). 
18 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, eGRID, available at http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/ 
documents/egridzips/eGRID2007_Version1-1_xls_only.zip (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) 
(reporting the 2005 fuel consumption, emissions, emission rates, and resource mix for all 
4998 electric generators in the United States). 
19 See Malte Meinshausen et al., Greenhouse-Gas Emission Targets for Limiting Global 
Warming to 2° C, 458 NATURE 1158 (2009); cf. Peter Baker, Poorer Nations Reject a 
Target on Emission Cut, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2009, at A1 (stating that G8 “negotiators 
embraced a goal of preventing temperatures from rising more than 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit, 
and developing nations agreed to make ‘meaningful’ if unspecified reductions in 
emissions”). 
20 See NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 
218 (2007) (defining and quantifying “stabilisation” as requiring an emissions reduction of 
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nation’s carbon emissions by an estimated 15% to 20%.21  The rest is 
the harder work and involves substantial governmental efforts, which 
are the subject of this Article. 
Sooner rather than later, efforts to address climate and energy 
issues must involve altering patterns of energy supply and use, which 
in turn means implementing a set of policies and programs that will 
exceed our current governmental capacity.  An ambitious 
administration and an unlikely cooperative Congress could enact new 
legislation, issue new regulations, and mandate the creation of new 
markets.  While at least some regulators possess the know-how to 
implement these new imperatives, the effort will generally require a 
range of capabilities and expertise in government that does not 
currently exist.  Some of these capacity deficits exist in the federal 
government, but the most dramatic gaps will occur at the state and 
local level where programs will have to be implemented to 
substantially expand the delivery of energy efficiency services,22 the 
most immediately available and economically viable carbon reduction 
strategy. 
Government can pass a stimulus bill, for example, that dedicates 
billions of dollars for green energy efforts at the state and local 
level,23 but most states do not possess the people and expertise to 
design the necessary programs, much less spend the money.  This 
mismatch between mandate and capacity for implementation will 
 
over 80% in order to balance “the Earth’s natural capacity to remove greenhouse gases 
from the atmosphere”). 
21 The uncertainties in such a calculation tend to ensure any algorithm will suffer from 
false precision.  This Article uses the following assumptions to produce an order of 
magnitude calculation: power plants generate approximately one-third of the nation’s 
carbon emissions; the fifty coal plants with the most emissions produce half of that 
amount; and retrofitting those plants could save one-third to one-half of the amount they 
emit depending on the nature of the substitution—but assuming the substitution is not by 
efficiency or renewables.  These generalities yield 1/3 x 1/2 x (1/3 or 1/2) = 5% to 8%.  
Transportation is responsible for about a third of the nation’s carbon emissions as well.  
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  Assume that CAFE increases yield a one-third 
reduction in that amount; thus, an additional 11% reduction occurs for a total reduction of 
16% to 19% from these changes, which is rounded to the 15% to 20% mentioned in the 
Article. 
22 For a discussion of state programs with substantial experience and success in 
efficiently using funds generated by voluntary cap-and-trade programs, see infra note 195 
and accompanying text.  For a discussion of state programs with substantial experience 
and success in efficiently using funds generated by charges applied to all users, see infra 
note 202 and accompanying text. 
23 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, H.R. 1, 111th Cong. 
(enacted). 
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increase manyfold as funds from either carbon cap-and-trade 
legislation or a carbon tax search for a productive home.24  As 
discussed throughout this Article, the levels of carbon price adder 
(through a cap-and-trade regime) or a carbon tax (at any tax levels 
under discussion) will not create market effects sufficient to reduce 
carbon emissions without implementation of efficiency and demand-
response policies and programs at the state level, which would require 
expertise to implement—an expertise currently nonexistent, or in 
short supply, in most states and in much of the federal regime as well.  
The source of this lack of capacity lies in both the historic, national 
ambivalence toward using government as a tool for addressing social 
concerns and the success of the conservative movement’s efforts to 
limit governmental authority and capability.25  The result is a 
government without the tools, people, or budget to address the 
national climate and energy agenda, unless a generation of neglect of 
the public sector is reversed. 
This Article examines the need for increased capacity in 
government in two related arenas: the use of a carbon tax or cap-and-
trade regime to control carbon emissions and the need to administer 
energy markets in a way that fulfills their function and operates 
without abuse.  This Article first examines the effort to control carbon 
emissions, discussing the governmental efforts that will be necessary 
to administer either a carbon tax or cap-and-trade regime.26  It then 
advances the thesis that the political and structural realities associated 
with our dependence on fossil fuel-based transportation and electricity 
generation make it unlikely that either approach can reduce carbon 
emissions solely through the market effect of increased carbon prices.  
Rather, this Article proposes that, for the next decade and likely the 
two after that, a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system can achieve 
carbon reductions largely through a combination of regulatory 
policies embedded in the legislation and the investment of the 
revenues resulting from the tax or carbon allowance sales in new 
government-directed programs to deliver energy efficiency and 
demand-response services on a nationwide basis.27  In theory, either a 
 
24 See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.; see 
also, e.g., Save Our Climate Act of 2009, H.R. 594, 111th Cong.; America’s Energy 
Security Trust Fund Act of 2009, H.R. 1337, 111th Cong.; Raise Wages, Cut Carbon Act 
of 2009, H.R. 2380, 111th Cong. 
25 See Davis et al., supra note 5. 
26 See infra Part I.A. 
27 See infra Parts I.B., I.C. 
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tax or a cap-and-trade system could generate the financial resources 
necessary.  However, while some states have developed the 
bureaucracies and skills necessary to run such programs,28 most have 
not and need to be incentivized to change course. 
This Article then examines the need for government regulation in 
the electricity sector as a whole, focusing on both the nation’s 
experimentation with markets, specifically the wholesale electricity 
market, and the move toward restructuring in many states.29  This 
Article contends that, while wholesale electricity markets are a 
necessary part of any modern system, such markets work only if 
carefully imbedded in a governmental regulatory regime.30  The move 
to restructure traditional command-and-control regulation and the 
move toward reliance on retail electricity markets in some states have 
failed to deliver financial benefits to consumers, have changed the 
cast of characters in the electricity system in ways that do not improve 
it, and have placed burdens on the American transmission grid.31  In 
general, markets have failed to produce the anticipated benefits, and 
government as regulator has emerged as the necessary paradigm. 
I 
CARBON TAX OR CAP AND TRADE, IT ALL COMES BACK TO 
GOVERNMENT 
As of this writing, the U.S. House of Representatives has passed 
and the Senate is considering complex cap-and-trade approaches to 
reduce carbon emissions from the power sector.32  Carbon tax 
 
28 See infra Part I.A. 
29 See infra Part II. 
30 See infra Part II.D. 
31 See SETH A. BLUMSACK ET AL., CARNEGIE MELLON ELEC. INDUS. CTR., COMMENTS 
ON WHOLESALE AND RETAIL ELECTRICITY COMPETITION 2 (2005), 
http://wpweb2.tepper.cmu.edu/ceic/pdfs_other/FERC_Comments_11_18_05.pdf (“Our 
research shows that there is no evidence that restructuring has produced any measurable 
benefit to consumers or to the systems which have restructured.”); see also Timothy P. 
Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE J. 
ON REG. 471, 489–90 (2002) (differentiating electricity from other industries in which 
deregulation was successful). 
32 See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.; 
GovTrack.us, H.R. 2454: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2454 (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). 
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proposals are under consideration as well.33  For reasons explained 
below, neither approach works in the absence of increased 
governmental capacity.  Both systems need substantial regulatory 
effort just to function, although a tax is much simpler to administer.  
In addition, neither the carbon “cap” nor any politically realistic level 
of carbon tax or carbon allowance cost will, operating alone, reduce 
carbon emissions.34  The advantage of both systems lies in the related 
policies that may be enacted and the funds the carbon price adder or 
tax will generate.  In the short and medium term, these funds and 
policies must support energy efficiency and demand response 
(together referred to as demand-side management or DSM), by far the 
cheapest and most readily available means to reduce carbon 
emissions.35  The bulk of that investment must occur through 
government policies, programs, and structures that do not yet exist in 
most states.  Thus, regardless of the legislative approach selected at 
the federal level, a successful carbon strategy will require substantial 
investment in new governmental capacity, especially at the state level. 
A.  Both Cap-and-Trade and Tax Regimes Require Substantial 
Governmental Presence for Basic Operation 
When considering a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program, most 
public observers and advocates tend to focus on the operation of the 
market rather than government to achieve the intended effect.  As 
discussed later, neither will achieve its ends primarily through market 
effect, but at the outset, it is important to note that the basic operation 
 
33 See, e.g., Save Our Climate Act of 2009, H.R. 594, 111th Cong.; America’s Energy 
Security Trust Fund Act of 2009, H.R. 1337, 111th Cong.; Raise Wages, Cut Carbon Act 
of 2009, H.R. 2380, 111th Cong. 
34 See Richard Cowart, Carbon Caps and Efficiency Resources: How Climate 
Legislation Can Mobilize Efficiency and Lower the Cost of Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Reduction, 33 VT. L. REV. 201, 208–09, 211–12 (2008) [hereinafter Cowart, Carbon 
Caps] (discussing the incorrect assumption that a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program will 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions significantly without reinvestment into efficiency 
programs); see also The Consumer Allocation for Efficiency: How Allowance Allocations 
Can Protect Consumers, Mobilize Efficiency, and Contain the Costs of GHG Reduction: 
Hearing on H.R. 2454 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Environment of the H. Comm. 
on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Richard Cowart, Dir., 
Regulatory Assistance Project) [hereinafter Cowart, Testimony] (stating “[p]rice is not 
enough.  While one of the essential purposes of cap-and-trade systems and carbon tax 
proposals is to deliver a price signal to producers and consumers of energy, a climate 
program that attempts to reduce emissions through price alone will be much more costly 
than a comprehensive program that includes proven techniques to deliver low-carbon 
resources, especially cost-effective efficiency resources” (emphasis omitted)). 
35 See infra notes 150–52 and accompanying text. 
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of either approach would be a substantial, new governmental 
presence. 
It is axiomatic, of course, that a tax requires a taxing authority, and, 
in the United States, such an effort would be carried out by the federal 
government through the Internal Revenue Service.36  The tax itself 
would involve substantial implementation issues, although much less 
so than the complexities of a cap-and-trade regime.  Any 
congressional system will merely set forth the basic policies for the 
tax—whether the tax is narrowly focused on electricity or extends to 
the manufacturing, building, or transportation sectors.  Similarly, 
Congress will determine whether the tax is imposed at one of the 
following points: far “upstream,” where oil and gas are imported into 
the United States; more downstream, at some intermediate point such 
as the manufacture of cars and trucks and the generation of electricity; 
or even further downstream, to the point of actual energy 
consumption.37  The legislation will also set out exemptions and 
exclusions, the point at which political pressures assert themselves in 
a taxation scheme, rendering potentially simple legislation complex.  
Once these policies are set, agencies of the federal government will 
need to create regulations and guidelines to apply these principles to a 
relatively small number of upstream users (possibly built on top of 
existing taxes) or, if further downstream, to hundreds of thousands of 
business taxpayers. 
The tax would likely be levied in terms of a certain dollar amount 
per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent, that is the tax rate multiplied by 
the number of tons, or fraction of tons, of carbon emitted by 
combustion of a unit of the taxed material.38  A simple, if 
unrealistically high, tax example would operate as follows: if the 
carbon tax were $100 per ton of CO2 equivalent and combustion of a 
 
36 Janet E. Milne, Carbon Taxes in the United States: The Context for the Future, 10 
VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 29–30 (2008) (summarizing the similarities and differences between 
carbon taxes and cap-and-trade programs). 
37 See H.R. 594 § 3; H.R. 1337 § 2; H.R. 2380 § 2; see also Janet E. Milne, Carbon 
Taxes Versus Cap-and-Trade: The Relative Burdens and Risks of Market-Based 
Administration, in 7 CRITICAL ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION: INTERNATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 445 (Lin-Heng Lye et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the 
comparative structure of carbon taxes and cap and trade, while pointing to the relative 
simplicity of the former). 
38 Stephan Speck, The Design of Carbon and Broad-Based Energy Taxes in European 
Countries, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 31, 44 (2008) (describing the schemes by which CO2 taxes 
are levied in Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom and showing 
Denmark’s tax of EUR 12 per ton of CO2). 
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barrel of oil was deemed to produce 0.43 metric tons of CO2 
emissions,39 then the tax would be $43 per barrel.  Some entity needs 
to quantify these equivalents and, if appropriate in light of how far 
downstream the tax is imposed, disaggregate the carbon equivalents 
and allocate them to the sources taxed, an exercise quite complex and 
laden with value judgments.40  Thus, implementation of a carbon tax 
will require substantial effort at the federal level. 
The basic operation of a cap-and-trade system presents complexity 
of a different order of magnitude and at all levels of government.  
Many proposals would create new bureaucracies to implement and 
watchdog the system at the national level.41  Existing cap-and-trade 
systems in the United States and in Europe and the proposals 
currently before Congress all share a common feature: a proposed cap 
of total carbon emissions that declines over time.42  The cap is 
expressed in terms of tons of CO2 or an equivalent for other 
substances that contribute more to the greenhouse effect.43  The 
legislation will likely set the cap, its rate of decline, and target year 
 
39 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Clean Energy: Calculations and References, 
http://www.epa.gov/cleanrgy/energy-resources/refs.html#oil (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). 
40 See Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 523 (2007) (discussing where to impose the carbon tax and the 
benefits of imposing the tax upstream). 
41 See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
§ 113(a)(1) (establishing a carbon capture and sequestration task force); id. § 171(a) 
(establishing eight Energy Innovation Hubs); id. § 182 (establishing the Clean Energy 
Deployment Administration); id. § 198 (establishing the Office of Consumer Advocacy 
and the Consumer Advocacy Advisory Committee); id. § 215 (establishing the 
WaterSense program within the EPA); id. § 223 (establishing the SmartWay Transport 
Program within the EPA); id. § 331 (proposing addition of § 731 to the Clean Air Act) 
(establishing the Offsets Integrity Advisory Board); id. § 452 (establishing the National 
Climate Service); id. § 475 (establishing the Natural Resources Climate Change 
Adaptation Panel); id. § 493(a) (establishing the International Climate Change Adaptation 
Program). 
42 See, e.g., id. § 311 (proposing addition of § 721(e) to the Clean Air Act); see also 
Council Directive 2003/87/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EU) (creating the European Union 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading System (EU ETS)); Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 
Participating States: State Regulations, http://www.rggi.org/states/state_regulations (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2010) (listing each state statute or regulation implementing the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)). 
43 For example, in terms of greenhouse effect, which is the atmosphere’s containment of 
heat, methane is estimated to have twenty-one times the effect of CO2, and, thus, a ton of 
methane emissions would be considered the equivalent of twenty-one carbon allowances.  
Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 40, at 504 (stating methane has a hundred-year global 
warming potential of twenty-one, which means that one ton of methane emissions has the 
same climate change impact as twenty-one tons of CO2). 
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for achieving a stated percentage reduction,44 but some federal entity 
must define the cap in more specific terms.45  The science behind 
equivalencies is fairly well advanced; however, the issue is not 
without its controversy, and the definitions will need to be the subject 
of an administrative process. 
The system begins with a base year, for example, 1990, 1995, or 
2005.46  Again, some entity will have to calculate the total tons of 
carbon emissions within the United States as of that year.  This 
involves assembling an inventory of all sources of carbon emissions 
and constructing a quantification of the base year emissions47 through 
recorded throughputs or modeling, a considerable challenge, likely 
subject to controversy.  In addition to the base year, existing and 
proposed cap-and-trade systems feature a stated target percentage 
reduction from the base year in a target year, for example, a 50% or 
80% reduction in carbon emissions from the base year by 2050.48  
The system will then mandate successive reductions in the cap.  Some 
proposals require steady reductions over the effective period of the 
legislation, while others rely on less frequent and steeper declines.49  
In either case, a governmental entity will need to track carbon 
 
44 See H.R. 2454 § 311 (proposing addition of § 721(e) to the Clean Air Act) (defining 
declining emission allowances for every year from 2012 to 2050). 
45 See id. § 311 (proposing addition of § 712(b)(1) to the Clean Air Act) (defining 
carbon dioxide equivalencies for purposes of the Clean Air Act).  Proposed section 
712(c)(1) of the Clean Air Act states that the EPA Administrator shall conduct the tasks 
associated with setting the CO2 cap, including reviewing the carbon dioxide-equivalent 
values of greenhouse gases every five years.  Id. 
46 See id. § 335 (proposing addition of § 861 to the Clean Air Act); infra note 194 
(describing the voluntary cap-and-trade programs).  In negotiations with the G8 in July 
2009, the United States insisted on language that leaves uncertain “the starting year against 
which emissions reductions will be measured.”  John M. Broder & James Kanter, Despite 
Shift on Climate by U.S., Europe Is Wary, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2009, at A9.  The 
Europeans prefer 1990, “which would require much steeper near-term emission cuts, while 
the United States, Australia and Japan [prefer] a 2005 benchmark.”  Id. 
47 See, e.g., H.R. 2454 § 311 (proposing addition of § 721(e) to the Clean Air Act) 
(setting the base at 4627 million emission allowances in 2012). 
48 See, e.g., id. (calling for a 77.6% reduction from 2012 to 2050); see also infra note 
195 (elaborating on state programs with substantial experience and success in efficiently 
using funds generated by voluntary cap-and-trade programs).  As of this writing, the 
Obama administration agrees with the Europeans on an aspirational goal of a 50% 
reduction by 2050.  Broder & Kanter, supra note 46. 
49 Compare, e.g., H.R. 2454 § 311 (proposing addition of § 721(e)(1) to the Clean Air 
Act) (defining specific emissions reductions for every year between 2012 to 2050), with, 
e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 
3, para. 1, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (defining one emissions reduction of 5% below 
1990 levels by 2012). 
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emissions over time through inventories, modeling, or a combination 
thereof in order both to determine whether covered emitters are in 
compliance with the downward steps and to determine the progress of 
regions, states, and the nation as a whole toward reducing carbon. 
In order to make the scheme functional, entities actually 
responsible for the carbon emissions in the aggregate have to reduce 
their emissions from the levels of the base year to the levels necessary 
to achieve the progressive reductions in the cap.  Cap-and-trade 
schemes accomplish this reduction in the electricity sector through a 
system of distribution, by auction (preferred by proponents of carbon 
reduction) or the no-cost allocation (preferred by emitters) of rights to 
emit carbon, called carbon credits or allowances.  The scheme 
mandates that each of these carbon sources only continue to emit 
carbon dioxide if the source possesses and then uses or retires the 
number of carbon allowances that reflect the tons of carbon it emits or 
consumes.50  Such carbon allowances will thus have a high value and 
importance, either (1) as the “currency” under the cap-and-trade 
scheme required to generate electricity or to purchase electricity 
generated by sources that produce carbon emissions, or (2) as a 
commodity that can be sold, if the possessing entity has excess 
allowances to sell on carbon allowance markets, to other entities that, 
in turn, need the carbon allowances for power generation or want to 
resell or option the allowances. 
For example, a system that power companies prefer could, upon 
the start date, allocate a number of carbon allowances equal to its 
current carbon emissions at no cost to each power-generating entity.  
Those carbon allowances would have a life equal to the applicable 
period.  If, for example, the legislation required a downward step each 
three years, the allowance could have a three-year life or less, as it 
could be three successive one-year allowances.  At the end of the 
three-year period, a fewer number of carbon allowances would be 
issued to the generating entity reflecting the required reduction in 
emissions; a downward step of 10%, for example, would result in the 
 
50 See generally H.R. 2454.  In any cap-and-trade system, allowances are issued and 
tracked by a governmental authority.  When allowances are “used,” that is, “retired,” the 
user notifies the administering agency, which then records that those allowances have been 
consumed and may not be used again.  The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 
2009 defines “retire” within the cap-and-trade program as “to disqualify such allowance or 
offset credit for any subsequent use under this title.”  Id. § 312 (proposing addition of § 
700(42) to the Clean Air Act). 
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issuance of 10% fewer allowances for the period.51  The supervising 
governmental entity would need to devise a system to allocate the cap 
among a group of sources it defines and inventories by determining 
the amount of current carbon emissions and, subsequently, 
administering the reduction in the allocation to the entities as the 
national cap declines.  Such a task is not dissimilar (though with 
fewer sources) to the effort required at the state and local level to 
apply the ambient air standards and timetables in the Clean Air Act to 
every source of emissions in the United States, a federal, state, and 
regional effort in collaborative government that required nearly five 
decades to develop.52 
Note that the example above involving the allocation of allowances 
to generators, while preferred by the generators themselves, is most 
problematic.  When the time comes to reduce the needed number of 
carbon allowances, the generator has few real options.  Carbon cap 
and trade presents very different realities to a power producer than the 
control of other pollution types such as sulfur dioxide, where the 
emitters can elect to install pollution control devices to reduce 
emissions.53  There exists no “scrubber” for carbon, no simple way to 
abate it through an add-on pollution control device.54  Thus, the 
generator has only a few, unpalatable choices: it can downsize its 
production, likely by shutting down some generating units; it can 
replace older, inefficient generating units with new generators that 
produce more megawatts per ton of CO2 emitted; or, as described 
below, it could purchase carbon allowances on a market for 
allowances created by the legislation.  None of these approaches 
 
51 See id. § 311 (proposing addition of § 721(e)(1) to the Clean Air Act).  Section 5.2 of 
the 2008 edition of RGGI’s model rule provides for the issuance of allowances every three 
years.  REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 
MODEL RULE § 5.2 (2008), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/Model%20Rule 
%20Revised%2012.31.08.pdf. 
52 See Regan J.R. Smith, Playing the Acid Rain Game: A State’s Remedies, 16 ENVTL. 
L. 255, 265 (1986) (presenting an overview of the administration of the Clean Air Act 
“utilizing state devised implementation plans to meet federally promulgated air quality 
standards”). 
53 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Reducing Acid Rain, http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/ 
reducing/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) (listing options for reducing sulfur dioxide 
emissions, including the installation of relatively inexpensive scrubbers). 
54 Carbon sequestration is, at best, in the demonstration stage.  Implementation presents 
daunting physical, economic, and legal obstacles.  See CCSREG PROJECT, CARBON 
CAPTURE AND SEQUESTRATION: FRAMING THE ISSUES FOR REGULATION 1–4 (2009) 
[hereinafter CCSREG INTERIM REPORT], available at http://www.ccsreg.org/pdf/CCSReg 
_3_9.pdf. 
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works well for a given generator over time.  Downsizing means going 
out of business.  Installing new units works only for older plants, and 
once that effort is complete, the option is no longer available.  
Purchasing carbon allowances will become increasingly expensive 
and difficult over time as the cap declines. 
Better systems would distribute the carbon allowances to 
consumers via a local electric service provider, such as an investor-
owned utility, a municipal utility, an electric cooperative, frequently 
referred to as a local distribution company (LDC), or some other 
consumer trustee.  The distribution amount would be set by a formula 
reflecting the electricity sold within the service area in the base year.  
The LDC would then be incentivized to utilize its allowances in the 
most efficient way by shopping for the least carbon-consuming 
electricity supply options, potentially using less than the allotted 
allowances and selling the remainders on the carbon allowance 
market.  In one iteration of this approach, these LDCs would be the 
ones charged with retiring one carbon allowance for each ton of CO2 
emissions caused by the generation of the electricity they distribute.  
The entity would, in essence, “use up” the allowances as it shopped 
for and purchased power, including from itself in the case of a utility 
that both purchases power and owns its own generation.55  This local 
service entity or consumer trustee would spend one allowance for 
each ton of carbon emitted by the sources from which it obtained 
power. 
This approach would present the owner of the carbon allowances 
(e.g., the local service provider) with choices that are more 
meaningful than those facing the generator in the above example, and 
this scheme would facilitate the policy goals of the cap-and-trade 
system.  While the generator has few options for reducing carbon, the 
local provider would start with a given number of allowances that it 
would be incentivized to use in the most carbon-efficient manner, 
buying the most power it could for the least number of allowances 
because, if it saved allowances, it could sell them on a carbon 
allowance market or possibly bank them for a future period depending 
on the banking provisions of the applicable legislation.  In any case, 
the local provider would not want to exceed its supply of allowances 
since it would then have to purchase allowances in the market, an 
 
55 See RICHARD COWART, THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, EFFICIENT 
RELIABILITY: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF DEMAND-SIDE RESOURCES IN POWER SYSTEMS 
AND MARKETS 63–64 (2001). 
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expense it would have to pass on to unhappy consumers.  Thus 
motivated to seek an efficient use of its carbon allowances, the local 
electricity provider or consumer trustee would likely prefer wind as a 
source of power over natural gas and natural gas over coal.  Most 
significantly, the local entity would likely invest in efficiency to 
reduce its demand so it could sell excess credits.56 
The formula for distribution of this initial national carbon cap 
among local distribution companies would likely be determined 
through national legislation and could be based either on current 
carbon emissions, on population, on current electricity sales, or on 
some form of combination, a determination fraught with economic 
and political consequences that cannot be overstated.  The formula 
determines, in significant part, which geographic regions and which 
industrial, commercial, and residential consumers will bear the 
economic costs of the transition to a low-carbon economy.  The terms 
of the formula will either reward or not reward the carbon efficiency 
of the current energy regime within each of the electric service areas.  
A distribution by current emissions would benefit geographic areas of 
the country with the highest carbon emissions per kilowatt-hour 
(kWh) sold.  These regions generally rely on coal-fired plants to 
produce electricity and include the oldest plants, which contribute the 
greatest part of CO2 emissions from the electricity sector.57  Such a 
distribution formula would disadvantage areas of the country that 
have historically relied on hydroelectric or natural gas generation 
 
56 Id.  Note that the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 employs a hybrid 
approach.  H.R. 2454 § 312 (proposing addition of § 700(13), which defines covered 
entities, to the Clean Air Act).  In the industrial sector, the Act provides that the EPA 
would allocate emission allowances directly to certain large industrial sources.  Id. § 115 
(proposing addition of § 786(f) to the Clean Air Act).  In the electricity sector, LDCs 
receive an allocation of carbon allowances as described in the text of this Article, but it is 
the generators that are the “covered entities,” which means the generators must obtain 
carbon allowances in order to operate in an amount reflecting their emissions.  See id. § 
321 (proposing addition of § 782 to the Clean Air Act).  The Act is silent on how the 
allowances will flow from the LDCs to the generators.  Some LDCs that do not own 
generation—“wirescos” that simply provide distribution and customer services—will shop 
around for carbon-efficient sources and, if they can, will both prefer efficiency or low-
carbon generation (such as wind) over natural gas and prefer natural gas over coal.  In 
those cases, the system may operate to reduce carbon.  However, LDCs that own both their 
own generation and distribution may simply transfer the allowances at no cost to 
themselves or to their generator affiliates.  In that situation, the system operates much like 
one that distributes allowances to generators, unless customers are able to pressure 
commissions to enact procurement policies that force the integrated LDCs to either search 
elsewhere for power or implement efficiency services. 
57 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 18. 
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plants or have invested substantially in energy efficiency and 
alternative energy to reduce emissions.  Conversely, distribution 
based on the number of electricity customers, the amount of kilowatt-
hour sales, or population will benefit those regions that serve each 
customer with the lowest CO2 emissions per capita or per unit of 
electricity sold.  Not surprisingly, both the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI) and the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 
2009 address this difficult issue with compromise.58 
Regardless of which entity the carbon allowances are distributed 
to, the burden of administration will be high.  The allowances will be 
distributed either freely (preferred by generators and utilities), 
through auction (preferred by economists and other policy advocates 
for carbon reduction), or through a combination.  In either case, 
whether carbon allowances are assigned to generators, to consumers 
via a trustee or local provider, or some combination thereof, the 
requisite emission levels and resulting number of allowances needed 
to operate must be determined for individual sources or service areas. 
If the allowances are distributed without an auction, the 
distribution must be carried out and monitored.  An auction would not 
relieve the administrative burden; even if sources or service areas 
must purchase their allowances at auction, a governmental entity must 
determine the number of allowances they require under the cap-and-
trade system in order to emit or cause the emission of CO2.  In the 
event the initial allowance distribution is by auction, the auction must 
be run.  Whichever approach is chosen in the legislation, the stakes 
will be so high that implementation will inevitably invite controversy.  
In addition, some governmental entity will need to administer the 
declining cap, a complex task that involves repeating the 
aforementioned burden of calculation, monitoring, and enforcement at 
each downward step of the distribution of total carbon allowances. 
In any cap-and-trade regime, government will also need the 
capacity to address the “trade” part of the cap and trade, a feature 
designed to build flexibility into the system and to promote efficient 
use of the economic resources necessary to reduce carbon 
emissions.59  Whether the distribution is to consumer entities or to 
 
58 See infra note 195 (discussing the RGGI in detail); see also H.R. 2454 § 321 
(proposing addition of § 782(a)(2), (b) to the Clean Air Act) (providing for the allocation 
of allowances for renewable electricity, energy efficiency, and low-income ratepayer 
assistance and for the allocation of allowances to “avoid disincentives to the continued use 
of existing energy-efficient cogeneration facilities”). 
59 See id. § 311 (proposing addition of § 724 to the Clean Air Act). 
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generators, those unable to reduce carbon emissions as the cap 
declines will have the option of purchasing carbon allowances on a 
carbon market, and those entities that have excess allowances can sell 
into the market and retain the resulting income for their consumers or 
shareholders.60  Those entities that find it most economically efficient 
to make investments that reduce carbon emissions, whether through 
changes to the generating process or through investment in demand-
side management, will do so and sell into the market, and entities that 
find investing to reduce emissions less economically efficient will 
purchase allowances on the market, at least in theory. 
As discussed above, generators do not possess the same range of 
choices for carbon reduction as they do for other sources of pollution.  
Thus, if allocation is made to them, this benefit of the market may not 
materialize.  In any case, all systems will feature a market, and 
someone has to administer it.61  This function will require expansion 
of governmental capabilities because no such national market exists at 
this time.  The Clean Air Act created a cap-and-trade system to 
control sulfur dioxide (SO2), but the SO2 markets present fewer 
complexities and are much smaller in scale than CO2 markets.62  In 
terms of the gross value of anticipated trades, a national carbon 
market would constitute the largest formal trading regime in the 
world.  Government will need to set rules and monitor the results of 
the market.  Government will need to create a system of market 
monitoring that will discourage the exercise of market power by 
actors manipulating the market, a substantial problem requiring 
solutions beyond those traditionally employed.63 
 
60 Id. 
61 See id. § 311 (proposing addition of § 721 to the Clean Air Act); see also Clean Air 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o (2006) (establishing the SO2 cap-and-trade program).  For 
a discussion of the lack of a “scrubber” for CO2 comparable to the inexpensive and readily 
available “scrubber” for SO2, see supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
62 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 53; see also Holly Doremus & W. Michael 
Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism 
Framework Is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 812 (2008) 
(discussing how, although sulfur dioxide regulation effectively targeted power plants—a 
narrow group, such a system would not work for the regulation of greenhouse gases 
because reducing these gases requires regulation of a much larger portion of the economy). 
63 See infra Part II.D (discussing special monitoring concerns of energy markets).  
RGGI, for example, is monitored by Potomac Economics, an independent market monitor.  
RGGI, CO2 Auctions: Market Monitor Reports, http://www.rggi.org/co2-auctions/ 
market_monitor (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).  Potomac Economics releases a Market 
Monitor Report after each auction.  See id.  The Market Monitor Report assesses both 
compliance with auction rules and procedures and attempts to manipulate auction prices.  
Potomac Economics, Practice Areas: Emissions Allowance Market Monitoring, 
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In addition to the administration of caps, base and target years, and 
initial and subsequent distributions of carbon allowances, any system 
that applies to a geographically delimited area must also address the 
issue of “leakage”—the sale of electricity generated from outside the 
area to consumers inside the area.  The location of a carbon source 
makes no difference for the underlying policy purpose of reducing 
greenhouse gases; carbon emissions from any location are eventually 
distributed throughout the atmosphere.  The cap-and-trade system 
must therefore operate in a manner that does not simply move carbon-
emitting activities from within the subject jurisdiction to other 
regions.  In RGGI, for example, “leakage” would refer to sales of 
electricity generated outside the area to customers inside the ten-state 
RGGI area, say by plants in Pennsylvania or Ohio, which are not 
RGGI member states.64  In any national scheme, “leakage” would 
refer to generation located outside of the United States but serving its 
citizens.65  For example, a substantial and increasing portion of the 
electricity consumed in the Southern California region is generated by 
plants located in northern Mexico or in neighboring states.66  In the 
 
http://www.potomaceconomics.com/practice_areas/emissions_allowance_market_monitor
ing (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). 
64 The states participating in RGGI are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.  
RGGI, Participating States, http://www.rggi.org/states (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). 
65 See H.R. 2454 § 312 (proposing addition of § 700(33) to the Clean Air Act) (defining 
“leakage” as a “significant increase in greenhouse gas emissions, or significant decrease in 
sequestration, which is caused by an offset project or activities under part E and occurs 
outside the boundaries of the offset project or the relevant program or project under part 
E”). 
66 In 2003, California generated 78% of its energy in state and received 14% from 
southwestern imports.  ADAM PAN & RON WETHERALL, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2003 
NET SYSTEM POWER CALCULATION 3 tbl.2 (2004), available at http://www.energy 
.ca.gov/reports/2004-05-05_300-04-001R.PDF.  Comparatively, California generated 68% 
of its energy in state and received 24% from southwestern imports five years later.  
MICHAEL NYBERG, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2008 NET SYSTEM POWER REPORT 5 tbl.2 
(2009), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2009publications/CEC-200-2009-010/CEC 
-200-2009-010-CMF.PDF.  In five years, 10% of California’s consumed power moved 
from California to plants located in the southwestern region.  See id.; see also MIGNON 
MARKS & AL ALVARADO, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, NET SYSTEM POWER: A SMALL 
SHARE OF CALIFORNIA’S POWER MIX IN 2005, at 5 tbl.2 (2006), available at 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-300-2006-009/CEC-300-2006-009-D 
.PDF; DARYL METZ & MICHAEL NYBERG, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2007 NET SYSTEM 
POWER REPORT 5 tbl.2 (2008), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2008publications/ 
CEC-200-2008-002/CEC-200-2008-002-CMF.PDF; ADAM PAN, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 
2006 NET SYSTEM POWER REPORT 4 tbl.2 (2007), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
2007publications/CEC-300-2007-007/CEC-300-2007-007.PDF; ADAM PAN & TERRY 
EWING, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2004 NET SYSTEM POWER CALCULATION 2 tbl.1 (2005), 
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absence of such leakage provisions, those external carbon emissions 
would not count toward the cap, and carbon sources would be 
incentivized to locate either outside the United States or in states that 
have more “headroom” for carbon consumption. 
This would replicate the unfortunate history of “export” of sources 
of criteria pollutant under the Clean Air Act.  Southern California 
utilities, for example, have sought to avoid the offset and other 
substantial barriers to the location of new sources of emissions within 
the San Diego and Southern California Air Quality Management 
Districts by utilizing energy from power plants in New Mexico, 
Arizona, and, as noted above, Mexico.67  Similarly, the cap-and-trade 
system could encourage such outsourcing of carbon emissions unless 
the regime contained leakage provisions that cover external emissions 
from sources serving the covered area.68  International accords may 
address this issue, but, until they do, any national scheme must 
include leakage provisions. 
The administration of leakage provisions creates extraordinarily 
complex definitional, permitting, monitoring, and enforcement 
activities by the applicable agencies.69  This administration poses 
complex accounting burdens and verification issues involved in 
obtaining accurate data about sources outside the affected jurisdiction.  
Even more difficult administrative issues are posed by another sort of 
leakage via “trade affected emitters.”  These emitters are industries 
that have increased costs of business due to the cost of carbon 
allowances, rendering them less competitive than similar facilities 
located outside the covered region, thus encouraging the “leakage” or 
out-migration of these exposed industries.  Advocates for these 
industries propose a free allocation of allowances, again posing 
 
available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-300-2005-004/CEC-300      
-2005-004.PDF. 
67 See sources cited supra note 66. 
68 OFFICE OF ATMOSPHERIC PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA ANALYSIS 
OF THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009 H.R. 2454 IN THE 111TH 
CONGRESS, app. 5, at 67–77 (2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ 
economics/pdfs/HR2454_Analysis_Appendix.pdf (discussing the need to regulate leakage 
in an appendix entitled “Global Results: Trade Impacts, Emissions Leakage, and Output-
Based Allocation Scenario”). 
69 Id.  The issue is sufficiently daunting that as of April 2008, despite widespread 
recognition of the question and substantial effort toward a solution, the only action RGGI 
had taken to address leakage was to issue a report recommending that RGGI states monitor 
for leakage and implement leakage mitigation measures.  See REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS 
INITIATIVE, POTENTIAL EMISSIONS LEAKAGE AND THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS 
INITIATIVE (RGGI) 41–42 (2008), available at http://rggi.org/docs/ 20080331leakage.pdf. 
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difficult distributional and equity considerations for administrative 
agencies.70 
In addition to these challenges, most existing and proposed systems 
contain offset provisions, which allow the applicable private or 
governmental entity responsible for retiring carbon allowances to 
offset existing or new sources of CO2 emissions with reductions in 
emissions achieved through various means, such as planting forests, 
which create carbon “sinks” and absorb carbon, or closing down other 
sources of emissions.71  Experience with similar provisions in the 
European market regime implemented pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol 
indicates the potential for substantial abuse.  Some offsets, for 
example, involve regimes that can lose their carbon-absorbing 
capabilities, such as forests planted but not maintained.72  Some 
offsets may even involve the “closing” of carbon-emitting plants that 
would never have been operated in any case or that were built simply 
 
70 An alternative to the slippery slope resulting from free distribution to some industries 
but not others would be the imposition of carbon-based tariffs on products imported from 
nonparticipating regions.  Opinions differ on whether such tariffs should be used.  
Compare John M. Broder, Climate Bill Is Threatened by Senators, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 
2009, at A12 (reporting that ten senators “seen as crucial undecided votes in the Senate 
debate on climate legislation” called for “‘border adjustments,’ tariffs, on goods from 
countries that do not agree to an international program for carbon dioxide reductions”), 
with Greg Hitt & Naftali Bendavid, Obama Wary of Tariff Provision, WALL ST. J., June 
29, 2009, at A3 (reporting that President Obama found objectionable provisions of climate 
change legislation imposing “tariffs on goods from countries that don’t match U.S. efforts 
to combat global warming”). 
71 See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
§ 502(a) (establishing offset allowances for greenhouse gas emission reductions or 
avoidance); id. § 503 (listing eligible practices). 
72 Mike Shanahan, Chinese Tree Scheme to Help Climate, Wildlife and Locals, 
SCIDEV.NET, May 24, 2005, http://www.scidev.net/en/news/chinese-tree-scheme-to-help   
-climate-wildlife-and.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2010) (discussing China’s plans to design 
tree planting programs with the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism in mind, 
and, unlike large plantings of non-native trees in the 1990s, China plans on planting native 
species); Barbara Stark, Sustainable Development and Postmodern International Law: 
Greener Globalization?, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 163–64 (2002) 
(discussing the economic incentives of the Kyoto Protocol and the unintended result of 
unsustainable monoculture tree plantations (citing FRIENDS OF THE EARTH INT’L ET AL., 
TREE TROUBLE: A COMPILATION OF TESTIMONIES ON THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF LARGE-
SCALE TREE PLANTATIONS PREPARED FOR THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTIONS ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE (2001) (describing the negative effects of monoculture tree plantations in Central 
and South America, Europe, and Africa)); Jonathan Watts, China Steps Up Reforestation 
Drive Amid Fears for Ecosystems, GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 12, 2009, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/mar/11/china-forests-deforestation 
(discussing China’s monoculture forests that deplete water supplies and lack biodiversity 
despite claims of their ability to capture carbon). 
 428 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 405 
to close.73  Some governmental entity needs to perform the 
permitting, accounting, and monitoring of this system to ensure that 
the offsets constitute real net reductions in carbon, remain real, and do 
not create other ecological harms deemed unacceptable.  In sum, the 
successful administration of carbon tax proposals and cap-and-trade 
systems will require complex new governmental regimes. 
B.  Neither Carbon Emission Caps, nor the Price of Carbon 
Allowances, nor a Carbon Tax Will Operate to Reduce Emissions 
For systemic and practical reasons, the market effect of the tax 
itself in a carbon tax scheme or the price of a carbon allowance and 
the cap itself in a cap-and-trade system will not make a significant 
contribution to the reduction of carbon emissions.  The levy of a tax 
on carbon will not likely operate to reduce emissions due to a lack of 
the political will necessary to impose a tax that would be high enough 
to reduce demand through market forces.74  The likely price of a 
carbon allowance in a cap-and-trade regime similarly will not reach a 
price sufficient to reduce electricity demand or cause a shift from 
either coal to natural gas or natural gas to renewables.  Many market 
barriers to efficiency services cannot be overcome by price increases 
in carbon-based generation, but rather require policy-based solutions.  
Finally, even if legislation mandates a reduction in carbon emissions 
through declining caps aimed at certain percentage reductions by a 
target year, political and economic realities will force Congress to 
raise the cap or extend the deadlines unless adequate alternatives to 
fossil fuel-based generation are in place to make timely compliance 
feasible.75 
 
73 See Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance 
and Potential, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1759, 1783–89 (2008) (discussing how manufacturers in 
developing countries purposely overproduce certain greenhouse gases simply to capture 
and destroy them, thereby generating Certified Emissions Reduction allowances). 
74 Brian C. Murray & Heather Hosterman, Climate Change, Cap-and-Trade and the 
Outlook for U.S. Policy, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 699, 706 (2009) (stating that, 
when comparing a cap-and-trade program to a carbon tax, there is a concern with the 
carbon tax that the government will not have “the political capacity to set the price at a 
level that would stabilize emissions”). 
75 See id. at 717 (stating that cap stringency is an issue that must be determined before a 
cap-and-trade program is adopted); see also infra notes 123–32 and accompanying text 
(discussing the physical and social realities leading to postponement of attainment 
deadlines for the Clean Air Act). 
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1.  The Price Effect of a Carbon Tax or Carbon Allowance 
Much of the debate over approaches to regulating carbon 
emissions, both in the United States and abroad, focuses on the 
relative merits of carbon taxes versus a cap-and-trade system.  
Proponents of a carbon tax point to its simplicity in comparison with 
the cap-and-trade approach, a contention discussed above.  Less clear, 
however, is the relationship between the central features of each 
system—the tax itself or the carbon price adder—and the goal of 
actually reducing carbon emissions.  In theory, a carbon tax would 
raise the price of activities subject to the tax that generate carbon 
emissions or consume oil and gas.  Similarly, the market price of 
carbon allowances necessary to generate electricity or sell gasoline 
under a cap-and-trade scheme would raise applicable prices.  The 
higher price of these activities would be passed on to consumers who 
would, in theory, be motivated to either consume less or switch to 
alternative activities that consume less.76 
Problems with the theory begin with the nature of the target 
activity.  Substantially more than half of the nation’s carbon 
emissions derive from the transportation sector and the electricity 
sector.77  In each case, the price effect of a carbon tax or carbon 
allowance will not raise the price of the underlying activity 
sufficiently to achieve the desired change in behavior and carbon 
emissions. 
In the transportation sector, most of the carbon is emitted through 
the combustion of gasoline.78  A carbon tax, whether levied at the 
pump, at the refinery, further upstream, or at import or production, 
would serve to raise the price of gasoline.  This would, in theory, 
reduce consumption.  Similarly, in a cap-and-trade scheme covering 
petroleum, upstream sources such as refineries would have to retire 
carbon allowances to operate, and the cost of the allowance would be 
reflected in the price of the product and, ultimately, the price of 
gasoline at the pump.  Unfortunately, the consumption of gasoline has 
 
76 Murray & Hosterman, supra note 74, at 706. 
77 EPA EMISSIONS INVENTORY, supra note 14, at ES-14 tbl.ES-7 (charting U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2007 allocated by economic sector and showing 28% of 
emissions resulted from the transportation sector and 34% from the electricity sector). 
78 STACY C. DAVIS ET AL., OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, 
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ORNL-6984, TRANSPORTATION ENERGY DATA BOOK 11.7 
tbl.11.6 (28th ed. 2009), available at http://cta.ornl.gov/data/tedb28/Edition28_Full 
_Doc.pdf (stating that, in 2007, 58.6% of carbon dioxide emissions resulted from motor 
gasoline in the transportation sector). 
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proven relatively unresponsive to price.  In 2007 through 2008, the 
retail price of gas jumped approximately 60% from about $2.80 to 
about $4.10, depending on the region.79  This increase produced a 
drop in consumption of about 4%.80  The small consumer response to 
such a large price increase, or the relative “inelasticity” of gasoline, 
reflects the low substitutability of the good, which for the purposes of 
this example is gasoline- or diesel-based transportation.81  Our 
historically low investment in public transportation82 leaves 
consumers in most situations with no choice but to drive, which 
means fewer options to substitute the higher-priced good (consuming 
more carbon, and thus more highly taxed or burdened with less 
carbon allowance costs) with a lower-priced good (consuming less or 
no carbon, and thus taxed or burdened less, if at all). 
 
79 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Retail Gasoline Prices, 
http://eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/wrgp/mogas_home_page.html (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2010).  On the East Coast, the price for retail gas (regular grade) increased 
from $2.78 in mid-August 2007 to $4.08 in mid-June 2008.  U.S. Energy Info. Admin., 
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Retail Gasoline Historical Prices: East Coast Weekly Retail, 
http://eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/wrgp/mogas_history.html (follow 
“East Coast” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).  In the New England area, the price for 
retail gas increased from $2.57 in March 2007 to $4.09 in June 2008.  U.S. Energy Info. 
Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Retail Gasoline Historical Prices: New England 
Weekly Retail, http://eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/wrgp/mogas 
_history.html (follow “New England” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).  In the 
Midwest, the price for retail gas increased from $2.86 at the end of October 2007 to $4.01 
at the end of June 2008.  U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Retail 
Gasoline Historical Prices: Mid West Weekly Retail, http://eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/ 
data_publications/wrgp/mogas_history.html (follow “Mid West” hyperlink) (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2010).  For the entire United States, retail gas prices increased from $2.51 in mid-
March 2007 to $4.00 in mid-June 2008.  U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 
U.S. Retail Gasoline Historical Prices: U.S. Weekly Retail, http://eia.doe.gov/oil 
_gas/petroleum/data_publications/wrgp/mogas_history.html (follow “United States” 
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 30, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Retail]. 
80 As Gas Goes Up, Driving Goes Down, CNN, May 27, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2008/US/05/26/gas.driving/index.html (reporting that the Department of Transportation’s 
Federal Highway Administration estimated Americans drove 4.3% less in March 2008 as 
compared to March 2007). 
81 Jonathan E. Hughes et al., Evidence of a Shift in the Short-Run Price Elasticity of 
Gasoline Demand, 29 ENERGY J. 113, 115 (discussing how gas prices between 1975 and 
1980 had a price elasticity between -0.21 to -0.34, but, between 2001 and 2006, the price 
elasticity was only -0.034 to -0.077). 
82 Trip Pollard, Follow the Money: Transportation Investments for Smarter Growth, 22 
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 155, 157 (2004) (stating that transit funds allocate 
substantially more to roads than public transportation).  For example, for the 2003–2004 
fiscal year budget in Virginia, only $177 million was allocated for alternative transit while 
$3.1 billion was allocated for roads.  Id.  Unsurprisingly, state and federal funds pay most 
of the road building and maintenance costs in Virginia but only 55% of the public transit 
capital expenses.  Id. 
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No carbon tax level or carbon allowance price under discussion 
approaches the levels required to duplicate the price increase 
discussed above and its modest effect on consumption.  Recent tax 
proposals would commence at approximately $10 per ton of carbon 
dioxide-equivalent emissions,83 which, for example, would impose a 
$1.16 tax on a barrel of oil for the carbon emitted through the 
combustion of that amount of oil.84  Such a tax would produce a rise 
in gasoline prices of about $0.028 per gallon.85  Recent experience 
indicates such a tax would have no measurable effect on 
consumption.86  Nor will phased increases over time likely reach the 
levels necessary to materially affect consumption if the current 
transportation system remains in place.  Duplication of the recent 
60% rise in gasoline price would require a carbon tax of 
approximately $535 per ton of carbon-equivalent emissions.87  This 
amount exceeds proposals currently in Congress and is an amount this 
Article asserts is far beyond the tolerance of the current, or any 
anticipated, political environment in the next two decades without 
major changes to our transportation system, even in the event of 
 
83 E.g., Save Our Climate Act of 2009, H.R. 594, 111th Cong. § 3 (proposing a tax of 
$10 per ton of CO2); America’s Energy Security Trust Fund Act of 2009, H.R. 1337, 111th 
Cong. § 2 (proposing a tax of $15 per ton of CO2). 
84 At a carbon tax of $5 per ton of CO2  equivalent, William D. Nordhaus at the Yale 
Department of Economics calculated the tax to be the equivalent of a $0.014 tax on one 
gallon of gasoline and a $0.58 tax on a barrel of oil.  William D. Nordhaus, Economic 
Approaches to Greenhouse Warming, in GLOBAL WARMING: ECONOMIC POLICY 
RESPONSES 33 tbl.2.6 (Rudiger Dornbusch & James M Poterba eds., 1991), available at 
http://www.ciesin.org/docs/003-311/003-311.html.  For a $10 carbon tax, I doubled Mr. 
Nordhaus’s calculations and determined that the tax would be the equivalent of a $0.028 
tax on one gallon of gas and a $1.16 tax on a barrel of oil. 
85 See supra note 84.  Representative Pete Stark of California testified regarding the 
Save Our Climate Act of 2009 that the $10 carbon tax will equal an estimated increase of 
$0.02 per gallon.  Congressman Pete Stark, Introducing the Save Our Climate Act, 
Address Before the U.S. House of Representatives (Jan. 15, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.stark.house.gov/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id =62). 
86 See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Retail, supra note 79; see also Hughes et al., 
supra note 81. 
87 This assertion assumes that gasoline prices increased 60% from $2.50 to $4.00, which 
is a $1.50 increase per gallon of gasoline.  The carbon tax would equal a tax of $535.71 
(($1.50/$0.028) x $10 = $535.71) per metric ton of CO2.  See STERN, supra note 20, at 421 
(estimating deployment of low-carbon technologies based on an assumed carbon price of 
$25 per ton of CO2); cf. U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, World Economic and Social 
Survey 2009: Promoting Development, Saving the Planet, 151, 166, U.N. Doc. 
E/2009/50/Rev.1, ST/ESA/319 (2009), available at http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/ 
wess2009files/wess09/wess2009.pdf (suggesting that only a carbon price as high as $50 
per ton of CO2 would “induce the required shifts in production and consumption patterns 
[that could] mobilize the large-scale investments” in clean energy). 
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sudden and significant manifestations of climate change.88  Estimates 
of the likely price of a carbon allowance in a cap-and-trade scheme 
similarly fall far short of the amount necessary to generate the effect 
of the rise in price in 2008,89 and most cap-and-trade schemes contain 
interrupters that suspend deadlines if the price of carbon allowances 
rises beyond a set limit. 
The substantial rise in the price of gasoline and diesel in 2008 and 
2009 contributed to socioeconomic trends that in turn led to a 
substantial positive effect on consumption, but this Article asserts that 
this effect is due to a onetime interaction between price and the 
sociopolitical environment, not the price rise itself.  For many opinion 
makers in both the political and business sector, the sharp rise in price 
gave credence to the concept of “peak oil.”90  The confluence of 
scientific information, international opinion, and political shifts 
within the United States created an atmosphere in which these leaders 
found themselves more susceptible to a fundamental change in 
viewpoint upon the occurrence of a triggering event, such as the 
abrupt rise in the price of oil.91  Despite the view, repeated in 
respected, popular press articles at the time, that the high price 
reflected transient oil market factors rather than the fundamentals of 
oil supply and demand, many leaders believed that the high price 
would reflect likely future prices, even if prices dropped in the short 
 
88 See supra note 83 (stating that pending carbon tax bills propose only an initial tax of 
$10 to $15 per ton of CO2). 
89 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 2454 AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY 
AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, at 12–13 (2009) [hereinafter CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST 
ESTIMATE], available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/102xx/doc10262/hr2454.pdf 
(tracking the estimated allowance price from $15 in 2011 to $26 in 2019). 
90 Hon. Richard D. Cudahy, The Bell Tolls for Hydrocarbons: What’s Next?, 29 
ENERGY L.J. 381, 394–95 (2008) (discussing both the depletion of oil and global warming 
as two threats to the world and how these threats may affect the economy and society); see 
also ROBERT L. HIRSCH ET AL., PEAKING OF WORLD OIL PRODUCTION: IMPACTS, 
MITIGATION, & RISK MANAGEMENT (2005), available at http://www.hilltoplancers.org/ 
stories/hirsch0502.pdf; ROBERT L. HIRSCH, NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, PEAKING OF WORLD OIL PRODUCTION: RECENT FORECASTS, DOE/NETL-2007/ 
1263 (2007), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/energy-analyses/pubs/Peaking%20of 
%20World%20Oil%20Production%20-%20Recent%20Forecasts%20-%20NETL%20Re 
.pdf; Peter Maass, The Breaking Point, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 30. 
91 Justin Stolte, Note, The Energy Policy Act of 2005: The Path to Energy Autonomy?, 
33 J. LEGIS. 119, 119–20 (2006) (quoting Matthew Simmons, an energy advisor to George 
W. Bush, who stated in an interview that “[i]t is past time [to consider peak oil].  As I have 
said, the experts and politicians have no Plan B to fall back on.”). 
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term.92  Car companies announced and undertook changes in their 
production lines to implement modest, if highly visible, increases in 
fleet fuel efficiency,93 and those plans did not change when prices 
subsequently dropped due to the recession that began in late 2008.94  
 
92 See Peter Huber & Mark Mills, Oil, Oil, Everywhere . . . , WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2005, 
at A13 (stating that the price of oil is influenced more by the political instability in Middle 
Eastern oil-producing countries than the lack of oil in the earth); Pelin Berkmen et al., Int’l 
Monetary Fund, The Structure of the Oil Market and Causes of High Prices (Sept. 21, 
2005), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2005/092105o.htm (explaining that a strong 
global demand for oil, speculation in the futures market, and fears of potential supply 
disruptions all play a part in high oil prices); see also Stolte, supra note 91, at 128–29 
(discussing the Energy Policy Act of 2005 as a response to peak oil and addressing the 
dwindling oil supply); cf. Posting of Keith Johnson, Peak Oil: Global Oil Production’s 
Peaked, Analyst Says, to Wall Street Journal Environmental Capital Blog (May 4, 2009), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/environmentalcapital/2009/05/04/peak-oil-global-oil-productions       
-peaked-analyst-says/.  Compare Press Release, Cambridge Energy Research Assocs. 
(CERA), Peak Oil Theory—“World Running Out of Oil Soon”—Is Faulty; Could Destroy 
Policy & Energy Debate (Nov. 14, 2006), http://www.cera.com/aspx/cda/public1/news/ 
pressReleases/pressReleaseDetails.aspx?CID=8444 (stating that there is three times the 
amount of remaining oil resources than what the peak-oil theory proponents estimate and 
arguing that emphasis should not be placed on supply constraints, but rather on factors 
such as politics, economics, and technology), with Roscoe Bartlett & Tom Udall, 
Congressional Peak Oil Caucus Responds to CERA Study, ENERGY BULL., Nov. 14, 2006, 
http://www.energybulletin.net/node/22396 (stating that, despite the overly optimistic 
prediction of the amount of oil remaining, CERA’s report does support urgency in dealing 
with oil shortages, global warming, and alternative energy); Samuel Bodman, Energy 
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Remarks at the Middle East Institute’s 60th Anniversary 
Conference (Nov. 13, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.mei.edu/Events/ 
Conferences/2006AnnualConference/2006ConferenceTranscriptBodman.aspx) (stating 
that, due to the increase of energy demand and the inability of oil to meet this demand, use 
of alternative fuels must be expanded). 
93 Janet L. Fix, GM, Ford in PR Battle Over Truck Fuel Mileage War of Words Leaves 
Skeptics Unconvinced, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 3, 2000, at 1A, available at 
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-122012702/general-motors-takes-form.html 
(reporting that, after Ford announced it was committed to improving SUV gas mileage by 
25% within five years, GM asserted it would improve the gas efficiency of minivans and 
light trucks in addition to SUVs—relatively modest changes given currently available 
technologies and vehicles). 
94 See Justin Hyde, Color This Show Green and Brawn, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 14, 
2008, at A1 (reporting that, although U.S. car companies have invested in manufacturing 
more efficient parts, the advanced technologies needed to meet environmental goals have 
to be borne partially by customers, and automakers are worried that these cars will not 
sell); Tom Krisher, Chrysler Plans New SUV; It Says Vehicle Will Be More Fuel-Efficient 
than Cherokee, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 14, 2008, at B4 (reporting that Chrysler Vice 
Chairman Tom LaSorda announced that Chrysler will invest in a new car-based SUV, 
which will be more fuel efficient than the truck-based Cherokee); Jayne O’Donnell, 
Higher Fuel Standards Proposed by Feds; Proposal Accelerates Timetable for Efficiency, 
USA TODAY, Apr. 23, 2008, at 1B (stating that a proposed Transportation Department rule 
announces cars and light trucks would have to be 25% more fuel efficient by 2015). 
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Political consensus on the issue accelerated the efforts to raise CAFE 
standards, successfully accomplished in 2009.95 
While these attitudinal and political shifts may continue to mature, 
and price pressure will assist in this process, this Article asserts that a 
fundamental shift has occurred.  The price effects of the relatively 
small tax rates proposed by a carbon tax would be overshadowed by 
even modest improvements in fleet efficiency produced by the CAFE 
legislation.  Political considerations will keep the tax or the price of 
carbon allowances at levels insufficient to produce a substantial 
change in activities that generate carbon emissions. 
The current structure of the electricity sector also makes it unlikely 
that the price effect of a carbon tax or carbon allowance regime would 
operate to reduce carbon emissions from electricity generation used in 
the commercial, industrial, or residential sectors.  Electricity 
consumption shares the inelasticity of the transportation sector 
discussed above.  In modern industrial society, electricity is deemed a 
mandatory service.96  Residential customers will not tolerate 
interruptions, brownouts, or shortages.  For most of the components 
of residential consumption, which include refrigeration, lighting, and 
air conditioning, no socially acceptable substitutes are available.97  
Commercial and industrial customers rely fundamentally on 
electricity to produce goods and services.  Modern industrial 
processes (e.g., computer chip fabrication) and increasing dependency 
 
95 The Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and 49 U.S.C.); Henry J. Pulizzi et al., 
Car Makers Expect to Hit Fuel Goals, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2009 (reporting President 
Obama’s announcement of a new CAFE standard, raising the national, fleetwide mileage 
average to 35.5 miles per gallon—23 for trucks and 27.5 for cars—by 2016). 
96 U.S.-CANADA POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, FINAL 
REPORT ON THE AUGUST 14, 2003 BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: 
CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (2004), available at https://reports.energy.gov/ 
BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf (“Modern society has come to depend on reliable electricity           
. . . .”). 
97 Matthew J. Libby, Deregulating the Electricity Market: What Can Be Learned from 
California’s Mistakes, 22 ME. B. J. 236, 243 (2007) (explaining that demand for electricity 
is “essential,” a “necessity,” “inelastic,” and unlikely to decrease due to price increases). 
Goods that exhibit inelastic demand are those where the percentage of change in 
demand is less than the percentage in change of price.  When consumers are 
dependent on goods with inelastic demand, they are very susceptible to rapid 
price increases.  Furthermore, there is no ready substitutable good for electricity.  
That is, if the price of electricity skyrockets, consumers cannot easily shift to gas 
power without a substantial investment that may take several months to 
complete. 
Id. (footnote call numbers omitted). 
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on electronic data systems and the internet render our society 
dependent on a highly stable grid of generation and transmission.98 
Electricity must be provided instantly upon demand and, unlike 
most other goods, it cannot be stored in meaningful amounts.  This 
economic reality and social consensus is reflected in our electricity 
regulatory and market systems.  Regulators require monopoly service 
providers to create and maintain systems that meet 100% of demand 
in each of the 8760 hours of the year.99  While we tolerate short, 
infrequent, and geographically contained power interruptions 
resulting from storms or other events that interrupt local distribution 
systems, the reliability standards that guide the design of our regional 
transmission system require levels of redundancy to ensure that 
service is maintained even if power plants and large transmission 
lines go down.100  Our wholesale electricity markets have historically 
treated demand as totally inelastic.101  Market operators project total 
demand for a given hour on the basis of prior experience, weather 
conditions, and similar factors and then accept bids to provide the 
necessary power to meet that demand, regardless of price.102 
 
98 See id.; Steven Ferrey, Power Future, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 261, 266 
(2005) (explaining that electricity is a complementary technology to computer technology, 
space exploration, military applications, and electric motors). 
99 See Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets be Trusted? The Effect of the Rise 
and Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 12 (2004) (discussing 
“regulatory compacts” between states and privately owned utilities in which “[t]he utility 
was granted a monopoly and in exchange had a duty to serve all customers in its 
territory”). 
100 The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) is required by the 
Federal Power Act to establish standards that will provide an adequate level of reliability 
to generation and transmission systems.  N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., DEFINITION 
OF “ADEQUATE LEVEL OF RELIABILITY” 3 (2007), available at http://www.nerc.com/ 
docs/pc/Definition-of-ALR-approved-at-Dec-07-OC-PC-mtgs.pdf.  “Adequate level of 
reliability” is achieved if six characteristics are present, including the following: (1) the 
system limits impact, (2) the scope of instability, and (3) the ability of the system to supply 
aggregate power and energy despite reasonably expected unscheduled outages.  Id. at 6. 
101 Erin T. Mansur, Upstream Competition and Vertical Integration in Electricity 
Markets, 50 J.L. & ECON. 125, 130 (2007) (explaining that the demand for wholesale 
electricity is inelastic because (1) “consumers have no incentive to reduce quantity 
demanded at higher prices because the regulatory structure of electricity retail markets has 
kept consumers’ rates constant” and (2) wholesale purchasers must provide power “at any 
cost”). 
102 In economic terms, a free market operates to set a market price at the confluence of 
an upward-sloping supply curve and a downward-sloping demand curve.  However, in 
electricity markets the demand indicator is neither a curve nor set by market factors, but 
rather a vertical line set by market operators at a point on the quantity “Q” (or “X”) axis at 
the point of anticipated demand.  The price reflects the point where that vertical demand 
line, which is set by regulators to meet all anticipated demand, intersects the supply curve. 
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2.  Structural Barriers to the Price Signal in the Electricity Sector 
This underlying inelasticity is compounded by the structure of 
energy rate systems, which insulate most customers from the impact 
of short-term or even medium-term changes in the price of electricity.  
Putting aside the quantitative inadequacies of any likely signal from 
either a carbon tax or a price increase due to the need to purchase 
carbon allowances, a price on carbon emissions is intended to 
differentiate the price of high-carbon electricity sources from low-
carbon sources, which should cost less.  Unfortunately, in most 
situations, prices are not set in a manner that allows the price signal to 
get through to the consumer.  In most states, residential consumers 
pay a single rate that reflects a long-term average of the prices paid by 
the utility or other local distribution company.  Such an LDC may 
purchase electricity from a coal plant, a nuclear plant, and a natural 
gas plant pursuant to long-term contracts with different prices.  It may 
purchase power on the wholesale regional market where most 
electricity generation, and the price, is derived from natural gas 
plants.  Finally, an LDC may purchase some power from wind 
facilities.  Yet, the retail price to the residential consumer will reflect 
the blended average—or an ex ante estimate of the blended average—
of all of these sources over the period of time between rate 
proceedings.103  Rates for commercial and industrial customers 
similarly reflect the blend of sources of power purchased. 
The structure of wholesale markets also operates to insulate the 
retail customer from price differentiation due to any carbon price 
adder.  In day-ahead wholesale markets, for example, different 
potential suppliers bid to offer a stated amount of power into the 
market at a given price for each hour of the next day.  The system 
operator or other market manager adds up the quantity of kilowatt-
hours of the bids starting with the lowest price per kilowatt-hour and, 
 
103 Rate proceedings are initiated by the LDC, and typically set rates prevail several 
years until the next proceeding.  The public utilities commission proceeding determines an 
estimated revenue requirement necessary for the LDC to pay its expenses and earn a rate 
of return necessary to attract capital.  The revenue requirement is then divided by 
estimated demand to create rates per kilowatt-hour for the residential class of customer.  
Some states allow expenses incurred by the utility to pass through to consumers each year 
to account for fluctuations in prices paid on the wholesale market, but even those 
adjustments are typically annual, reflecting a blended rate that sends weak, if any, price 
signal to the customer.  JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY 
RATES 263 (2d ed. 1988).  Commercial and industrial customers frequently have more 
complex rates that pass through to them, but those prices, whether daily or hourly, still 
reflect the blended cost of all electricity sources during that time.  See id. at 485. 
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when the quantity in the stack of bids reaches the system operator’s 
best estimate of what demand will be for the hour, the operator 
accepts those bids, rejects the higher ones, and the market price is set 
at the amount of the highest accepted bid—the “clearing price.”  All 
those accepted are “dispatched” for that hour, meaning the winning 
bidder and all bidders below in the bid stack must provide the power, 
and those not needed are not dispatched. 
The clearing price then becomes the price paid to all bidders, 
regardless of what they originally bid; therefore, participants are not 
paid what they bid, but rather the amount of the highest bid that 
“cleared,” or was dispatched to meet demand.104  Typically in the 
Northeast, for example, the lowest bids are from nuclear and large 
hydro facilities.  These facilities have low marginal costs despite their 
high original cost of construction.  They will almost always sell into 
the market regardless of the price because any price is better than 
nothing.  In addition, nuclear plants cannot easily or rapidly be turned 
off and on.  For these reasons, such plants will bid low amounts, or 
frequently zero, because they intend to run regardless of the ensuing 
clearing price.  Plants with higher marginal costs and the ability to 
turn on and off daily, based on a decision whether to run, will bid 
their actual marginal costs, and may or may not be dispatched.  For 
example, a nuclear plant may bid $0.00 per kWh, a coal plant may bid 
$0.03 per kWh, a wind facility may bid $0.06 per kWh, a combined-
cycle natural gas plant may bid $0.08 per kWh, and another similar 
natural gas plant may bid $0.09 per kWh, each for the amount of 
power stated in the bid.  If the highest bid to achieve the quantity 
necessary to meet demand, or the “last” plant in the stack is the first 
of the two natural gas plants in this example, then the clearing price 
would be $0.08 per kWh.  All bidders below that bid in the stack 
would be dispatched and receive that same price.  The last natural gas 
plant would not be dispatched, would not sell into the market, and 
may not run at all if it does not have alternative customers. 
If a carbon tax or a price adder for a carbon allowance increases the 
price of the last plant dispatched, then it increases the clearing price 
for all sources, including the low-carbon sources at the bottom of the 
stack.  In many markets, the low-carbon sources are, in fact, at the 
bottom of the stack.  These sources bid lower than the highest bid 
dispatched or accepted by the market operator, frequently made by 
 
104 See id. at 136, 421 (defining the market-clearing price as the price required to bring 
demand into equality with available supply based on a comparison of supply and demand). 
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plants using natural gas or coal.  Nuclear, hydro, and wind sources 
may thus get a windfall, but the purchasing LDC and its customers 
see no differentiation among sources, just a higher wholesale price for 
all of the power purchased that hour due to the carbon price adder. 
For related reasons, the carbon price adder will not cause the 
market operator to change the pattern of dispatch to favor low-carbon 
sources over high-carbon sources.  First, most of the low-carbon 
sources, as discussed above, bid low and run anyway.  But, it could be 
asked, will the price increase caused by a carbon tax or the 
requirement that the generator retire carbon allowances cause the 
price of coal to rise to the point where it is more expensive than lower 
carbon natural gas?  This issue has been carefully studied.  The 
carbon content of gas and coal is well understood.  One megawatt-
hour (mWh) of coal produces approximately a ton of carbon, and one 
megawatt-hour of natural gas produces approximately half that 
amount.  One can calculate the amount of a carbon-based price adder 
that would cause natural gas to displace coal.  Calculations made by a 
variety of interests indicate a consensus that a carbon tax or a carbon 
allowance price well in excess of $50 per ton of CO2 emissions would 
be required to cause natural gas to displace coal given current, 
relatively low prices for natural gas.105  Higher prices for natural gas 
would require an even higher carbon tax or allowance price.106  These 
prices are neither in the politically feasible range of a carbon tax nor 
in the range of the estimated price of a carbon allowance in a cap-and-
trade regime.107 
 
105 See Cowart, Testimony, supra note 34, at 5–6 (stating that “in the upper Midwest, 
which is highly dependent on coal . . . ‘[e]ven a CO2 value of $50/ton would produce only 
a 4 percent reduction in regional emissions given the current generation mix’ . . . [i]n 
Texas, [which relies heavily on gas] . . . ‘even a CO2 value of $40/ton produces little 
emissions reduction’ from the existing mix” (quoting Victor Niemeyer, The Change in 
Profit Climate: How Will Carbon-Emissions Policies Affect the Generation Fleet?, PUB. 
UTIL. FORT., May 2007, at 20, 24)). 
106 In 2002, the natural gas electric power price was $3.10 per thousand cubic feet.  U.S. 
Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Natural Gas Electric Power Price 
(Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet) (Oct. 30, 2009), http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/hist/ 
n3045us3m.htm.  The price increased steadily and consistently until September 2005 when 
it jumped above $10 for the first time since 2002.  Id.  The 2005 spike leveled out around 
$6 in mid-2006 and remained steady until the end of 2007, and then the price consistently 
increased until April 2008.  Id.  From April 2008 until August 2008, the price remained 
high, peaking at $12.50.  Id.  However, March and April 2009 saw prices drop to the $4 
range, a price not seen since November 2003.  Id. 
107 See supra p. 415.  Pending carbon tax bills propose only a tax of $10 to $15 per ton 
of CO2, which would not create demand-side behavioral changes. 
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The same logic applies to the price point at which the price of 
carbon emissions might cause the market to deliver new clean sources 
that displace the next coal plant that would have been built, or to pay 
for the cost of carbon capture and storage.  The consensus of studies 
of these questions indicates that the price of the carbon adder would 
have to exceed $90 per ton,108 again far in excess of either a likely tax 
or carbon allowance.109  A recent study by the Electric Power 
Research Institute concluded that, in a scenario favorable to low-
carbon or carbon-neutral substitutes, carbon prices would need to 
reach $50 per ton to stimulate the replacement of coal power with 
nuclear.110  In a scenario where high capital costs and other factors 
render nuclear energy development more sluggish,111 a more realistic 
future in the view of many, equivalent carbon allowance prices of 
$125 to $150 per ton would have to prevail to affect emissions, a 
price many times that of the likely or possible.112 
3.  Nonprice Barriers to Efficiency 
For the electricity and heating needs of the residential, commercial, 
and industrial sectors, energy efficiency is the cheapest source of 
energy—as cheap, and often cheaper, than generating electricity with 
coal or heating with oil or gas.  A kilowatt saved is the same as a 
kilowatt generated and consumed.  One can estimate with some 
precision the cost of efficiency, that is the cost of saving a kilowatt, 
 
108 In a study on a carbon cap-and-trade program in California, Energy and 
Environmental Economics, Inc. (E3) found that the carbon allowance price must be at least 
$90/ton to create sufficient incentives for market investments in renewables.  Order 
Instituting Rulemaking to Implement the Commission’s Procurement Incentive 
Framework and to Examine the Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into 
Procurement Policies, Rulemaking No. 06-04-009 Docket No. 07-OIIP-01, at 8–9, 13 
(June 2, 2008) (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n) (AB 32 Implementation: Greenhouse Gases, 
Opening Comments of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power), available at 
https://www.pge.com/regulation/GreenhouseIncentivesOIR/Pleadings/LA-DWP/2008/ 
GreenhouseIncentivesOIR_Plea_LA-DWP_20080602-01.pdf; see also E3: Energy & 
Envtl. Econ., Inc., CPUC Avoided Cost Proceedings (July 31, 2006), http://www.ethree 
.com/avoidedcosts.html. 
109 See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
§ 321. 
110 Victor Niemeyer, Lew Rubin & Kyle Davis, CO2 Prices and Their Potential Impact 
on the Western U.S. Power Market, 24 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 3, 3–5 (summarizing an 
Electric Power Research Institute study titled, “An Analysis of CO2 Policy Impacts on 
Western Power Markets”). 
111 See infra notes 146–47 and accompanying text (discussing nuclear energy’s 
increasing expenses and substantial long-term carbon footprint). 
112 Niemeyer, supra note 110, at 3–5. 
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and compare that cost to the cost of generating the electricity instead.  
Managing demand through efficiency yields in the range of $0.02 to 
$0.04 per kilowatt saved.113  This compares to a national average 
retail electricity price of $0.11 per kilowatt for residential customers 
and $0.09 across all sectors.114  Despite this price advantage, 
efficiency has not nearly reached its potential because of both market 
and nonmarket barriers that do not relate to price and, thus, would not 
be addressed through the increased price advantage that might be 
conferred by a carbon tax or carbon allowance imposed on high-
carbon generation alternatives. 
These barriers have been well documented elsewhere, and 
consequently, this section of this Article provides only a brief 
overview.  The monopoly regulatory scheme prevalent in the United 
States incorporates the cost of capital into rates.115  The certainty of 
such a system combines with the tax-free bonding capacity116 of 
utilities to ensure inexpensive and plentiful (some would say too 
plentiful)117 capital for the construction of power plants.  With few 
exceptions, such cheap capital is not available for the installation of 
efficiency services on the customer side of the meter.  An LDC can 
use tax-free bonds to build a power plant, but a customer who wants 
to purchase a more efficient refrigerator must pay the added cost with 
cash or borrow at far less advantageous rates.  The same holds true for 
 
113 Efficiency Vermont, one of the national leaders in energy efficiency services, 
continues to provide low-cost energy savings.  A recent annual report estimates the cost of 
saving electricity between $0.025 and $0.029 per kWh.  EFFICIENCY VT., 2008 
HIGHLIGHTS: HELPING VERMONT FAMILIES AND BUSINESSES SAVE MONEY AND SAVE 
ENERGY, http://www.efficiencyvermont.com/stella/filelib/Highlights2008_Final.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2010). 
114 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Average Retail Price of Electricity 
to Ultimate Customers: Total by End-Use Sector, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/ 
electricity/epm/table5_3.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).  Efficiency remains far more cost 
effective than fossil fuel-generated electricity, regardless of the fuel source.  Consider 
prices in Pennsylvania, a predominately coal state, with a price average across all sectors 
of $0.0964 per kWh compared to California, which relies on mostly natural gas and little 
coal, with an average price across all sectors of $0.1376 per kWh.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, FORM EIA-826 SALES AND REVENUE SPREADSHEETS 
(2009), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/sales_revenue.xls [hereinafter U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. DATABASE]. 
115 BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 103, at 198. 
116 Id. at 19. 
117 PAUL PETERSON ET AL., SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., THE NEW ENGLAND 
EXPERIMENT: AN EVALUATION OF THE WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS 21 (2003), 
available at http://www.synapse-energy.com/Downloads/SynapsePaper.2003-06.0 
.Wholesale-Electricity-Markets-Evaluation.A0008.pdf (referring to the incorporation of 
the cost of capital as resulting in “redundant compensation for a single service”). 
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the typical industrial customer that wants to purchase more expensive, 
but more energy-efficient, boilers, fans, ovens, or other industrial 
processes.  Furthermore, the initiative for construction of generation 
lies with a specialized institution (the LDC or merchant generator), 
while it is the individual customer, busy with the other aspects of life, 
who must purchase the energy-efficient appliance. 
Many efficiency opportunities relate to building improvements in 
the residential or commercial setting, where better insulation and 
more efficient heating, cooling, and lighting can produce electricity 
savings at rates substantially below the avoided cost of generating the 
electricity.  Yet these efficiency elements are not constructed because 
the benefits accrue to a different entity than the entity making the 
construction decisions.  These “split incentives” plague multifamily 
residential construction where developers would have to front the 
additional costs of efficiency, but the eventual tenants reap the 
benefit.118  Due to other structural aspects of the real estate market 
and the simple lack of information, the value to the tenant does not 
carry upstream to rents for the landlord and thus to sales prices for the 
developer.  Similarly, commercial structures can incorporate energy-
saving features, but neither builders nor landlords (sometimes the 
same entity) experience the benefit since the price of many leases is 
net of energy costs, which are borne by the tenant.  As discussed later, 
policy and program solutions can address these split incentives and 
lack of access to capital, but a simple carbon price adder will not.119 
This disconnect between those burdened by the cost and those 
receiving the benefit can be especially acute for systems that do not 
reduce electricity consumption or manage demand, but rather change 
the time of day consumption occurs, shifting consumption from peak 
to off-peak periods.120  Such processes can save the LDC enormous 
amounts, but rate structures frequently do not pass on the savings to 
 
118 CHERYL HARRINGTON, THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, WHO SHOULD 
DELIVER RATEPAYER FUNDED ENERGY EFFICIENCY? 8 (2003) (providing an example of 
“split incentives such as that between landlord and tenant where a tenant who pays the 
electric bill might see savings from an efficiency program but the landlord who would 
need to make the capital improvement does would not realize any savings”). 
119 See infra Part I.D. 
120 See ELEC. ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SMART GRID: ENABLER OF 
THE NEW ENERGY ECONOMY 9 (2008), available at http://www.oe.energy.gov/ 
DocumentsandMedia/final-smart-grid-report.pdf (discussing the benefits of the smart grid 
to consumers in terms of the consumers’ “ab[ility] to better plan and manage their energy 
consumption,” which in turn leads to cost savings by reducing consumption rather than by 
reducing rates). 
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the residential or commercial customer who undertakes the process to 
shift demand.  The LDC will likely pay much more for electricity at 
times of peak demand than at periods when demand is low.  
Wholesale prices on an August afternoon paid in a region that 
experiences air conditioner-driven summer peaks of energy use, 
especially in a region with insufficient supply, might exceed 
nighttime prices by one or, in situations with inadequate supply, two 
orders of magnitude.121  In the New England region, for example, 
utilities may pay more than 10% of the total amount paid for power in 
order to provide power during 2% of the hours, when prices are 
highest.122  If demand can be shifted off of such peaks, the savings 
are great.  Such demand response may involve an industrial facility 
changing hours of operation on a day with particularly heavy energy 
demand.  Utilities could remotely cycle residential air conditioners on 
and off in the homes of participating customers while not allowing 
temperatures to fluctuate more than acceptable amounts.  The cost of 
such strategies is small compared to the financial savings, but, in the 
traditional utility model, the cost is born by the customer 
implementing the strategy.  The benefit, however, accrues to the 
LDC, which, under prevailing rate structures that charge average 
rates, cannot pass the savings on to the customer bearing the cost.  
Carbon price adders do not affect that calculus. 
4.  The Cap in Cap and Trade 
Sociopolitical considerations similar to those that limit the possible 
price of a carbon adder will likely operate such that the “cap” in cap 
and trade will not force a reduction in carbon emissions from the 
electric sector.  Absent other mechanisms that offer noncarbon 
alternatives or reduce demand, society will simply exceed the caps as 
they decline.  When that occurs, this Article asserts that the caps will 
be raised or the compliance dates will be extended, either by 
 
121 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-844, ELECTRICITY MARKETS: 
CONSUMERS COULD BENEFIT FROM DEMAND PROGRAMS, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN 8 
(2004); see also COWART, supra note 55, at 8 (“System loads vary substantially from hour 
to hour (e.g., by a factor of two to three during a single day) . . . .”). 
122 COWART, supra note 55, at 9 & fig.1 (showing that, in reference to “annualized 
price-duration curves,” the “[t]op 1% of [p]rices equal 15.8% [of] [w]holesale [c]osts 
(weighted by load)”); cf. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE SMART GRID: AN INTRODUCTION 
19, http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/DOE_SG_Book_Single_Pages.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2010) (“[Ten percent] of all generation assets and [twenty-five 
percent] of distribution infrastructure are required less than 400 hours per year, roughly 
[five percent] of the time.”). 
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administrative action or by an act of Congress.  Experience with the 
attainment deadlines in the Clean Air Act illustrates such repeated 
adjustments of target dates to address political realities.123  Just as 
cap-and-trade legislation would set permissible levels of carbon 
emissions as deemed necessary to prevent unacceptable global 
warming, the Clean Air Act sets necessary standards for certain 
pollutants in the ambient air to protect the public health and 
welfare.124  Just as cap and trade would set time deadlines for the 
reduction of carbon emissions by stated amounts, the Clean Air Act 
sets deadlines for attainment of the national ambient air standards in 
all air basins.125  The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 set the 
attainment date at 1977 at the latest.126  Most major metropolitan 
areas found that technically feasible and socially acceptable means of 
reducing pollution to the levels set by the ambient air standards were 
unavailable, and these areas simply failed to meet the deadlines, 
limiting their plans and their behavior to the implementation of 
options they deemed realistic.127 
In the face of those realities, the “letter” of the law did not prevail.  
The Act provided, and still provides, that when a state fails to submit 
a State Implementation Plan (SIP) that complied with the Act to the 
EPA, the Agency itself must establish a Federal Implementation Plan 
(FIP) for the state or metropolitan area containing sufficient 
mechanisms to meet the standards.128 Given the political 
 
123 Carolyn McNiven, Using Severability Clauses to Solve the Attainment Deadline 
Dilemma in Environmental Statutes, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1255, 1263–65 (1992) (discussing 
both the 1977 Clean Air Act before it was amended in 1990 and the difficulty the courts 
experience in fashioning an appropriate remedy after attainment deadlines have passed). 
124 Id. at 1265. 
125 See id. at 1266–67. 
126 Id. (noting that “state governments were to achieve national air quality standards for 
regulated pollutants within three years” of the 1970 Clean Air Act or within five years 
with federally approved extensions); see also U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283, 285 
n.1 (7th Cir. 1979) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1) as amended in 1977, which required 
states to submit a list of areas that do not meet ambient air quality standards to the EPA 
Administrator within 120 days of August 7, 1977). 
127 McNiven, supra note 123, at 1266–67, 1269 (stating that the 1977 amendments to 
the 1970 Clean Air Act extended attainment deadlines once it was clear some regions 
could not meet the deadlines). 
128 Coalition for Clean Air v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 971 F.2d 219, 228–29 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(ordering the EPA to meet its statutory duty and promulgate an FIP for the South Coast 
Air Basin after the EPA failed to establish a federal plan and the Coalition for Clean Air 
filed suit); Abramowitz v. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1988) (ordering the EPA to 
disapprove California’s State Implementation Plan for the South Coast Air Basin because 
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consequences, the EPA initially balked129 and then complied with a 
judicial mandate by issuing plans containing physically available, but 
socially and politically unacceptable, mechanisms.130  For example, 
for the city of Los Angeles, the EPA required that gasoline be 
rationed such that the amount sold would be limited to the amount 
that, when combusted, would allow attainment of the standard.131  
Naturally, Congress responded by extending the deadline and has 
repeatedly extended the deadline as necessary to conform the law to 
the social and political realities reflecting the availability of actual and 
acceptable means to reduce emissions.132 
Such political stasis occurs even where technologically and 
economically viable solutions are readily available.  CAFE itself 
provides a discouraging example.  Since the CAFE standards were 
enacted in 1975, automakers have developed smaller, more fuel-
efficient cars.  Yet, due in substantial part to the political efforts lead 
by congressmen representing Detroit, CAFE standards were frozen 
 
the plan did not show ozone and carbon monoxide would be reduced to the attainment 
levels by 1987). 
129 Coalition for Clean Air, 971 F.2d at 228; McNiven, supra note 123, at 1274–75 
(discussing the EPA’s actions after the court orders in Abramowitz and Coalition for Clean 
Air and how the EPA subsequently published the proposed FIP in 1988, but the Agency 
did not take final action on the proposal because it hoped Congress would pass 
amendments that would end the need for an FIP). 
130 McNiven, supra note 123, at 1279–80 (citing 38 Fed. Reg. 31,232, 31,233 (1973)); 
38 Fed. Reg. 2194, 2195 (1973) (discussing the EPA’s 1972 plan for air quality attainment 
for the city of Los Angeles, after the EPA was ordered to promulgate a plan for the 
metropolitan area by January 15, 1973, in City of Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, 4 Env’t Rep. 
Cas. (BNA) 1728, 1731 (C.D. Cal. 1972)). 
131 McNiven, supra note 123, at 1279–80. 
132 Id. at 1269–71 (discussing the attainment deadline being extended to 1982 and 
Congress’s attempts to extend the deadline afterwards as well).  After 1981, Congress 
repeatedly attempted to amend the Clean Air Act to replace overdue deadlines with new 
ones, but, because of deadlock over acid rain provisions, the legislation did not pass until 
1990.  Id.  As such, between 1983 and 1990, nonattainment areas were stuck between 
deadlines they could not meet with no statutory provisions for a postdeadline plan.  Id.; see 
also Trs. for Alaska v. Fink, 17 F.3d 1209, 1210 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 
7502(a)(2)) (stating that the 1977 amendments extended the deadline for nonattainment 
areas for carbon monoxide to 1982, or until 1987 if the EPA approved a SIP); Joseph M. 
Feller, Non-Threshold Pollutants and Air Quality Standards, 24 ENVTL. L. 821, 826 & 
n.24 (1994) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1) (Supp. 1992) (extending deadlines for ozone), § 
7512(a)(1) (extending deadlines for carbon monoxide), and § 7513(c) (extending deadlines 
for particulate matter)).  For example, ozone was given a five classification scheme.  Id. at 
830–31.  In the areas where ozone was marginally in excess of the standard, attainment 
was to be completed in three years.  Id. at 831.  “Moderate” areas were given six years.  Id.  
“Serious” areas were given nine years.  Id.  “Severe” areas were given fifteen years.  Id.  
The worst or “extreme” areas were given twenty years.  Id. 
 2009] Recovery of a Lost Decade (or Is It Three?) 445 
for more than five years while fleet mileage standards and 
performance in Europe, Japan, and China surpassed those in the 
United States.133  Similarly for carbon, until means are developed for 
continuing the activities that currently create electricity demand with 
less carbon, neither the cap nor the deadlines will have the desired 
effect. 
In sum, at tax or carbon allowance prices proposed or currently 
anticipated, neither the tax in carbon tax legislation, nor the cap, 
targets, or price of carbon allowances in cap-and-trade legislation will 
operate to reduce carbon emissions to target levels.  Political realities 
will make the tax or price of the carbon allowance too low to affect an 
inelastic demand, and neither the cap nor the targets will remain in 
place unless socially and economically acceptable strategies are 
available and implemented to meet them. 
C.  Both Systems Can Have an Effect by Directing Revenue to 
Efficiency and Demand Management 
We are led then to the question of how to develop other means for 
reducing the demand for fossil fuel-based transportation and electric 
power.  Since neither the carbon tax itself, nor the price of carbon 
allowances, nor the cap itself will reduce demand, what in the 
proposed legislation will?  The answer is funding and policies.  Both 
a tax or cap-and-trade system can generate new funds, but the success 
of the legislative effort will depend for the most part on how those 
funds are spent and what policies, enacted at both the federal and state 
level, accompany the effort.134 
 
133 For an example of congressional actions freezing CAFE standards, compare S. 1506, 
104th Cong. (1995), with H.R. 2200, 104th Cong. (1995).  Congress also terminated 
funding for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration such that the Agency was 
unable to engage in CAFE standards rulemaking.  See Department of Transportation and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-50, 109 Stat. 436 (1995).  Congress 
lifted its freeze on CAFE standards in 2001.  See Department of Transportation and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-87, 115 Stat. 833. 
134 See Cowart, Testimony, supra note 34.  The American Clean Energy and Security 
Act of 2009, in fact, contains policies and programs that approach reducing demand or 
development of alternative energy directly rather than through a cap or carbon trading.  
See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 
131(a), (c) (establishing State Energy and Environment Development (SEED) Accounts to 
serve as repositories for state emissions allowances designated for renewable energy and 
energy efficiency); see also id. § 184 (establishing the Clean Energy Investment Fund); id. 
§ 246 (establishing the Clean Energy Manufacturing Revolving Loan Fund Program to 
increase manufacturing of clean energy and energy-efficient technologies); America’s 
Energy Security Trust Fund Act of 2009, H.R. 1337, 111th Cong. § 2 (establishing Trust 
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In the transportation sector, some progress has been made outside 
of either scheme.  As discussed above, the CAFE standards have been 
raised, and further regulatory efforts at the national level can include 
progressive tightening of these standards.135  Funds from a carbon tax 
or cap-and-trade system could assist efforts by the federal government 
to expand both public transit directly and efforts by the states to 
coordinate transit and land use at the regional and local level to 
reduce carbon output.136  A major advance, however, will lie in the 
eventual, complete electrification of the ground fleet, a development 
that leads back to the nation’s electricity system, which is the subject 
of this discussion.137 
1.  Generation Options, Including Renewables 
In the longer term, rising demand for electricity will require 
dramatic increases in the portion of our power mix supplied by 
noncarbon generation.  A brief review of the generation options, 
however, is not encouraging, at least in the next decade and possibly 
in the next two decades.  Coal plants, of course, are the problem, not 
the solution.  Newer plants produce more megawatt-hours per million 
British thermal unit138 than older plants and, thus, have a smaller 
carbon footprint per unit of power, but that footprint is still very 
large.139  Carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology has yet to be 
demonstrated at the relevant scale, and substantial institutional, legal, 
and environmental issues need to be resolved before CCS would be 
 
Fund for investments in clean energy technology); cf. Raise Wages, Cut Carbon Act of 
2009, H.R. 2380, 111th Cong. § 2 (offsetting Social Security Tax with carbon tax 
revenue). 
135 E.g., Josh Voorhees, Obama Finalizes 8% CAFE Hike for 2011 Models, 
GREENWIRE, Mar. 27, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/print/2009/03/27/2 
(suggesting minimum standards may increase or become mandatory prior to 2020). 
136 See H.R. 2454 § 222(c)(3) (amending 23 U.S.C. § 135(f)) (requiring that state 
emissions reduction processes address transportation-related greenhouse gases). 
137 See generally H.R. 2454 §§ 121, 122, 123 (establishing an electric vehicle 
infrastructure, a large-scale vehicle certification program, and plug-in electric-drive 
vehicle manufacturing). 
138 Milne, supra note 36, at 3 n.9 (defining the British thermal unit (Btu) as the 
“quantity of heat required to raise the temperature of one pound of water one degree 
Fahrenheit” (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 178 (3d college ed. 1991))). 
139 See generally SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., INC., DON’T GET BURNED: THE RISKS OF 
INVESTING IN NEW COAL-FIRED GENERATING FACILITIES (2008), available at 
http://www.synapse-energy.com/Downloads/SynapseReport.2008-02.ICCR.Don’t-Get      
-Burned-Risks-of-New-Coal.07-014.pdf. 
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practical.140  Natural gas is better, but, while replacing coal with 
natural gas is a possible short-term approach,141 even highly efficient, 
combined-cycle natural gas plants produce substantial carbon 
footprints.  If the natural gas must be imported as liquefied natural gas 
(LNG), the total life cycle carbon output approaches the output of 
efficient coal plants.142 
As much attention as is given to renewable generation, its share of 
the U.S. total electric generation mix remains at about 9% and 
declines as the country’s total increases.143  Most of that amount 
consists of generation from large hydro facilities, which usually take 
the form of major dams built in the early- to mid-twentieth century.144  
Due to environmental, financial, and siting constraints, meeting 
additional demand through the construction of additional large 
hydroelectric facilities is not a realistic option in this country.145  
Nuclear energy comprises about 20% of the mix, but, for price, 
environmental, and regulatory reasons, that share is unlikely to 
 
140 See CCSREG INTERIM REPORT, supra note 54, at 1–2. 
141 See Paulina Jaramillo et al., Comparative Life-Cycle Air Emissions of Coal, 
Domestic Natural Gas, LNG, and SNG for Electricity Generation, 41 ENVTL. SCI. & 
TECH. 6290, 6294 (2007) (“[I]ntegrated coal gasification combined cycle (IGCC) and 
natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) power plants could be installed.  [These] plants are 
generally more efficient . . . than the current fleet of power plants.”). 
142 The carbon footprint of LNG must include power consumed and emissions from 
processes related to liquefaction at the source, pumping to port, ship transportation, and 
regasification.  Id. at 6291–92.  Until recently, projected domestic consumption was 
estimated to outpace supplies, requiring a rapid substitution of LNG for native natural gas.  
However, note that recent gas discoveries have made native gas more available and a more 
attractive substitution for coal, at least in the short term.  Ben Casselman, U.S. Gas Fields 
Go from Bust to Boom, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2009, at A1 (“A massive natural-gas 
discovery here in northern Louisiana heralds a big shift in the nation’s energy landscape.  
After an era of declining production, the U.S. is now swimming in natural gas.”).  
Nevertheless, natural gas futures markets still anticipate large price increases in the 
coming years.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SHORT-TERM 
ENERGY OUTLOOK 6 (2010), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/jan10 
.pdf (“[S]pot price averaged $4.06 per Mcf in 2009, and the forecast price averages $5.36 
per Mcf in 2010 and $6.12 per Mcf in 2011.”). 
143 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER 
ANNUAL 2008, at 2 fig.ES1 (2010), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/ 
epa/epa.pdf. 
144 See id. (showing hydroelectric power accounting for 6%). 
145 DOUGLAS G. HALL ET AL., IDAHO NAT’L LAB., FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT OF THE 
WATER ENERGY RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES FOR NEW LOW POWER AND SMALL 
HYDRO CLASSES OF HYDROELECTRIC PLANTS 9 fig.3 (2006), available at 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/pdfs/doewater-11263.pdf (showing large 
hydro sites account for less than 1% of all feasible hydroelectric sites in the United States, 
yet have the potential for 26% of the total estimated 300,000 MWa gross power potential). 
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increase significantly.146  Also, although the production of nuclear 
energy emits less carbon than fossil fuel-based generation, if viewed 
on a life cycle basis, its carbon footprint is actually substantial.147 
All remaining renewables comprise slightly more than 3% of the 
energy mix.148  We have seen dramatic percentage increases in solar 
production, but these increases occurred on an almost insignificant 
base of existing generation.  No matter how rapidly solar energy 
builds market penetration, it will be at least a decade before solar 
displaces a significant portion of our current fossil fuel-based 
generation.  Biofuel is problematic as a low-carbon substitute because 
it involves either feedstocks, such as corn, that have high-carbon 
production processes or other feedstocks that require converting large 
land areas that may now be forested or otherwise currently operate as 
large carbon sinks.149  Development of algae- or bacteria-based 
systems will take years to research, demonstrate, and 
 
146 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. DATABASE, supra note 114.  The “nuclear 
renaissance” proposed by advocates has not materialized.  Most of the thirty applications 
filed during the last administration were generated by a deadline in subsidy legislation and 
are not active.  Mary Anne Sullivan, The Many Challenges of the “Full Portfolio” 
Approach: Utilities Prepare for Climate Change Regulation, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. 
FOUND., Apr. 10–11, 2008, at 12–14.  “Next generation” plants in Finland and France are 
suffering cost and time overruns similar to the prior generation of plants.  See MARK 
COOPER, VT. LAW SCH., THE ECONOMICS OF NUCLEAR REACTORS: RENAISSANCE OR 
RELAPSE? 41 (2009), available at http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/Cooper%20 
Report%20on%20Nuclear%20Economics%20FINAL%5B1%5D.pdf.  Thus far, the 
United States has been unable to find an area for a waste disposal site.  Reprocessing 
plants, proposed as a solution by nuclear advocates, actually leave most of the high-level 
waste in place and in need of long-term sequestration.  Nuclear power plants remain a 
prohibitively expensive source of power.  See id. at 33.  One author recently estimated that 
doubling our nuclear capacity through the addition of one hundred new plants would cost 
over a trillion dollars.  Id. at 1 (estimating lifetime costs of one hundred new reactors 
between $1.9 and $4.4 trillon).  No private entity has pursued a plant without some sort of 
government subsidy.  Id. 
147 COOPER, supra note 146, at 57–58 (noting that construction, decommissioning, and 
early fuel cycle of nuclear reactors are all energy intensive with CO2 emissions increasing 
over the life of a reactor). 
148 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 143, at 2 fig.ES1 (showing “other 
renewables” accounted for 3.1% of electricity generation in 2008). 
149 THE RUSH TO ETHANOL: NOT ALL BIOFUELS ARE CREATED EQUAL 22–23 (2007) 
(explaining that an increase in feedstock cultivation leads to higher pesticide use, soil 
depletion, and deforestation, depleting natural CO2 absorption and increasing emissions); 
see Sindya N. Bhanoo, Calculating Emissions Is Problematic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/23/science/earth/23biofuel.html?emc=eta1.  See 
generally Mark Z. Jacobson, The Short-Term Cooling but Long-Term Global Warming 
Due to Biomass Burning, 17 J. CLIMATE 2909 (2004) (providing a detailed analysis on 
emissions and climate change for biofuels and deforestation). 
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commercialize.150  Wind energy can now be priced competitively 
with fossil fuel generation, even without tax subsidies, in many parts 
of the country.  Yet, again, its dramatic growth is on a small base.151 
For both wind and solar energy, transmission constitutes a 
constraint.  The current configuration of the nation’s power 
transmission grid is not optimized to bring power to users from 
locations where wind and solar energy will most likely develop.  
While wind energy now and solar energy in a decade may be 
competitive in the market,152 neither can afford to internalize the cost 
of transmission necessary to transport power to the urban centers that 
are the locus of demand.153  The variable or intermittent nature of 
these sources also limits their share of total use.  Even a “smart grid” 
possesses physical attributes that limit the amount of such variable or 
intermittent energy it can absorb.154  The remainder must either be an 
uninterruptible supply, or at least dispatchable or deliverable on 
demand, or consist of a “base load” currently provided both by large 
 
150 See Jad Mouawad, A Biofuel Drop in the Bucket?, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009, at B1 
(indicating commercialization of such systems is five to ten years away). 
151 See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, RENEWABLE 
ENERGY TRENDS IN CONSUMPTION AND ELECTRICITY 2007, at 23 tbl.1.11 (2009), 
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/page/trends/trends.pdf 
(showing increase in total wind generation by a factor of more than two from 2003 to 
2007); cf. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, RENEWABLE ENERGY 
CONSUMPTION AND ELECTRICITY PRELIMINARY STATISTICS 2008, at 4 tbl.1 (2009), 
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/alternate/page/renew_energy_consump/ 
pretrends08.pdf (reporting wind energy consumption in 2007 at 0.3% of total energy 
consumption and 4.67% of renewable energy consumption). 
152 RON PERNICK & CLINT WILDER, CLEAN EDGE, UTILITY SOLAR ASSESSMENT 
(USA) STUDY: REACHING TEN PERCENT SOLAR BY 2025, at 7 (2008) (projecting solar 
photovoltaics will reach cost parity on a kilowatt-hour basis with conventional electricity 
by 2015); Global Energy Technology Strategy Essential to Addressing Climate Change, 
17 AIR POLLUTION CONSULTANT 1.7, 1.10 (2007) (noting wind generation costs are 
competitive but solar is not because of large capital costs); see also David R. Hodas, 
Ecosystem Subsidies of Fossil Fuels, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 599, 612–13 (2007) 
(suggesting solar energy is not cost competitive with fossil fuels because solar reflects the 
true cost of capturing energy and, thus, needs market adjustments to justify capital costs). 
153 Government action to support such transmission has been tied up in financial and 
regional conflict.  See Matthew L. Wald, Debate on Clean Energy Leads to a Regional 
Battle over Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009, at A13. 
154 The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) notes that, to date, the 
smart grid has only experienced variable generation less than 5% of total annual 
generation.  N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., ACCOMMODATING HIGH LEVELS OF 
VARIABLE GENERATION 4 (2009).  However, increased generation from sources such as 
wind, solar, and some hydro is expected to increase variability.  Id. at i.  Increased 
variability in the bulk power system could present a threat to reliability and, therefore, 
must be managed through NERC standards and advances in technology.  See id. at 4–5. 
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coal and natural gas plants, which must somehow be replaced, and by 
the existing fleet of nuclear and hydro plants, which is unlikely to 
experience a significant increase.  This continued need to rely on base 
load poses a difficult problem because, even where alternative 
generation technologies are or become available, the effort to replace 
high-carbon base generation with low-carbon alternatives faces the 
heavy impediment of slow amortization of the existing fleet.  Annual 
depreciation rates for base-load plants are sufficiently small enough 
that, even assuming an optimistic low carbon for high carbon swap 
rate, between one and two decades would pass before the fleet 
showed any substantial change in mix. 
Other approaches to the intermittent and variable nature of 
renewables include the development of devices to store large amounts 
of electric energy (such as compressed air, flywheels, and advanced 
batteries), but commercialization of these technologies, while 
growing, has not yet been reached.155  Wave energy is a significant 
possibility and may have low environmental impact and low 
variability, but again, it will be at least a decade before this source of 
energy generates any significant share of our electricity.156 
2.  Demand-Side Management: Efficiency, Demand Response, and 
Grid Improvements 
The United States needs a source of carbon-efficient power to meet 
increases in demand and hopefully allow reductions during the next 
decade or so before renewables can make major inroads into the 
current coal- and natural gas-based electric generation.  That “source” 
is demand-side management (DSM), an effort to meet demand by 
reducing and managing power needs.  DSM includes increases in the 
efficiency of the power system.  With appropriate policies and 
organizational efforts, DSM can provide the same substantive 
electricity services provided now with substantially less electricity.  A 
watt of energy saved is the same as a watt generated, or, as Amory 
 
155 Id. at 49–50 (discussing the possibility for storage technologies such as battery 
energy storage, flywheel energy storage, and compressed air energy storage to assist 
integration of large-scale variable generation). 
156 See generally Minerals Mgmt. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Alternative Energy 
and Alternate Use Guide: Wave Energy, http://www.ocsenergy.anl.gov/guide/ 
wave/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 2, 2010) (indicating that wave power has significant 
potential to offset growing energy demand but is not yet commercialized). 
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Lovins terms it, a “negawatt” is the same as a kilowatt.157  Such 
enhancements are referred to as “energy efficiency.”  In addition, 
shifting the time at which the demand for power occurs can reduce 
peak demand.  This shift is referred to as “demand response.”  The 
power grid can also be improved to create substantial savings, 
adopting a package of improvements loosely referred to as the “smart 
grid.”  These options are discussed briefly below. 
Just as ratepayer funds have routinely been invested in the 
construction of new power plants, ratepayer funds can be invested in 
energy efficiency.158  Traditionally, a utility or other local provider, 
which determined the need to meet new demand, received regulatory 
approval to construct or participate in the development of a new 
generating plant.  The applicable public utility commissions (PUCs) 
typically approved rates that incorporated the cost of the capital for 
the plant—frequently in the form of tax-exempt bonds—into the 
applicable rates.  The same utilities, state agencies, or hybrid 
“efficiency utilities,” such as Efficiency Vermont, can similarly invest 
ratepayer funds in ways that reduce demand.159  For example, 
Efficiency Vermont can pay hardware stores to subsidize the price of 
compact fluorescent lightbulbs (CFLs) to $0.99 instead of the market 
price of $3.00.160  The utility can contract with an industrial facility to 
 
157 See Amory B. Lovins, Saving Gigabucks with Negawatts, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 
21, 1985, at 19.  “Negawatt” is roughly defined as a unit of power that is not consumed 
and was coined in 1985 by Amory B. Lovins.  See id. 
158 COWART, supra note 55, at 66–70 (proposing mechanisms to encourage energy 
efficiency from utilities including system benefits charges). 
159 See generally MAGGIE ELDRIDGE ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT 
ECON., ACEEE REPORT NO. E086, THE 2008 STATE ENERGY EFFICIENCY SCORECARD 6–
8 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 ACEEE SCORECARD] (benchmarking state energy efficiency 
efforts).  Most states allow utilities to undertake this effort under supervision with varying 
degrees of rigor.  In some states, state agencies deliver efficiency services directly.  
Efficiency Vermont is the nation’s first efficiency utility.  Efficiency Vt., About Us, 
http://www.efficiencyvermont.com/pages/common/AboutUs/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).  It 
is funded by an energy efficiency charge applied statewide to all ratepayers.  Id.  The 
funds pay for energy efficiency improvements in residential and commercial applications.  
Id.  For a great case study review of fourteen state ratepayer-funded efficiency utility 
programs, see HARRINGTON, supra note 118; infra note 195, which elaborates on state 
programs with substantial experience and success with the efficient use of funds generated 
by voluntary cap-and-trade programs; and infra note 202, which elaborates on state 
programs with substantial experience and success with the efficient use of funds generated 
by charges applied to all users.  This hybrid approach may be the most effective. 
160 See Efficiency Vt., RebateCenter, http://www.efficiencyvermont.com/pages/ 
Residential/RebateCenter/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).  Currently, Efficiency Vermont’s 
statewide CFL rebate program offers in-store coupons for various amounts off Energy Star 
light bulbs.  Id.  CFLs use “75 percent less energy and [last] about 10 times longer than an 
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pay outright for the replacement of all of its inefficient electric motors 
with new efficient models, or Efficiency Vermont can subsidize the 
conversion with low- or no-interest loans.  Utilities or state agencies 
can invest ratepayer funds to either change out incandescent lighting 
for florescent or replace older industrial heating or cooling processes, 
including heating, ventilating, and air conditioning units, with high-
efficiency models that perform the same function but with less 
electricity consumption.  Outside of the electric sector, building 
retrofit and the construction of new buildings incorporating highly 
insulating walls, roofs, and windows serve the same function as 
poorly insulated structures but save fuel for heating and cooling.161 
Such efficiency services require the finance or subsidy of the 
applicable appliance or industrial/residential feature or process and 
substantial organizational development to locate opportunities, enter 
into relevant agreements, deliver the service, and conduct verification.  
While the cost of this effort is considerable, it is substantially lower 
than the cost of construction and operation of energy generation.  
States such as California, Oregon, Washington, and New York, as 
well as the New England states, have substantial experience with 
these efficiency programs in the electricity sector and have developed 
sophisticated systems for pricing the cost of saved electricity to the 
ratepayer per watt, the cost of the “production” of “negawatts” that 
can be compared to the production of megawatts.162  As stated earlier, 
this process would manage demand through efficiency costs in the 
range of $0.02 to $0.04 per kilowatt saved.163  This compares to a 
national average retail electricity price of $0.11 per kilowatt for 
residential customers and $0.09 across all sectors.164 
Note that a comparison of the efficiency costs to retail rather than 
wholesale electric prices is appropriate here.  The retail price of 
 
incandescent bulb.”  Energy Star, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Light Bulbs (CFLs), 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=cfls.pr_cfls (last visited Feb. 2, 2010). 
161 See JENNIFER THORNE AMANN & ERIC MENDELSOHN, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN 
ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., REPORT NO. A052, COMPREHENSIVE COMMERCIAL RETROFIT 
PROGRAMS: A REVIEW OF ACTIVITY AND OPPORTUNITIES 7 (2005) (estimating potential 
building energy savings from a comprehensive commercial retrofit program as 11% to 
26% of consumption). 
162 See 2008 ACEEE SCORECARD, supra note 159, at 5 tbl.2 (ranking the overall utility 
and public benefits programs in all fifty states and concluding the top states in order were 
Vermont, Connecticut, California, Minnesota, Oregon, New York, Massachusetts, and 
Washington). 
163 Id.; see also supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
164 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
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generated electricity is higher than the wholesale price because of the 
cost of transmission, meter reading, billing, and other customer 
services that are normally factored into retail rates.  Efficiency gains 
generally occur on the customer side of the meter, are not in need of 
transmission, relieve transmission congestion, and reduce the demand 
for new transmission and distribution facilities—a cost savings not 
included in the above calculations.  Efficiency improvements also do 
not generally increase the metering and service costs reflected in retail 
rates.  The more appropriate price comparison is between the $0.02 to 
$0.04 cost per kilowatt-hour saved by efficiency services, which 
includes customer costs, to substantially higher retail rates that 
include transmission and service. 
Americans are far from exhausting opportunities for reducing 
demand by increasing efficiency.  As discussed below, most states 
have yet to begin serious efficiency efforts.  In those states that have 
undertaken substantial efforts, the resulting gains in efficiency 
flatlined per capita growth in electricity demand,165 despite increases 
in economic activity, and, together with some adoption of renewable 
sources, total generation needs in such states frequently remain stable 
or decline. 
The examples above focused on “end use” efficiency.  
Improvement of the physical and technological nature of the electric 
transmission and distribution166 system has promise as well.  The 
current grid is a patchwork of poorly integrated systems, in many 
cases utilizing lines, switches, capacitors, and other elements whose 
design dates from the early-twentieth century and whose component 
equipment may not be much newer.  Grid operators frequently have 
only a general sense of grid performance and power flows.  They 
sustain performance by ensuring that substantial excess generation 
 
165 ANANT SUDARSHAN & JAMES SWEENEY, U.S. ASS’N FOR ENERGY ECON., 
DECONSTRUCTING THE ROSENFELD CURVE: UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA’S LOW PER 
CAPITA ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION 16–19 (2008), available at http://www.usaee.org/ 
usaee2008/submissions/OnlineProceedings/Sudarshan_Sweeney.pdf (discussing 
California’s low electricity consumption per capita despite the rising rate of U.S. 
consumption as a whole and the reasons for the difference); see also LEE SCHIPPER & 
JAMES MCMAHON, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT ECON., REPORT NO. E951, 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN CALIFORNIA: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (1995). 
166 Transmission refers to “the transportation of electricity over long distances at high 
voltages, typically from generators to local utility companies.”  TIMOTHY J. BRENNAN ET 
AL., ALTERNATING CURRENTS: ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13 (2002).  
Distribution refers to “the transformation of high-voltage electricity to lower voltages and 
the delivery of that power to users for lighting, heating, air conditioning, appliances, and 
other personal and commercial uses.”  Id. 
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capacity is online.  Current grid reliability standards require that 
plants that are not needed at the time operate just to provide backup 
power in the event a mechanical malfunction takes a plant or 
transmission line off-line.167  These plants consume fuel for reserve 
purposes alone; their turbines are literally running just as a precaution 
called “spinning reserve.”  Extra generation is also required to make 
up for line losses due to the old design and age of equipment.168  
Development of a modern, computerized system of generation and 
distribution can reduce the ways in which the grid itself consumes 
power or requires excess generation.169  Depending on the nature and 
scope of these improvements, such grid upgrades are estimated to 
reduce annual carbon emissions by between 5% and 16% by 2030, a 
substantial contribution.170 
 
167 Eric Hirst & Brendan Kirby, Technical and Market Issues for Operating Reserves, 
ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 1999, at 36 (discussing the required balance between production and 
consumption to maintain the grid and operating reserves necessary when a major generator 
or transmission line fails). 
168 Line loss is defined as “[e]lectric energy lost because of the transmission of 
electricity.  Much of the loss is thermal in nature.”  U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t 
of Energy, Energy Glossary: L, http://www.eia.doe.gov/glossary/glossary_l.htm (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2010); see also Nathanael Greene & Roel Hammerschlag, Small and Clean 
Is Beautiful: Exploring the Emissions of Distributed Generation and Pollution Prevention 
Policies, ELECTRICITY J., June 2000, at 50, 57 (discussing the benefits of distributed 
generation, including the decrease in line losses) (“Depending on the size, grid, loading 
and distance between load and generator, line losses can vary from just a few percent to 
20% to 30%.  Average line losses vary from 5% to 10%.”). 
169 See ELEC. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 120, at 10 (stating that smart meters can 
“reduce . . . electricity consumption by up to 25% during peak periods”); see also id. at 8 
(discussing reduction in distribution losses).  The U.S. Energy Information Administration 
believes that a smart grid will “enable more efficient use of the transmission and 
distribution grid, lower line losses, facilitate greater use of renewables, and provide 
information to utilities and their customers that will lead to greater investment in energy 
efficiency and reduced peak load demands.”  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, AN UPDATED ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2009 REFERENCE CASE REFLECTING 
PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT AND RECENT 
CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 10 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/ 
oiaf/servicerpt/stimulus/arra.html. 
170 Smart Grid or Smart Policies: Which Comes First?, ISSUESLETTER (Reg. 
Assistance Project, Montpelier, Vt.), July 2009, at 7 n.16 [hereinafter Smart Grid], 
available at http://www.raponline.org/showpdf.asp?PDF_URL=Pubs/Issuesletter 
_July09.pdf.  Note that the “smart grid” concept is defined in various ways depending on 
the interests of the proponent.  Some studies limit the improvements to remotely read 
meters, which may financially benefit utilities that can replace meter readers with 
automated systems but would not operate to improve carbon emissions per se.  Others may 
take the opposite tack, including arguably extraneous elements in the smart grid to 
enhance the claimed benefits.  See generally id. at 1–4.  Some estimates, for example, 
include as part of the smart grid coordinated off-peak charging by pervasive, plug-in 
hybrid-electric vehicles that then discharge at peak periods if not in use.  See id. at 4.  The 
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A shift of demand away from the peak is also a means to produce 
substantial financial savings for consumers and may, but not 
necessarily will, reduce carbon emissions.  Utilities and private 
efficiency enterprises are now installing and operating systems that 
allow remote coordination of industrial, commercial consumers to 
reduce power demand at peak periods and pass the savings along to 
those entities participating.171  This process, known as demand 
response, promises substantial cost savings.172  Factories can shut 
down certain processes at peak periods and share in the resulting and 
frequently very large savings.173  If the “smart grid” upgrades include 
remotely accessible, price-sensitive meters that can be linked to smart 
appliances, the grid would enable remote control of household 
devices.  Local service providers could cycle air conditioners or other 
electric appliances off in thousands of participating households to 
reduce the peak demand usually met through fossil fuel-based 
generation.174  These processes are commercially available now.  
However, such demand-response efforts will not necessarily operate 
to reduce carbon emissions since, while demand is redistributed away 
from the peak hours and ratepayer expenditures are reduced, the total 
power demand remains unchanged.  Funds can be liberated and 
invested in efficiency, but carbon savings occur only if inefficient 
peaking units with high-carbon footprints are replaced with lower 
carbon emission sources to serve as a base load. 
Estimates of the electricity consumption savings from these 
efficiency and demand-response efforts vary, but the Electricity 
Advisory Committee estimates that efficiency and demand services 
could reduce total electricity consumption between 10% and 15% by 
 
low range of savings cited in the text assumes only grid elements available today.  The 
higher number cited (16%) includes high-potential technologies available in the longer 
term, such as large-scale storage devices, but not this use of electric vehicles.  Id. at 7 n.16. 
171 EnerNOC, Inc., for example, deployed PowerTalk in Boston, Massachusetts, in 
April 2009.  Press Release, EnerNOC, Inc., EnerNOC Deploys Industry’s First Presence-
Enabled Smart Grid Technology (Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://www.enernoc.com/ 
press/press-releases.php (follow “2009” hyperlink; then follow “EnerNOC Deploys 
Industry’s First Presence-Enabled Smart Grid Technology” hyperlink).  PowerTalk is the 
first smart-grid technology that enables real-time communication between smart meters 
and EnerNOC’s Network Operations Center, which can send information more efficiently 
to customers.  Id. 
172 See ELEC. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 120, at 9 (discussing the smart grid’s 
benefits as a “demand response [and] load management [program]”). 
173 Id. at 5–6 (discussing the economic and environmental benefits of smart grids). 
174 See id. at 4 (describing smart meter installations in Texas and California). 
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2025.175  Shifting demand away from peak periods through demand 
reponse could reduce demand at peak periods by 25%, although 
carbon emission reductions would be lower and would depend on the 
nature of the substituted nonpeak generation.176  A substantial but 
realistic effort comparable to that already undertaken in a number of 
states could eliminate the need for new fossil fuel-based generation, 
and pilot smart-meter programs show decreases in consumption as 
high as 37%.177  As discussed above, grid improvements could affect 
additional savings. 
Thus, regardless of the choice of tax or cap and trade, legislative 
efforts to control carbon for the electricity sector and for residential, 
commercial, and industrial uses must include funding and policies 
that enhance the delivery of efficiency services, grid improvements, 
and possibly demand response on a nationwide basis.  In the absence 
of necessary funds and policies, the tax will not reduce demand in the 
absence of a lower carbon alternative, the cap itself will not reduce 
demand, and legislators will lift the cap or delay the dates for its 
attainment.  This Article first discusses the funding below and then, in 
Part D below, the policies necessary to produce the desired reductions 
in carbon emissions. 
3.  Funding for Efficiency, Demand Response, and Grid 
Improvements 
States with successful efficiency and demand-response systems use 
some sort of surcharge on rates to fund the programs that deliver 
efficiency services.178  Without duplicating the successful state 
programs on a national scale, both cap-and-trade and tax legislation 
will fail to have the desired effect.179  Fortunately, however, either 
one of these legislative approaches can generate sufficient funds, 
when coupled with appropriate policies at the national and state level, 
to deliver carbon reduction through efficiency, grid reform, and 
demand management.  The tax itself can be partly devoted to this 
 
175 Id. at 6 tbl.2-1. 
176 Id. 
177 See Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Unveils Plans for One of the Most 
Advanced Smart Grid Initiatives in the Nation, BUSINESS WIRE, July 13, 2009 (reporting 
that Baltimore Gas and Electric Company’s advanced metering and consumer rebate 
program showed that customers reduced their consumption during peak periods by 26% to 
37%). 
178 See infra Part I.D. 
179 See infra notes 195, 202. 
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purpose as well as a portion of the revenues from the sale of carbon 
allowances. 
The amount of revenue generated in the case of a tax simply 
depends on the tax itself, but current tax proposals are estimated to 
produce approximately $60 billion per year.180  Analysis of revenues 
from a cap-and-trade system depends on the structure of the 
legislation.181  Revenues derive from the sale of carbon allowances.  
In a pure auction system, all carbon allowances are created by the 
government and either sold in an open market to generators that need 
the allowances to continue to operate, or distributed to local 
electricity providers or consumer trustees that, in turn, can sell 
them.182  The market sets the price.  The RGGI market auctions 100% 
of the carbon allowances.183  Revenues from the operation of an 
auction, or multiple auctions in a nationwide system, would dwarf any 
prior experience with such markets and are currently estimated in the 
range of $130 billion to $366 billion.184 
In the case of cap and trade, actual revenues will likely be much 
lower because not all allowances will be auctioned.  Although many 
experts and advocates of efficiency and renewables favor a system 
where all carbon allowances are auctioned, most proposals under 
 
180 For example, the Save Our Climate Act of 2009, H.R. 594, 111th Cong. § 2, 
proposes an initial carbon tax of $10 per ton of carbon emitted.  According to the U.S. 
Energy Information Association, total U.S. carbon dioxide emissions in 2007 were 6022 
million metric tons.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, EMISSIONS OF 
GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 2007, at 13 (2008), available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/pdf/0573(2007).pdf.  Multiplying $10 per ton by 
6022 million tons of carbon, House Bill 594 will generate over $60 billion in revenue per 
year if carbon emission rates remain stagnant.  However, from 2006 to 2007, carbon 
emission rates increased 1.6%. 
181 In 2007, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Joint Program on the 
Science and Policy of Global Change analyzed various bills proposing cap-and-trade 
systems, including the Lieberman-McCain Bill of 2007.  SERGEY PALTSEV ET AL., MIT 
JOINT PROGRAM ON THE SCIENCE & POLICY OF GLOBAL CHANGE, REPORT NO. 146, 
ASSESSMENT OF U.S. CAP-AND-TRADE PROPOSALS 2 (2007), available at 
http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC_Rpt146.pdf.  The report analyzed the 
bills using the MIT Integrated Global System Model and the MIT Emissions Prediction 
and Policy Analysis Model.  Id.  Though revenue depends on a number of factors, 
including allocation, MIT estimated that the potential revenue streams from proposed cap-
and-trade programs would be “substantial, ranging in just the first period of the policy 
from $130 billion in the 287 bmt case to $366 billion in the 167 bmt case.”  Id. at 24. 
182 Id. (discussing the differences between allowances given away as opposed to 
auctioned for purposes of the study). 
183 See infra note 195. 
184 PALTSEV ET AL., supra note 181, at 24. 
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consideration contain either partial auctions or no auctions.185  Power 
companies prefer that the government allocate carbon allowances to 
current emitters at no cost.186  In that case, revenues would be nil.  
Bills in Congress compromise through an auction of some of the 
allowances.187 
Potential funding for efficiency services could be reduced by 
diversion to stakeholders that want a portion of such revenue to 
mitigate their real and perceived costs of a cap-and-trade system or a 
carbon tax.188  Low-income ratepayers want to be compensated to 
neutralize rate increases due to the impacts of the tax or cost of the 
carbon allowances.189  Energy-consuming economic industries want 
assistance for the same reason.190  The congressional cap-and-trade 
legislative effort has provoked a feeding frenzy of interests that have 
 
185 See Obama for Am., Barack Obama and Joe Biden: Promoting a Healthy 
Environment, available at http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/issues/EnvironmentFact 
Sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2010) (stating that a “100 percent auction ensures that all 
large corporate polluters pay for every ton of emissions they release, rather than giving 
these emission rights away for free to coal and oil companies”); see also CAL. ENERGY 
COMM’N, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DESIGNING A GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE 
SYSTEM FOR CALIFORNIA 58 (2007), available at http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/ 
publications/market_advisory_committee/2007-06-29_MAC_FINAL_REPORT.PDF 
(discussing the pros and cons of both the free distribution of allowances and the auction of 
all allowances, concluding that a mixed approach is superior). 
186 CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, supra note 185, at 58 (reporting that free distribution 
advocates argue companies already have the right to pollute; therefore, the free allowances 
are the equivalent of traditional regulation in which companies are “allowed to emit for 
free up to a certain level”). 
187 The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, provides for an initial 
auction of 5% of the power sector allowances. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 311 (proposing 
addition of § 726 to the Clean Air Act).  Most of the remaining allowances are distributed 
to LDCs at no charge.  See id.  Those LDCs may sell them to generators, which need to 
retire them to operate.  See id.  Those sales would create a subsequent market generating 
revenues which the LDC could invest in efficiency services.  H.R. 2454 § 321 (proposing 
addition of § 783(b)(1) to the Clean Air Act, which provides for the distribution of 
allowances for electricity LDCs, and proposing addition of § 783(e)(1) to the Clean Air 
Act, which provides for distribution of allowances for small LDCs). 
188 See CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, supra note 185, at 55 (stating that the advantages of 
auctioning the allowances include the ability to use revenues to advance program goals, 
use revenues to advance the same treatment of new entrants and existing emitters, and 
avoid windfall profits and perverse incentives). 
189 For a discussion of industries affected by or exposed to cap-and-trade programs, see 
supra note 70 and accompanying text.  See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 
ANALYSIS OF THE WAXMAN-MARKEY DISCUSSION DRAFT: THE AMERICAN CLEAN 
ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 30 (2009), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/pdfs/WaxmanMarkeyExecutiveSummary 
.pdf. 
190 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 189, at 4–6. 
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identified potential impacts on their constituencies.  The same 
constituencies would also push for the diversion of funds from any 
carbon tax.  Dedication of some of the revenue for these purposes 
may be necessary and socially important,191 but, to the extent that 
these interests operate to produce legislation that reduces income 
available to successfully fund nationwide demand-side management, 
the success of the entire effort, be it tax or cap and trade, is placed at 
risk. 
The most extreme of these diversion scenarios would divert all of 
the funds away from efficiency or demand response by simply 
providing for a return of all the proceeds from an auction directly to 
citizens for use as they see fit.192  Such “cap-and-dividend” 
legislation193 would constitute the worst form of legislation: society 
would go through the administrative and financial effort of cap and 
trade in a manner that might compensate impacted social and 
industrial sectors, but not much real-world reduction in carbon would 
occur.  The stakeholders or citizens in receipt of the funds would 
possess new financial resources that may compensate for the 
perceived or actual added costs of the cap-and-trade system, but 
society itself will have developed no realistic short-term solutions to 
reduce electricity demand.  The effort would create an illusion of 
progress without the substance. 
Even a system that auctions a minority of the allowances, however, 
has the potential to generate substantial levels of funding for the 
delivery of nationwide demand-side management on a scale much 
larger than any prior effort.  Recent estimates of the amount of 
funding available for demand-side management from the Waxman-
Markey Bill range from $56.7 billion to $95 billion, depending on 
 
191 Milne, supra note 36, at 5 (stating “[i]f all of the revenue from the tax is used to 
provide tax relief of some form, the tax is ‘revenue neutral.’  The new revenue offsets the 
revenue loss from the tax cuts, rendering the tax package as a whole revenue neutral.”); id. 
at 16 (discussing placement of the carbon tax revenue into a deficit-reduction package, 
which would, in turn, benefit a broad range of constituents). 
192 JOHN BAILEY, NEW RULES PROJECT, CARBON CAPS WITH UNIVERSAL DIVIDENDS: 
EQUITABLE, ETHICAL & POLITICALLY EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY 1 (2008) (advocating 
for dividing dividends from carbon allowance auctions equally on a per capita basis).  The 
rationale is based on the theory that clean air (lower emissions) is a public commons, and 
therefore the revenue should be returned to the public.  Id. at 2.  Bailey also considers the 
prospects of spending revenue on efficiency and renewable energy.  Id. at 6. 
193 Such legislation was introduced by Representative Christopher Van Hollen on April 
1, 2009.  See generally Cap and Dividend Act of 2009, H.R. 1862, 111th Cong. 
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how local service providers use the allowances distributed to them.194  
It is through the application of a portion of this funding to efficiency 
and demand response that these bills will have effect, not through the 
cap nor through the tax. 
D.  A Successful Demand-Side Management Program Will Require 
Substantial Additions to Governmental Policies and to 
Governmental Capacity in the States 
The story does not end, however, with availability of funds.  The 
funds have to be spent, and the necessary services have to be 
delivered effectively.  The effort requires an array of policies at the 
national and state level and a complex of public and private capacities 
at the state and local level.  While some states have the systems and 
the people in place to absorb funding of this magnitude, the great 
majority does not.195  A substantially increased governmental 
 
194 Compare CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, supra note 89, at 33–39, with 
AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., HR. 2454 ADDRESSES CLIMATE 
CHANGE THROUGH A WIDE VARIETY OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY MEASURES (2009), 
http://www.aceee.org/energy/national/HR2454_Estimate06-01.pdf. 
195 In general, states with experience effectively spending funds to reduce emissions 
have acquired that experience through either charges applied to all users or the 
administration of funding derived from cap-and-trade programs.  Currently, only one 
voluntary cap-and-trade program is fully operational in the United States: the RGGI.  
Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Welcome, http://www.rggi.org/home (last visited Feb. 2, 
2010).  Two other programs—the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord 
(MGGRA) and the Western Climate Initiative (WCI)—are currently under development.  
See Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, Home, http://www.midwestern 
accord.org/index.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2010); W. Climate Initiative, History, 
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/history (last visited Feb. 2, 2010). 
 RGGI includes the following ten Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states: Connecticut, 
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont.  Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Participating States, 
http://www.rggi.org/states (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).  Collaboratively, the ten states wrote 
a CO2 Budget Trading Program Model Rule, which each state then implemented through 
state regulations.  Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Model Rule, http://www.rggi.org/ 
about/history/model_rule (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).  RGGI specifically caps emissions 
from power plants and auctions allowances from plants under their allotted cap.  Reg’l 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI Benefits, http://www.rggi.org/about/benefits (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2010).  The intent of the program is for the states to invest the proceeds from the 
auctions in programs that benefit consumers, such as efficiency and renewable energy.  Id. 
 Thus far, RGGI has conducted six auctions.  Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Auction 
Results, http://www.rggi.org/co2-auctions/results (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).  The net 
revenues were: $38,575,738.09 on September 25, 2008; $106,489,935.24 on December 17, 
2008; $117,248,629.80 on March 18, 2009; $104,242,445.00 on June 17, 2009; 
$66,278,239.35 on September 9, 2009; and $61,587,120.90 on December 2, 2009.  Id.  
Each state allocates its share of the revenue individually.  Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 
Investment Programs, http://www.rggi.org/states/program_investments (last visited Feb. 2, 
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presence in the demand-side management arena will have to be 
developed in order to bring the promise of either a tax or a cap-and-
trade system to fruition. 
For reasons discussed above, markets alone do not cause the 
delivery of efficiency services.  A successful effort involves both 
standards and government involvement in delivery.  Some part of this 
effort should take the form of legislated standards and must occur at 
the federal level.  Increases in our automobile fleet efficiency require 
higher CAFE standards, an effort recently undertaken but still needing 
further upward modification in mileage standards, investment in 
transit at the federal and state levels, and changes to local land use.196  
But to address energy demand from the industrial, commercial, and 
residential sectors, solutions lie in changes in state approaches to 
energy efficiency and demand response.  Some states have appliance 
efficiency standards, but most do not.  National standards for heating, 
air condition, lighting, and refrigeration would provide the backbone 
of a national DSM effort.  While the public discussion of the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 has focused on its 
cap-and-trade provisions, the legislation actually contains ground-
breaking national appliance standards197 and national building 
standards,198 as well as national renewable portfolio standards,199 
which will assist in the eventual development and deployment of 
renewable energy sources.  For the reasons discussed herein, these 
standards constitute an essential companion to the cap; without more 
efficient appliances and buildings, achieving the cap will prove 
 
2010).  For example, New Hampshire, Maine, and Vermont allocate 100% of their RGGI 
revenue to either energy efficiency or demand-side management.  See N.H. DEP’T OF 
ENVTL. SERVS., RGGI ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
SERVICES AND PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 9, 11, 12–13 (2009), available at 
http://www.puc.nh.gov/SustainableEnergy/GHGERF/10-9-09 RGGI Annual Report to NH 
Legislature.pdf.  Maryland allocates the least to energy efficiency or demand-side 
management with only 46%.  S.B. 268, 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 1999).  The other five 
states fall in a range of 65% to 88%.  See N.H. DEP’T OF ENVTL. SERVS., supra, at 8–12. 
 It is likely too early to know if the investments in energy efficiency or demand-side 
management from RGGI have been effective, considering that those allocations only 
began after the first auction in September 2008.  But, encouragingly, nine of the ten RGGI 
states realized a reduction in megawatt-hours sold from 2007 to 2008—Maine was the 
exception.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. DATABASE, supra note 114. 
196 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (tracking the freeze and unfreeze of 
CAFE standards). 
197 See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 
212–14, 218. 
198 Id. §§ 201–209. 
199 Id. §§ 101–103. 
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problematic and Congress will find it difficult to resist extensions of 
time. 
Some grid improvements should be planned at the national level by 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the U.S. 
Department of Energy.  Some must occur regionally, planned and 
carried out by regional transmission operators or regional 
transmission associations.200  However, the nature of the delivery of 
efficiency and demand response makes the implementation of these 
efforts largely a matter of state utility regulation and other efforts at 
the state, local, and service-area level.201  It is here that the nation’s 
carbon reduction effort will meet its test.  Some states have been 
examples of innovation and delivery of demand-side management, 
but most have not.  That situation will have to change if the current 
carbon reduction effort is to succeed. 
Delivery of efficiency and demand-response services uses 
organizational approaches that a number of states have mastered.202  
 
200 FERC sets rates (“tariffs”) for interstate transmission.  Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, About FERC: What FERC Does, http://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2010).  There are currently seven regional transmission organizations in the 
United States—generally nonprofit organizations with varied experience and success in 
modernizing their grids.  See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, FERC Industries: 
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2010) 
(mapping the RTOs and ISOs in the United States and Canada).  One difficulty in creating 
a voluntary, multistate RTO/ISO is the differing preferences for a for-profit transmission 
company as opposed to a nonprofit RTO/ISO.  See 18 C.F.R. § 35.34 (2009). 
201 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,626 n.544 (May 10, 
1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385) (“This Final Rule will not affect or encroach 
upon state authority in such traditional areas as the authority over . . . administration of 
integrated resource planning and utility buy-side and demand-side decisions, including 
DSM . . . .”). 
202 The states with experience spending funds effectively to reduce carbon emissions 
have acquired that experience through either voluntary cap-and-trade programs or charges 
applied to all users.  See supra note 195.  Such programs are funded by charges included in 
customer utility bills.  The revenue generated is then invested in energy efficiency and 
demand-side management by either the utility itself or a separate entity.  2008 ACEEE 
SCORECARD, supra note 159, at 6. 
 The ACEEE found Vermont, California, and Connecticut have the leading ratepayer-
funded efficiency programs.  Id. at 18 fig.1.  Vermont’s program, for example, is funded 
by a “non-bypassable charge” affixed to every customer’s monthly bill.  Efficiency Vt., 
About Us, http://www.efficiencyvermont.com/pages/common/AboutUs/ (last visited Feb. 
2, 2010).  The revenue generated goes straight to Efficiency Vermont, a separate entity 
that administers the funds for energy efficiency and demand-side management projects.  
Blair Hamilton & Michael Dworkin, Four Years Experience of the Nation’s First Energy 
Efficiency Utility: Balancing Resource Acquisition & Market Transformation Under a 
Performance Contract, in PROC.-2004 ACEEE SUMMER STUDY ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
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The funds are typically raised as part of rates, a charge that applies to 
all users—sometimes called a “non-bypassable charge” or a “wires” 
charge if collected by additions to the component of rates attributable 
to transmission and distribution.203  The funds are spent in a myriad 
of ways to facilitate the installation of the most efficient motors, 
appliances, and heating, cooling, and other processes for commercial, 
industrial, and residential customers. Some states use regulatory 
regimes to require utilities to perform almost all functions of 
efficiency, including installation, although evidence that utilities 
perform the function vigorously is mixed.204  Other states provide 
efficiency services as part of the state bureaucratic function,205 
although funds allocated for that purpose are then sometimes subject 
to legislative diversion to meet other budget priorities.206  Vermont 
has experimented with an efficiency utility that provides efficiency 
services with ratepayer funds through a performance-based contract 
with the state regulator.207  This approach has the advantage of both 
an organizational culture dedicated to the efficiency effort208 and a 
funding stream insulated contractually from potential diversion for 
other state budget priorities.209 
However structured, a successful demand-side management 
program requires development of policies and dedication of resources 
at the state level.  The unevenness of the states’ commitment to 
efficiency lies at the heart of the problem that must be addressed in 
order to succeed in reducing the nation’s carbon footprint.  In 2008, 
the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy ranked all 
 
IN BUILDINGS 5-129, 5-129 (2004).  Because of their ratepayer-funded energy efficiency 
program, Vermont realized 1% savings in utility needs from 2006 to 2007 and 1.7% from 
2007 to 2008.  2008 ACEEE SCORECARD, supra note 159, at 18 fig.1. 
 Efficiency Vermont has experienced such success for a number of reasons.  First, it 
operates under a competitively awarded, performance-based contract, which means it must 
achieve results in order to continue to exist.  See Hamilton & Dworkin, supra, at 3.  
Second, revenue goes directly to Efficiency Vermont instead of the state treasury, 
minimizing temptation for diversion.  Id. at 2.  Finally, as an entity separate from the state 
government, Efficiency Vermont can adapt quickly to efficiency innovations, which has 
fostered “an attitude and culture of ongoing flexibility and innovation.”  Id. at 10. 
203 See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
204 See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
205 See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
206 See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
207 See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
208 See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
209 See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
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fifty states based on their overall energy efficiency performance.210  
The report also separately ranked states for their ratepayer-funded 
energy efficiency programs.211  Forty-one states have at least some 
form of a ratepayer-funded energy efficiency program in place.212  
However, at least nine states have no program at all.213  Also, eleven 
states can be said to barely have a program at all.214  South Carolina, 
Georgia, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Kansas, Arkansas, 
Nebraska, Michigan, South Dakota, and North Dakota received less 
than two points out of a possible twenty.215  In fact, only thirteen 
states scored higher than ten points for their ratepayer-funded energy 
efficiency programs, six of which were RGGI states.216  In many of 
the states leading the effort, dollars spent for energy efficiency in the 
electricity sector constitute about 2% of system revenues, and, in 
many states, the amount is less than 0.5%.217  A robust program 
would require the investment of approximately 5% of system 
revenues and, as discussed above, would return cost savings and 
carbon reductions in the most cost-efficient manner. 
Devotion of resources at the state level is necessary for a successful 
DSM effort, but resources alone are insufficient: the effort requires 
thoughtful revision of long-standing regulatory policies and market 
structures.  A key example involves the delivery of efficiency 
services, especially by utilities, and demonstrates the sophistication of 
the necessary policies that need revision.  While FERC plays an 
increasingly important role due to the importance of transmission, 
multistate and regional wholesale markets, and experiments with 
deregulation,218 the great bulk of regulation lies with the states 
through their public utility commissions.  PUCs set rates that 
determine utility compensation for key activities, including the return 
of capital invested in generation, in-state transmission and 
distribution, and the operation of their system.  If the utilities perform 
 
210 2008 ACEEE SCORECARD, supra note 159, at iv–v tbl.ES-1. 
211 Id. at 5–6 tbl.2. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. (scoring Alaska, Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, Delaware, West Virginia, 
Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Wyoming at 0 points out of a maximum possible score of 20). 
214 See id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 7–8 tbl.4. 
218 For a discussion of restructuring and wholesale markets, see infra Part II.B.2. 
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demand-side mangement services, those services are regulated at the 
state level as well.219 
The traditional rate-setting process, as it exists in almost all states, 
operates in a manner that discourages utilities from undertaking the 
delivery of efficiency services.  Some states have altered their rate-
setting processes to hold utility revenue harmless from the effects of 
reduced consumption, but most have not.  In the absence of changes, 
the typical regulatory system produces a situation in which efficiency 
reduces utility revenue and profits.  The rate-setting process begins 
with an estimate of the total revenue required to operate a utility, 
including a reasonable rate of return necessary to reward investors in 
amounts consistent with the risk they undertook and to attract 
necessary additional capital.  That total revenue requirement is then 
divided by the anticipated demand for kilowatt-hours to produce a 
rate—for example, $0.12/kWh for residential customers.  That rate, 
and not the total estimated dollar revenue requirement, is typically the 
legal and operative output of the rate-setting process that simply 
authorizes the utility to charge the adjudicated rate per kilowatt-
hour.220  If sales are higher than estimated, profits are higher.  If sales 
are lower than estimated in the rate-setting process, profits are lower 
or nonexistent.  Efficiency programs pose a problem for utilities 
because, if successful, the programs reduce sales to levels lower than 
anticipated in the algorithms used to derive the rate.  If the installation 
of efficiency measures reduces total kilowatt-hour sales by even a 
small amount, the resulting drop in revenue can produce a large 
percentage reduction in profit, as profits come from the last dollars 
earned.221  Some forward-looking states have now put revised rate-
making processes in place that “decouple” revenue from sales in a 
manner that holds utilities harmless from sales declines due to 
efficiency measures.  Some states have enacted a form of 
performance-based ratemaking that operates to incentivize efficiency 
services rather than penalize utilities for reduced sales due to 
efficiency.222 
 
219 See infra Part II.B.2. 
220 See BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 103, at 201–02. 
221 For example, if the total revenue required were $100, of which profits were $10, 
then a 5% drop in revenue to $95 is a 50% drop in profits to $5.  Efficiency measures that 
reduce revenue frequently reduce costs, so the literal math of this example would not hold 
to the stated extent.  Nonetheless, profits would likely decline substantially more than 
revenues.  Id. at 201. 
222 See WAYNE SHIRLEY ET AL., THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, REVENUE 
DECOUPLING STANDARDS AND CRITERIA: A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA PUBLIC 
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States need to consider a myriad of other changes to their 
regulatory policies and rate structures to enhance efficiency and to 
realize the potential benefits of physical smart-grid improvements.  
Some states still have rate structures that encourage consumption 
rather than efficiency.  During the 1940s through the 1960s, states 
viewed electrification as a social good and took on the role of 
advocating for increased consumption.  Many enacted declining block 
rates that set lower per kilowatt-hour rates for increased levels of 
consumption, a sort of quantity discount.223  Some states have now 
reversed course, approving “inclining block” rates that charge more 
per kilowatt-hour for increased usage levels.224  Some states are 
encouraging the installation of smart meters, which allow customers 
to view electricity rates in real time.  Some systems could allow 
customers to install (or have the local service provider install and 
remotely operate) devices that periodically cycle off appliances such 
as air conditioners to reduce demand when prices are high.  However, 
these physical improvements will have no effect unless state PUCs 
offer dynamic rate options that allow them to pay market rates at the 
time of the demand reduction, or some variation, rather than rates 
reflecting annual system averages.  Improvements to the grid, such as 
line upgrades, smart controls, and system monitoring, require similar 
policy initiatives to deliver system benefits and reduce carbon 
 
UTILITIES COMMISSION 36–37 (2008), available at http://www.raponline.org/docs/ 
RAP_Shirley_DecouplingRevenueRpt_2008_06_30.pdf; see also NAT’L ACTION PLAN 
FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY, ALIGNING UTILITY INCENTIVES WITH INVESTMENT IN ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY 5-3 (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/RDEE/documents/incentives 
.pdf.  Such systems typically set the rate as described in the text above but they also 
guarantee the utility the total revenue required regardless of the actual sales.  See SHIRLEY 
ET AL., supra, at 6.  If sales, and thus revenue, are less than the authorized amount, then 
the utility receives the difference through rate increases in the next year—effectively a 
“true up.”  See NAT’L ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY, supra, at 5-3 to 5-5.  
Similarly, if revenues are higher than the set amount, rates the next year are reduced.  See 
SHIRLEY ET AL., supra, at 12.  The allowed revenue in the next year also factors in growth 
in population or industrial/commercial activity.  See id. at 32.  After a few years, the 
guaranteed revenue is reset to take into account the effects of efficiency, which may either 
offset growth and cancel the need for new plants or reduce demand—allowing for the 
closing of older units or reductions in purchases on the wholesale power markets.  See 
generally id. 
223 See Ren Orans et al., Inclining for the Climate GHG Reduction via Residential 
Electricity Ratemaking, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 1, 2009, at 40 (advocating for GHG 
reductions via changes to inclining block rates for residential consumption). 
224 Id. 
 2009] Recovery of a Lost Decade (or Is It Three?) 467 
emissions.  Commissions will need to clarify reliability objectives and 
policies.225 
Development of energy-saving and energy-generating options on 
the customer side of the meter will similarly require policy innovation 
at the state level.  In many cases, the difference between poor or no 
policies and excellent policies will be the dispositive factor in 
determining whether strategies reduce or increase carbon emissions.  
For example, in a very few years, many car manufacturers will offer 
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs).  This means that much of 
our energy use for transportation will switch from consumption of oil 
to electricity.  While this development could reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions if the source of electricity is renewable, the increased 
consumption of electricity in areas that rely primarily on coal 
generation would more than offset gains from reduced combustion of 
gasoline, thus causing a net increase in greenhouse gas emissions.226  
Regulatory policies, however, could encourage PHEV charging 
during off-peak times and discharging back into the grid during on-
peak periods, effectively creating a distributed storage network.  State 
policies that incentivize the local service provider to equip customers 
with the necessary devices could ensure that the pervasive use of 
PHEVs produces benefits to our carbon reduction program.227 
These efforts to enhance efficiency and demand management in the 
power sector must be undertaken on a state-by-state basis.  No 
shortcut exists.  These strategies derive from each state’s regulatory 
regime, rate-setting methodologies, and efficiency delivery systems.  
Some states such as California, New York, Vermont, Connecticut, 
and Massachusetts have several decades of experience with 
efficiency, and some states, though fewer, have experience with 
demand management.228  Most states, however, have small, utility-
run programs that deliver a limited suite of efficiency services, such 
as insulation retrofit for low-income homeowners, and not much 
 
225 For an excellent summary of policies necessary to realize the potential of the smart 
grid, see Smart Grid, supra note 170, at 5–6. 
226 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL ENERGY AND FLEET 
MANAGEMENT: PLUG-IN VEHICLES OFFER POTENTIAL BENEFITS, BUT HIGH COSTS AND 
LIMITED INFORMATION COULD HINDER INTEGRATION INTO THE FEDERAL FLEET 11–12 
(2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09493.pdf. 
227 Smart Grid, supra note 170, at 4. 
228 See supra note 195; supra note 202. 
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more.229  Many states effectively have no program at all.230  No 
program means a lack of experienced staff. 
These efforts, especially the direct delivery of efficiency, are 
financially more efficient than the construction of new power plants 
but the enterprise requires substantial human capital and the 
investment of ratepayer funds.  The current extent and efficacy of 
these programs depend on the value individual states place on 
efficiency.  Some states, as mentioned above, have devoted 
substantial funds to the efficiency effort.231  The majority of states, 
however, have devoted little or no funding or regulatory resources to 
the effort.  They lack experience in program design and evaluation, 
marketing, and training personnel and, as a result, have low consumer 
awareness.  Federal funding or presence in the delivery of efficiency 
services has been minimal in prior administrations and is still largely 
inchoate under President Obama.232 
For these inexperienced states, expending a major allocation of 
federal funding for demand-side management would currently be a 
simple impossibility.  Congress can pass the legislation and deliver 
the funds to the states, but, in the absence of capacity to implement, 
the funds cannot be spent productively.  It is an uncomfortable truth 
that human and bureaucratic capacity takes time to develop, and those 
states that have never made the effort, or made the effort in the Carter 
era and subsequently dismantled during restructuring, will require 
substantial time to construct the governmental presence necessary to 
 
229 See supra note 195; supra note 202. 
230 See supra note 195; supra note 202. 
231 See supra note 195; supra note 202. 
232 The [former] President’s overall FY 2008 budget request for energy-efficiency 
[sic] programs within DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
is $515 million, down nearly $117 million (18%) from the FY 2006 appropriated 
level.  This large cut follows a gradual slide from the $695 million that was 
appropriated for these programs in FY 2002.  Funding for these programs has 
decreased by one-third (37%) since 2002, after adjusting for inflation.  In 
addition, the request for electricity R&D programs, many of which focus on 
efficiency, is $86 million, a decrease of $50.3 million (37%) from the FY 2006 
appropriated level.  Several deployment programs, along with industrial R&D, 
have experienced some of the biggest funding cuts. 
Fiscal Year 2008 Appropriations for Energy-Efficiency Programs of the U.S. Department 
of Energy Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Water Development of the H. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Kateri Callahan, President, Alliance to 
Save Energy), available at http://ase.org/content/article/detail/3699. 
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dispense the funds in ways that achieve the goals of the cap-and-trade 
or carbon tax legislation.233 
How can the states be incentivized to undertake this effort as 
swiftly as feasible?  If funds are allocated to states without oversight, 
or even with oversight, then the revenue will be spent but not 
effectively.  No state will likely return the funds,234 but, in those 
states without the necessary governmental capacity, carbon emissions 
per capita will not be reduced.  The only way to create a real capacity 
for the nationwide delivery of demand-side management services will 
be through elements of the applicable legislation that incentivizes 
states to develop the capability—and possibly penalizes those states 
that do not.  An initial distribution of allowances on the basis of sales 
or bases other than current carbon consumption235 is a mild motivator 
since a rational consumer trustee or local provider will search out 
efficiency as the most immediately available and least expensive 
carbon-efficient strategy.  However, stronger measures are needed, 
especially after the initial period.236  The funding formula could 
change such that those states that achieve or sustain previously 
achieved low-carbon emissions per capita would receive a greater 
share of the funds.  Absent concerted efforts by the states, the nation 
will not be successful in meeting national carbon reduction targets. 
 
233 Michael Dworkin et al., A Driving Need, a Vital Tool: The Rebirth of Efficiency 
Programs for Electric Customers, 209, 211, 228–29, in CAPTURING THE POWER OF 
ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING (Joey Lee Miranda ed., 2009). 
234 Republican Governor Mark Sanford of South Carolina tried to reject stimulus dollars 
but, even in one of the most conservative states, he found the position impossible to 
maintain over time.  Posting of Kate Phillips, South Carolina Governor Rejects Stimulus 
Money, to The Caucus Blog (Mar. 20, 2009), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/ 
20/round-2-omb-rejects-sc-governors-stimulus-plan/; see also Shaila Dewan, 6 Governors 
May Reject Portions of Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at A12.  But see Posting of 
Kate Phillips, South Carolina Will Apply for Most of Its Stimulus Money, to The Caucus 
Blog (Apr. 3, 2009), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/03/south-carolina-will     
-apply-for-most-of-its-stimulus-money/. 
235 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 401 
(proposing addition of § 761 to the Clean Air Act) (describing a distribution of emission 
allowance rebates). 
236 See Cowart, Testimony, supra note 34, at 18.  Intrinsically, the mere allocation on 
the basis of electricity sales rather than carbon consumption has some motivational effect. 
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II 
THE MIXED SUCCESS OF THE MOVE TO MARKETS REVEALS THE 
NEED FOR GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
The state search for more efficient energy regimes is not new.  By 
the 1990s, states leading the effort had sophisticated energy 
regulatory schemes in place that had adapted traditional monopoly 
regulation to mandate or incentivize energy efficiency and the 
development of renewable energy sources.237  Some of those states 
abandoned those nascent systems for free market schemes that have 
both failed to deliver the anticipated economic advantages and 
decimated renewable energy and efficiency programs.238  Markets 
have proven as expensive—and perhaps more expensive—to 
administer than traditional monopoly regulation.  FERC and the states 
should cabin the use of markets to distinct purposes and build 
regulatory expertise to manage the remaining power markets. 
A.  The Traditional Cost of the Service Model 
In response to concerns over the implacable tendency of railroads 
to produce monopolies, American legislators, economists, and other 
public intellectuals initiated a system of monopoly regulation.239  In 
 
237 Duane, supra note 31, at 487–88. 
238 Nancy A. Rader & Richard B. Norgaard, Efficiency and Sustainability in 
Restructured Electric Markets: The Renewables Portfolio Standard, ELECTRICITY J., July 
1996, at 39–41; see also RYAN WISER & GALEN BARBOSE, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L 
LAB., RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATUS REPORT 
WITH DATA THROUGH 2007, at 4 fig.2 (2008), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/ 
reports/lbnl-154e-revised.pdf (reporting a timeline of the enactment of state renewable 
portfolio standards). 
239 Railroads presented the first case of a phenomenon now called “natural 
monopolies,” although earlier cases indicate the nation had begun to grapple with the 
issue.   Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135 (1876) (holding that a statute regulating rates 
charged by grain elevators at a railroad terminal point was valid because the grain elevator 
both had a natural monopoly at the terminal and was serving the public interest); Charles 
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 500 (1837) (holding state legislation that 
charters a corporation providing public benefits, such as a bridge or ferry, must be 
construed against the corporation in order to protect the public interest); see also Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Monopoly: An American Historical 
Perspective, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1263, 1266 n.24 (1984) (discussing United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), as an example of the Supreme Court forcing 
competition even though railroads are natural monopolies).  As for turnpike regulation, see 
Peter Karsten, Supervising the “Spoiled Children of Legislation”: Judicial Judgments 
Involving Quasi-Public Corporations in the Nineteenth Century U.S., 41 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 315, 365 n.191 (1997), which discusses cases where turnpike and bridge companies 
were dissolved due to failure to build or maintain the structures as stipulated. 
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the century and a half since the electrification of America began, 
Congress, state legislatures, administrative agencies, and the courts 
have labored to produce a monopoly regulatory approach to the power 
sector that provides the nation with reliable, reasonably priced 
electricity.240  State commissions developed staffs with deep 
familiarity with the financial, structural, and physical nature of both 
the power industry as a whole and the utilities under their control.241  
Though with great variation among the states and distinct cycles of 
regulatory focus and neglect, the resulting system provided reliable, 
inexpensive electric service, assisted in substantial part by sustained 
low levels of inflation, inexpensive oil and gas, and technological 
advances in generation that produced ever-increasing economies of 
scale.242  This socioeconomic situation and regulatory certainty 
provided vertically integrated utilities with a business environment 
featuring monopoly rights and guaranteed levels of return, which 
encouraged adequate—and some said excessive—capital investment 
in the power sector.243 
B.  The Rise of the Markets in the Energy Arena 
The factors that supported a historic downward trend in rates 
changed in the 1970s and 1980s.244  Inflation spiked, technologies 
reached a plateau, and oil producers formed and maintained an 
oligopoly that successfully increased prices.245  Environmental 
 
240 See EDWARD KAHN, ELECTRIC UTILITY PLANNING AND REGULATION 7 (1988); 
CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 3 (3d ed. 1993). 
241 Paul R. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 
4 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 5 (1986) (discussing, in general, state regulatory structures for rate 
setting). 
242 Duane, supra note 31, at 478 (noting that “ever-larger generating units lowered per-
unit costs just as expanding markets allowed greater efficiencies”); Stefan H. Krieger, An 
Advocacy Model for Representation of Low-Income Intervenors in State Public Utility 
Proceedings, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 639, 639–41 (1990) (citing DOUGLAS D. ANDERSON, 
REGULATORY POLITICS AND ELECTRIC UTILITIES: A CASE STUDY IN POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 70 (1981); Paul R. Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural 
Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J.L. & ECON. 291, 312–13 
(1974)) (discussing both the decrease in energy costs between 1951 and 1971 and the 
economies of scale and technological advances achieved after World War II). 
243 See Tomain, supra note 4, at 446–47 (stating that monopoly regulation supported the 
expansion of the industry, including more capital investments in infrastructure). 
244 Duane, supra note 31, at 481. 
245 Id.; Tomain, supra note 4, at 450 (noting that factors such as inflation, increase in 
environmental regulatory costs, and OPEC restrictions on oil production caused increases 
in energy prices). 
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regulations increased costs, and, in the late 1970s, recession reduced 
growth in consumption.246  Investment in nuclear plants produced 
large losses, rate increases, and, in some cases, utility bankruptcies.247  
During the Carter presidency, the federal government began 
experimenting with fundamental reforms to the monopoly regulatory 
regime to address these trends, encourage efficiency, and engage 
environmental issues, while maintaining reasonable rates of return for 
utilities,248 but the Reagan administration had little interest in 
pursuing such regulatory innovation.249 
The reform effort moved to the states, a generally suitable forum 
because the state PUCs regulated the electricity providers.250  By the 
1990s, the most active commissions in the more environmentally 
conscious states had sophisticated, modified regulatory regimes in 
place that had adapted traditional monopoly regulation to mandate or 
incentivize energy efficiency and the development of renewable 
energy sources.251  Commissions in these states required that utilities 
develop integrated resource plans that both encouraged efficiency and 
demand response and gave priority to power from renewable 
sources.252  Customers in these states paid small nonbypassable 
transmission charges to subsidize efficiency, renewables, and 
 
246 Tomain, supra note 4, at 450. 
247 John F. Lomax, Jr., Future Electric Utility Bankruptcies: Are They on the Horizon 
and What Can We Learn from Public Service Co. of New Hampshire’s Experience?, 12 
BANKR. DEV. J. 535, 554 (1996) (discussing the cost overruns of nuclear plant 
construction during the mid-1980s). 
248 Tomain, supra note 4, at 451 (stating that the Carter administration passed the Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) to encourage energy conservation, 
alternative energy sources, and market-based rates). 
249 Id. at 437 (reporting that the Reagan administration stressed deregulation). 
250 Scott F. Bertschi, Comment, Integrated Resource Planning and Demand-Side 
Management in Electric Utility Regulation: Public Utility Panacea or a Waste of Energy?, 
43 EMORY L.J. 815, 816–17 (1994) (stating that, under the U.S. Constitution, states 
regulate utilities pursuant to their police power). 
251 DAVID MOSKOVITZ, THE WORLD RES. INST., RENEWABLE ENERGY: BARRIERS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES, WALLS AND BRIDGES 14 (1993), available at http://www.raponline.org/ 
Pubs/General/RenewEnergyBarriersOpportunities.pdf (offering that state commissions 
such as those in Arizona, Texas, and Vermont initiated efforts to incorporate photovoltaics 
in their planning, rules, and practice). 
252 Michael Dworkin et al., Revisiting the Environmental Duties of Public Utility 
Commissions (2006), 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2–3 (2006) (describing the duties of fifteen 
states’ public utility commissions to consider environmental policies, including resource 
planning and conservation programs); see also Bertschi, supra note 250, at 830–35 
(discussing the characteristics of integrated resource planning); Duane, supra note 31, at 
487–90. 
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developers of solar, wind, biomass, and cogeneration energy 
facilities.253  In such states, federal law giving preferences to 
renewable sources254 was implemented aggressively to provide these 
sources with the high returns and long-term contracts necessary to 
attract risk capital.255  In some states, such as California, and in the 
Northeast, resulting gains in efficiency flatlined per capita growth in 
electricity demand,256 despite increases in economic activity, and, 
together with some adoption of renewable sources, eliminated most of 
the need for new power plant construction.257 
A countervailing trend emerged, however, in the form of the use of 
markets, in lieu of traditional rate setting (which market proponents 
gave the pejorative label “command-and-control”).258  The Reagan 
administration nurtured the concept; the idea grew in the first Bush 
years, aided by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the following 
market triumphalism, which embraced markets as a cheaper, more 
efficient, and allegedly more just approach to social policies than 
regulation.259  Deregulation and competition in the natural gas 
industry had led to substantial investments in new capacity and much 
lower gas prices.  Partial deregulation in telephony led to lower toll 
prices and product innovation.  This led many observers, including 
those who favored some public oversight, to push for increased 
competition in the supply of electricity.  The market movement 
manifested itself in two distinct, if related, ways in the power sector: 
wholesale regional markets and the replacement of monopoly 
 
253 CHERYL HARRINGTON ET AL., THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY POLICY TOOLKIT 70–88 (2006), http://www.raponline.org/Pubs/General/ 
EfficiencyPolicyToolkit.pdf (discussing energy efficiency planning and investments of 
different states). 
254 The Federal Power Act encourages the increased use of alternative energy sources 
by requiring local utilities to buy power from small power production facilities with a 
production capacity of eighty megawatts or less and that are cogenerators.  Federal Power 
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 796(17)(c), 824a-3 (2006). 
255 See Tomain, supra note 4, at 452. 
256 See generally supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
257 See Duane, supra note 31, at 476–93 (elaborating on the evolution of regulation 
from the “Utility Consensus” paradigm of the 1920s to “Integrated Resource Planning” of 
the 1980s and 1990s). 
258 President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291, which stated that 
“[r]egulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the 
regulation outweigh the potential costs to society.”  Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 
13,193, 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981).  President Bill Clinton rescinded Executive Order 12,291 
with Executive Order 12,866 and modified several particulars without altering the basic 
idea of the order.  Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
259 Duane, supra note 31, at 491. 
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regulation with retail, market-based systems in many states, a process 
generally labeled “restructuring.”260 
1.  Wholesale Markets 
With the encouragement of FERC, regional wholesale electricity 
markets emerged as an important element of electricity management 
in substantial portions of the United States.  Traditionally, utilities and 
other entities serving local markets produced some or most of the 
power they sold to their customers, and their state commissions 
determined the price of that power.261  Increasingly, however, utilities 
and other local service entities wanted a market to purchase extra 
power when needed and to sell excess power.262  Also, a new type of 
entity emerged, one that simply owned generation and had no retail 
customers.  Such independent power producers or “merchant 
generators” relied on long-term, bilateral power sale and purchase 
contracts with utilities serving retail customers, but these 
independents also wanted an open market to sell their power.263  
Loose associations of utilities began the buying and selling, and soon, 
in key regions of the country, tightly integrated power pools 
emerged—nonprofits controlled by member utilities.264  Some of 
these, under the leadership of FERC, have morphed into quasi-public 
independent system operators (ISOs), controlling the grid within their 
broad regional jurisdiction and operating day-ahead, short-term 
markets and “day-of” (e.g., same day), spot markets.265  In other areas 
of the country, regional markets of a sort emerged but these were 
coordinated by the largest utility in the area. 
FERC desired to make such regional markets mandatory 
throughout the United States but was unsuccessful.  Today, regional 
markets operate in California, New York, the Midwest, the mid-
Atlantic states, and New England.266  Utilities and other local entities 
 
260 See id. at 490–92. 
261 See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824, 824a–824j, 824j-1, 824k–824w (2006). 
262 See Tomain, supra note 4, at 451–52. 
263 See id. 
264 Id. at 457. 
265 See Seth Blumsack, Measuring the Benefits and Costs of Regional Electric Grid 
Integration, 28 ENERGY L.J. 147, 147, 153–54 (2007) (discussing the FERC’s role in 
encouraging independent management of the grid and a centralized spot market). 
266 See id.; Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator  (ISO), Mission and Vision, 
http://www.caiso.com/docs/2005/09/28/200509281333048821.html (last visited Jan. 30, 
2010); Midwest Indep. Sys. Operator (MISO), Overview, http://www.midwestiso.org/ 
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serving retail customers use these markets to supplement their 
“native” generation and their long-term contracts to purchase power 
from outside sources.267  In some areas, as much as half of the total 
power comes from these regional markets, while, in others, it is a 
small fraction of a total derived mostly from locally based 
generation.268 
2.  Restructuring 
A more sweeping redesign of the monopoly regulatory system 
emerged from a combination of political and economic forces that 
created buyers and sellers with strong incentives to bypass traditional 
monopoly utilities in order to deal with each other directly.269  In the 
depressed years of the early 1990s, industries sought to control rising 
power costs.270  Their historic suppliers, the vertically integrated, 
regulated utilities, ran a mixture of older, more expensive plants and 
newer, cheaper ones.271  Their energy supply mix also included 
mandatory and expensive contracts to purchase power from 
alternative energy suppliers, as well as write-offs for expensive and 
sometimes nonoperational nuclear plants.272  Their rates, set by 
 
home (last visited Jan. 30, 2010); New England Indep. Sys. Operator (ISO-NE), Overview, 
http://www.iso-ne.com/aboutiso/co_profile/overview/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 
2010); N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator (NYISO), Our Purpose and Responsibility, 
http://www.nyiso.com/public/about_nyiso/nyisoataglance/purpose/index.jsp (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2010); PJM Interconnection (PJM), Company Overview, http://www.pjm.com/ 
about-pjm/who-we-are/company-overview.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2010); Sw. Power 
Pool (SPP), About SPP, http://www.spp.org/section.asp?pageID=1 (last visited Jan. 30, 
2010); Elec. Reliability Council of Tex. (ERCOT), About ERCOT, http://www.ercot.com/ 
about/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).  The remaining areas are divided into the following 
regions: the Northwest, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Electric Power Markets: 
Northwest, http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/northwest.asp#rto (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2010); the Southwest, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Electric Power 
Markets: Southwest, http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/southwest.asp 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2010); and the Southeast, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Electric 
Power Markets: Southeast, http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/southeast 
.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2010). 
267 Stephen L. Teichler & Ilia Levitine, Long-Term Power Purchase Agreements in a 
Restructured Electricity Industry, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677, 691–99 (2005) 
(discussing the importance of long-term contracts despite open access and spot markets). 
268 See supra note 66 (describing California’s locally based generation). 
269 See Tomain, supra note 4, at 450. 
270 Duane, supra note 31, at 489. 
271 See Tomain, supra note 4, at 444, 452–53. 
272 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 796(17)(c), 824a-3 (2006). 
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regulators to reflect these blended costs, were frequently high.273  By 
contrast, emerging independent power producers or merchant 
generators could offer power from new, inexpensive natural gas 
plants at lower marginal costs, rather than the higher average cost of 
the system offered by the utilities.274  Cost-conscious industrial 
buyers sought bargains from equally motivated merchant generators, 
but the two groups could not transact with each other because the 
monopoly utility stood in between.275  In monopoly regulation, the 
local service provider, usually a utility, provides power to all 
consumers.276  Cheap merchant generation could be sold to utilities, 
but the savings were simply blended into other higher costs.  
Industrial buyers and merchant generators pushed politically to 
bypass the utility altogether by entering into bilateral power purchase 
agreements with each other directly.277  These forces combined with 
the free market ideology described above to produce a rush for 
restructuring in many states.278 
States that chose to address these forces through what proponents 
called restructuring (as opposed to the more politically charged 
“deregulation”)279 implemented open access to allow any type of 
entity—merchant generators, wholesale power producers, or sellers of 
any sort (including utilities)—to enter into agreements to sell directly 
to retail customers, which, depending on the state, could include 
combinations of industrial, commercial, or residential consumers.280  
Utilities were required to transmit the power in these contracts, or 
“wheel” the power, at the same price as power transmitted from the 
utilities’ native generation to their own customers.281  In order to 
reduce the perceived likelihood that utilities might manipulate 
 
273 Tomain, supra note 4, at 451–52. 
274 See id. 
275 See id. at 453. 
276 Duane, supra note 31, at 476–78. 
277 Tomain, supra note 4, at 453. 
278 Duane, supra note 31, at 491–94; Peter Navarro, A Guidebook and Research Agenda 
for Restructuring the Electricity Industry, 16 ENERGY L.J. 347, 353 (1995). 
279 Duane, supra note 31, at 490–91.  To some extent, this process occurred at the 
federal level.  See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 
(codified in 15, 16, 38, and 42 U.S.C.); 18 C.F.R. § 35.28 (2009); 18 C.F.R. § 37 (2009). 
280 Navarro, supra note 278, at 347–48.  In most states, local service providers were 
obliged to continue to offer some classes of customers that did not choose to select 
alternative sources of power the option to continue with the current service provider, 
which offered default or basic service under various labels. 
281 Id. at 348. 
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transmission rate structures to discriminate in favor of their own 
power transmission and against other entities using their lines, some 
states required utilities to “unbundle,” or separate their generation 
from their transmission assets, and many utilities sold off generation 
assets to either newly created, unregulated affiliates or other 
generators—leaving themselves as primarily transmission, 
distribution, and service companies.282  Many states did not 
restructure.283  These states operate with traditional, local power 
service providers, frequently vertically integrated utilities, with prices 
set by the states on a traditional cost-of-service basis.284  Even in 
these nonrestructured states, however, the wholesale market is an 
increasingly important source of power purchase and sale. 
Restructuring also tilted power away from the states and toward 
FERC.  As the public utility shrank or moved assets to unregulated 
affiliates, state regulators lost authority over much of the electric 
sector.285  Instead of local generation selling through state-regulated 
transactions with local consumers, a greater percentage of the power 
bought and sold flows on interstate transmission systems where rates 
are set by FERC, not the states.286  FERC’s embrace of the market 
concept during the administrations of Presidents Clinton and George 
W. Bush enhanced the promarket tilt.287  While state regulators in 
nonrestructured states set rates to reflect the projected cost of 
providing service, including a rate of return calculated to leave the 
utility in good economic health, FERC allowed rates for these 
increasingly important interstate transactions to be set simply by 
operation of the market.288 
 
282 See generally id. at 361–62 (identifying disadvantages of forced divestiture of utility 
assets). 
283 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STATUS OF STATE ELECTRIC 
INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITY (2003), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/ 
chg_str/restructure.pdf. 
284 See Navarro, supra note 278, at 405. 
285 See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 792–832 (2006); see also Tomain, supra note 
4, at 452. 
286 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2006). 
287 See generally Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594.  
George W. Bush signed the Energy Policy Act, which set forth three energy policy goals, 
one of which was to promote competition in the wholesale power market.  See id. 
288 See Midcoast Ventures I, 61 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,029 (1992).  The FERC’s 1992 Policy 
Statement on Incentive Ratemaking for Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, Oil Pipelines, and 
Electric Utilities made clear that the Agency does not require the traditional cost-of-
service price setting, but rather approves market-based rates and allows incentive 
ratemaking in the appropriate situation.  61 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,168 (1992). 
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There now exists more than a decade of experience and analysis 
available regarding these two major structural changes—creation of 
regional wholesale markets and restructuring in many states.  The 
former has advantages and disadvantages; wholesale markets are here 
to stay and have valuable functions, although they clearly require 
extensive governmental and protective apparatus and attentive market 
monitoring.  Proponents of restructuring believed the switch to open 
access and market-based retail rates would reduce prices for all 
customers, expand private investment, reduce regulatory costs, and 
increase the efficiency of the system.289  That is not the way it has 
turned out. 
C.  Retail Markets for Residential and Commercial Customers in 
Restructured States Fail 
Although open access worked for large industrial clients in some 
states, it did not work for many commercial or residential customers.  
Few wanted or found alternatives to their local utility, which became 
providers of last resort.290  Potential alternative providers found the 
price of entry into the market too high.291  The marketing costs of 
attracting customers exceeded potential profits.292  Nonprice barriers 
to entry were high: utilities understood their customers and had 
billing, repair, and other mechanisms in place that new entrants found 
expensive to duplicate.293  The only remnant of open access in most 
restructured states is found in the industrial sector, where large 
 
289 Tomain, supra note 4, at 436 (discussing the benefits of competitive electricity 
markets). 
290 Duane, supra note 31, at 505 (“Industrial customers had the sophistication and 
incentive to sign on with new providers, but residential customers had little reason to 
switch.”). 
291 Id.  (“New competitors had to charge their own customers to pay the CTC toward 
the utilities’ stranded costs, which made it extremely difficult to compete with the utilities 
on the basis of price.  New providers also faced sign-up costs of up to $600 per customer, 
as well as the inertia of customers’ familiarity with their existing utilities.  Most potential 
entrants to the retail market, therefore, made a decision to wait until the transition period 
ended in 2002 before competing aggressively.”). 
292 Id.  In many restructured states, utilities were required to be the supplier of last 
resort (under a “standard offer”) at rates set low on a transitional basis to protect 
residential customers from initial market fluctuations.  These rates were lower than the 
market prices in most cases. 
293 See id. 
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consumers have found price benefits from the ability to contract with 
merchant providers.294 
D.  The Wholesale Markets Require Careful Governing Efforts and 
Careful Market Monitoring to Avoid Manipulation 
Although many of those states that experimented with restructuring 
have partially reregulated, wholesale markets have provided a 
valuable source of power to local service providers, can be structured 
to encourage efficiency and demand management,295 and will remain 
a factor in much of the country.296  There is a significant body of 
opinion and some factual evidence that regional wholesale markets 
will deliver both reliability and cost savings to power systems.297  
The nation will retain a hybrid system.  However, hybrid systems 
work only when embedded within a regulatory system that requires 
extensive and careful control and monitoring. 
 
294 The U.S. Energy Information Administration labels the electric entities resulting 
from restructured (or deregulated) markets as “Energy-Only Providers.”  U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2008, at 63 tbl.7.3 
(2010), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa.pdf.  The 2008 report 
charts revenue from retail electricity sales by provider and sector.  Id.  In 2007, Energy-
Only Providers received 22.9 billion dollars in revenue, compared to the 343.7 billion 
dollars received by the total electric industry.  Id.  That is 6.63% of electricity revenue 
going to restructured markets.  See id.  Within the Energy-Only Providers, the industrial 
sector received 31.5% of the revenue—compared to 7.2% for residential and 59.3% for 
commercial.  See id. (charting all providers and all sectors from 1997 through 2008). 
295 Regional markets and related grid enhancements may be needed to integrate 
intermittent renewable energy sources into the grid.  See text accompanying notes 152–56 
(discussing issues related to the integration of renewable intermittent energy sources, such 
as wind and solar, into the grid). 
296 California, for example, has returned largely to the regulatory model.  The state 
terminated open access except for certain grandfathered purchasers.  Utilities have “re-
bundled” by acquiring generation, and rates are regulated.  See 18 C.F.R. § 35.34 (2009) 
(establishing RTOs, which are meant to prevent discriminatory access to transmission).  
However, the state determined this reregulation did not eliminate the need for a wholesale 
market; the California ISO opened day-ahead and day-of markets on April 1, 2009.  Press 
Release, Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., California ISO Launches New & Improved 
Markets (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.caiso.com/2383/23837b9467860.pdf. 
297 See MOSKOVITZ, supra note 251, at 13–14 (discussing studies examining the 
benefits of restructuring and regional market integration).  While consultant studies found 
that consumers benefited from lower rates, academic studies found no evidence of lower 
prices.  Id. at 19–20.  Although one academic study did indicate a benefit, the benefit was 
much smaller than that determined by consultants.  Id.; see also David B. Spence, Can 
Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 776–77 (2008) 
(stating studies have found that the restructuring of the PJM electricity market resulted in 
lower prices, but other studies of restructuring in general found price increases). 
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Each of the wholesale markets requires substantial governing 
capability.  Governance varies by market.  The ISOs are nonprofit 
entities with stakeholder boards and substantial staff.  These entities 
perform governmental functions, and issues arise as to the delegation 
of such vital functions to nongovernmental entities.298  Concerns have 
also been voiced by state regulators that may have only advisory or 
informal relationships with these important regional entities, which 
have so much influence over the delivery of power to the customers 
within a given state.299  The effort to oversee these complex regional 
markets requires large, well-paid staffs; the cost of these staffs is 
borne by customers through surcharges on power sold.  Recent 
estimates indicate that the cost of running these markets is 
comparable to the cost of traditional cost-of-service regulation, and, 
although there is overlap, consumers will pay for both systems.300  It 
should be noted, however, that the cost is not great in relation to the 
benefit of the regulatory supervision. 
The regional wholesale markets have proven susceptible to 
manipulation in ways that the traditional tools designed to address 
anticompetitive behavior were ill-suited to address.301  The results 
were especially devastating in restructured states such as California 
where vulnerabilities of the wholesale market were compounded by 
 
298 See Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the 
Public Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional Transmission 
Organizations, 28 ENERGY L.J. 543, 572 & n.158 (2007) (discussing the constitutional 
dilemma of a federal agency delegating “to a private body the authority to make decisions 
about the substantive provisions of federal law or regulatory obligations”). 
299 Id. at 586 (“At the same time, the states, as yet, have not played a day-to-day role in 
RTO decision-making.  Since these organizations were established, state regulatory bodies 
have struggled to determine what their role is in this new system regarding the markets, 
reliability determinations, and future planning.”). 
300 The FERC has estimated annual labor costs associated with the operation of RTOs 
to be $22 million, with an average cost per employee of $117,167.  FED. ENERGY 
REGULATORY COMM’N, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOCKET NO. PL04-16-000, STAFF 
REPORT ON COST RANGES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATION OF A DAY ONE 
REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATION 16 (2004), available at http://www.ferc.gov/ 
EventCalendar/Files/20041006145934-rto-cost-report.pdf (comparing cost information 
submitted by various existing RTOs).  The FERC also estimated the average RTO requires 
187 full-time equivalent employees for minimum functionality.  Id.  The FERC concluded 
that costs associated with the operation of RTOs likely cost the typical retail customer 
$2.31 per year.  Id. at ii. 
301 See Duane, supra note 31, at 535–36 (“Both history and a sophisticated technical 
understanding of electricity markets demonstrate that this is an industry that is too 
susceptible to abuse to be left free of regulatory oversight.  That was regulation’s original 
rationale, and it remains valid today despite the many benefits that some deregulation in 
other sectors has brought.”). 
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new state policies.302  Wholesale power markets typically involve a 
small number of players that make repeated transactions.  The electric 
grid, historically designed to connect regulated generators to their 
retail customers, presents limited options for moving power, and the 
number of power sources available to serve given customers in certain 
locations is also limited.303  Customer demand, by contrast, is 
relatively inelastic and, in most cases, treated by market 
administrators as totally inflexible.304  Market demand for a given 
hour on a given day is estimated using weather and consumption 
models, and then administrators take bids until that amount of power 
is made available.305  Administrators simply assume that customer 
demand is inflexible and unrelated to cost; they will buy the power no 
matter what the cost.  In the absence of corrective market reforms to 
enhance the intrinsic hedging functions of efficiency and demand 
management, and given that there are no substitutes for electricity in 
most situations, the administrators are correct.306  Also, there is a 
coincidence of power demand among most customers, creating high 
peaks in demand at certain points during the day.  The power facilities 
that can quickly meet this peak demand are expensive, and their 
 
302 Id. at 481 (enumerating the results of the California energy crisis as: “rolling 
blackouts, skyrocketing rates, utility bankruptcies, stonewalled investigations, document 
destruction, and the effective insolvency of California itself”).  In California, restructuring 
provisions required investor-owned utilities to buy power through the day-ahead market, 
meaning electricity transactions had to move through the market and investor-owned 
utilities could not enter into bilateral contracts with sellers.  Id. at 498–99.  This eliminated 
the hedge of long-term contracts and increased vulnerability of the short-term market to 
manipulation.  Id. at 499. 
303 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 294, at 28 tbl.2.1 (showing 89% of net 
generation in 2007 came from only coal, natural gas, and nuclear). 
304 See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 42–
43 (2004 ed.) (citing the high value of electricity as a reason to consider customer demand 
inelastic, but also citing excessive price escalations as capable of reducing consumption). 
305 See ISO New England, Inc., Morning Report, http://www.iso-ne.com/ 
sys_ops/mornrpt/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2010) (providing daily information used 
to determine generation needs and price, including the weekly weather forecast, weather 
forecast for peak hour, peak load from the previous day, capacity, maintenance, etc.). 
306 For an excellent discussion of possible market reforms to stimulate DSM as a hedge, 
see COWART, supra note 55.  In the absence of such DSM measures, the disconnect 
between price and consumer demand is prevalent because residential customers and some 
commercial customers pay a rate that is derived from an average of all prices paid during 
the month or year.  Such consumers are not even aware of hourly or daily price spikes.  
See supra note 304 and accompanying text (referring to the disconnect between price and 
consumer demand as inelasticity). 
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ownership or control can be concentrated in the hands of a few market 
players.307 
This inflexible demand, spatially and quantitatively limited supply, 
and unique market structure combine to make the wholesale electric 
market highly susceptible to manipulation by market participants.308  
These participants quickly learn the characteristics of the other 
players and the behavior of the market and can manipulate prices in 
ways that escape traditional regulatory and judicial approaches to 
protecting markets from the exercise of market power.309  The 
administration of antitrust statutes relies on complex algorithms 
applied to make a static determination of whether a given market 
player has market share and other characteristics necessary to exercise 
market power, that is the ability to change prices through its actions 
alone.310  These calculations are made assuming such market power 
evolves slowly and sustains itself for long periods of time.  Antitrust 
administration also relies on lengthy, slow post hoc regulatory 
analysis and judicial enforcement.311  By contrast, manipulation of 
wholesale markets, especially in restructured states, can cause 
precipitous changes in price not typical of the usual retail markets that 
antitrust statutes address.312  Prices can spike by factors of a hundred 
 
307 For example, there are currently 980 power plants in California and only 40 are 
“peakers.”  Cal. Energy Comm’n, http://energyalmanac.ca.gov/powerplants/POWER 
_PLANTS.XLS (last visited Jan. 30, 2010). 
308 See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 304, at 289–94 (detailing the various 
manipulations accomplished by Enron, including “wash trades,” “fat boy,” “get shorty,” 
and others). 
309 See generally KONG-WEI LYE, LEARNING AGENTS IN POWER MARKETS (2004) 
(reporting a simulation of power markets involving ten computerized decision makers, or 
“agents,” that were able to raise prices very quickly without complex knowledge of 
strategies or the ability to communicate with one another). 
310 Antitrust is controlled by the following statutes: the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 
(2006); the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2006); and the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–51 (2006).  See also BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 166, at 26–32 
(describing the regulation of competition in the electricity industry). 
311 See BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 166, at 93–94 (describing the responsibilities for 
enforcing antitrust laws, which rest with the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division). 
312 Duane, supra note 31, at 505 (“Existing participants in the wholesale market were 
also behaving inconsistently with the economic theory upon which the move to 
deregulation and restructuring had been based.  The ISO’s Market Surveillance Committee 
(‘MSC’), composed of three independent economists, issued several reports noting 
evidence of market power in 1998 and 1999.”  (citing FRANK A. WOLAK ET AL., AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE JUNE 2000 PRICE SPIKES IN THE CALIFORNIA ISO’S ENERGY AND 
ANCILLARY SERVICES MARKETS (2000), available at http://www.caiso.com/docs/2000/ 
09/26/200009261407245692.pdf)). 
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or more.  Enron’s power traders discovered various strategies that 
both were difficult to detect and could concentrate high levels of 
market power in one market player for brief periods of time, resulting 
in price spikes of two orders of magnitude.313  The economic and 
social costs of such manipulation cannot await years of analysis and 
litigation for correction. 
The emergent solution appears to be the installation of market 
monitors within both regulating entities and the administration of 
wholesale markets.314  These market monitors, now installed to 
various degrees in the PJM Interconnection, the New York ISO, and 
the New England regional transmission organization,315 would 
consist of cadres of highly trained individuals, armed with computing 
capability that matches any of the market participants.  They would 
use computer programs to evaluate each transaction against projected, 
normal market behavior to detect unusual events that might reflect 
market manipulation.  They can flag suspected transactions.  Market 
participants balance their accounts on a periodic basis, typically 
monthly.  At the end of a month, participants will pay balances owed 
for the power supplied.  A flagged transaction indicates to market 
participants that the affected market transaction will be analyzed 
during the current period, and the price may be reduced.  The bidder 
of a flagged transaction still must provide the power if dispatched but 
it may receive a much lower price than originally indicated when the 
transaction cleared.316  Also, repeated evidence of manipulation 
 
313 Duane, supra note 31, at 477–78. 
314 Such an approach has been advocated by Richard Cowart of The Regulatory 
Assistance Project since the Enron crisis.  See generally RICHARD COWART, THE 
REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, MARKET POWER AND MARKET MONITORING–
CRITICAL ISSUES FOR SERC AND COMPETITIVE WHOLESALE MARKETS (2003), available 
at http://www.raponline.org/Pubs/China/SERCMarketPower.pdf. 
315 PJM, Overview of Market Monitoring Unit, http://www.pjm.com/sitecore/content/ 
Globals/Training/Courses/ol-mmu.aspx?sc_lang=en (last visited Jan. 30, 2010); N.Y. 
INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, FERC ELECTRIC TARIFF: ATTACHMENT O (2009), available at 
http://www.nyiso.com/public/webdocs/documents/tariffs/market_services/ms_attach 
ments/att_o.pdf; ISO New England, Inc., Market Monitoring Reports, http://www.iso-
ne.com/markets/mktmonmit/rpts/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2010) (providing 
monitoring reports for both internal and external market monitors).  For the rule adopting 
an independent market monitor, see 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.365 (2007), available at 
http://www.puc.state.tx.us/rules/subrules/electric/25.365/25.365.pdf. 
316 COWART, supra note 314 (describing a 2002 incident in which the PJM Market 
Monitor successfully detected and corrected an irregularity) (“[A] power marketer actually 
purchased power from PJM at one interface, and then scheduled its return into PJM at 
another, higher-priced location . . . [and] pocketed the difference between the two 
prices.”). 
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would constitute grounds for either expulsion from the market or 
other legal action.  The operation and regulation of these market 
monitors constitute a substantial portion of the expense and regulatory 
effort of running a wholesale market. 
E.  Wholesale Markets Require Secondary Markets in Order to 
Provide Adequate Investment in New Capital Facilities 
It also appears that wholesale markets fail to produce the desired 
investment in new plants necessary to meet growing demand.317  As 
described above, society considers the value of reliable and 
continuous electrical service too high to tolerate any risk of 
inadequate supply.318  It turns out that the financial interests that drive 
investors in new plants do not naturally align with a regulator’s need 
to produce adequate investment in new generation (or in new energy 
efficiency) to assure reliable service in the future.  A solution, at least 
within the New England wholesale market, has been the creation of a 
second wholesale market where the market administrators ask for bids 
on the creation of new sources of supply, or capacity.319 
The traditional cost-of-service regulatory approach provided 
regulators with the means to assure that monopoly utilities provided 
adequate supply.  Of equal or greater significance, the regulatory 
system provided utilities with electricity rates expressly calculated to 
both run the existing system and attract capital for the creation of new 
 
317 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the Electricity 
Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 490 (2005) (“[A] restructured market that relies 
entirely on a competitive wholesale market to produce revenues for generators is 
insufficient to induce the socially necessary level of investment in generating capacity.”). 
318 U.S.-CANADA POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, supra note 96, at 140–70 
(describing changes needed to ensure reliability, and therefore to avoid the high costs of 
chronic large-scale blackouts, and estimating the cost of the August 14 blackout between 
$4 and $10 billion in the United States). 
319 In order to correct the market tendency to underinvest in capital projects, New 
England created the Forward Capacity Market (FCM).  ISO New England, Inc., Forward 
Capacity Market, http://www.iso-ne.com/markets/othrmkts_data/fcm/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2010).  The FCM facilitates auctions to purchase sufficient capacity to 
meet forecasted demand.  Id.  Capacity is purchased at the auction three years before the 
delivery date.  CARISSA SEDLACEK, ISO NEW ENGLAND, INC., WELCOME TO THE 
FORWARD CAPACITY MARKET (FCM) NEW RESOURCE QUALIFICATION FORUM FOR 
CAPACITY COMMITMENT PERIOD 2013–2014, at 11 (2009), available at http://www.iso     
-ne.com/support/training/courses/fcm/fcm_forum_may_5.pdf.  This allows new companies 
to bid into the power generation system.  Id.  The secured future purchase agreement 
allows the new companies to solicit capital investment, borrowing against that agreement. 
 2009] Recovery of a Lost Decade (or Is It Three?) 485 
facilities necessary for growth.320  The wholesale market does not 
expressly address this issue; other bidders set the price.  As discussed 
earlier, in such wholesale markets the “clearing price” is the price of 
the last unit dispatched by the market manager to meet demand for the 
applicable period.321 
This may initially appear counterintuitive, but it represents the way 
most markets function.  Some manufacturers can make a given type 
of shirt, for example, for a higher cost and some for less.  Each may 
“bid” into the market by offering the shirt for sale.  Some potential 
shirt buyers will pay more and some less for this given shirt.  In 
classic economics, the clearing price, the market price for the shirt, 
will be where these demand and supply curves meet. That market 
price is the end of the matter.  Those producers that want or need a 
higher sale price will not get it and will not participate in the market.  
Those that would have produced the shirt for less will not charge less; 
they will charge the market price and pocket the difference.  The same 
is true in the power market as each bidder dispatching power gets the 
clearing price.  Those above this price do not play in that transaction, 
and those below it reap higher profits due to their lower costs and 
resulting “producer surplus.”322 
In economic terms, the cost-of-service approach sets rates to reflect 
the subject utilities’ average cost of producing electricity, while the 
free market trends toward the marginal cost of the power.323  
Marginal cost does not compensate players for the sunk, or needed, 
costs of new capital expansion; the players have to rely on the periods 
when the clearing price is over their marginal cost or bid.324  This 
works in markets where prices and bidders are multiple and vary.  In 
power markets, some participants always bid what they know will be 
 
320 See BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 103, at 92–93.  The traditional rate-setting 
formula calculates the “Revenue Requirement” of the subject utility as equal to its total 
expenses plus a rate of return on capital sufficient to attract the investment necessary to 
raise the capital (through a combination of sale of stock, sale of bonds, and borrowing) to 
construct generation necessary to meet demand. 
321 See supra note 104 and accompanying text; see also BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 
103, at 485. 
322 BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 103, at 421 (“Let the current rate of output be even 
slightly below the maximum output permitted by plant capacity . . . and marginal cost of 
service may be a mere fraction of average cost.”). 
323 Id. at 412–13 (comparing the competitive price structure, which relies on average 
costs, with the marginal-cost principle). 
324 Id. at 410 (explaining that marginal costs include not only the additional cash 
required for additional output, but also enhancements to increase the rate of output). 
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below the clearing price because they know they must run their plants 
regardless of the clearing price.  Nuclear power plants, for example, 
cannot turn on and off depending on these transactions, so if they 
have excess power, they face the choice of either selling it or not.  In 
those cases, they will always prefer to sell, regardless of price.  Other 
producers may bid low for similar reasons: they know they need to be 
one of those picked to sell or be dispatched.325 
It turns out that such a market-based marginal price does not 
encourage investment in new, inevitably expensive plants.326  In the 
current environment, future power sources, especially given higher 
construction costs and the costs of environmental regulation, are 
estimated to produce power at substantially higher wholesale prices 
than existing plants.327  If the new plants were built, their bids into the 
wholesale market or their price requirements in longer-term bilateral 
contracts would be higher to meet their marginal cost of operation.  
They might not “clear,” or be dispatched, enough to pay back 
investors, unless demand was reliably high over the thirty or more 
years necessary to pay back the investment in the plant.  This 
problematic market operation aggravates other problems with raising 
capital.  In a regulated system, the government sets prices that are not 
only calculated to attract capital, but public utilities can raise funds 
through tax-free bond offerings.  Private merchant generators can sell 
bonds as well, but they are taxable.  Also, risks for merchant 
generation are higher than in a monopoly regulatory environment, so 
investors want a higher return.  Thus, the cost of capital is higher for 
private power developers than regulated utilities.328 
One solution is reregulation.  For example, California has taken 
steps since its disastrous encounter with restructuring to reregulate the 
system.329  The state no longer relies exclusively on a spot market and 
 
325 Id. at 136. 
326 Libby, supra note 97, at 241. 
327 See Christine Real de Azua, The Future of Wind Energy, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 485, 
498 (2001) (“The main reason for the continued high use and low price of electricity 
produced from coal in the United States is that the older power plants remain exempt from 
the performance standards applied to the new power generators regarding regulated 
pollutants.”). 
328 See generally BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 103, at 13 (differentiating a private 
business from a public utility, which is subject to both governmental price control and 
additional limits (i.e., taxations) on the ability to earn an excessive rate of return). 
329 For a full discussion of California restructuring, see supra Part II.B.  See also Libby, 
supra note 97, at 242 (“In an effort to alleviate the problems apparently causing electricity 
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encourages other contractual options.330  But wholesale markets have 
proven useful, and in some states, local service providers purchase a 
substantial portion of their total power on the spot market.331  Thus, a 
solution needed to be devised that corrected for the market’s tendency 
to produce underinvestment in new capital facilities.  In New 
England, that need became a second, independent “forward capacity 
market” run by the same market authority that manages the wholesale 
power market, the New England ISO.332 
Early proposals for this capacity market provde contentious.  Many 
stakeholders believed that early proposals, while aiming at new 
capacity, overcompensated market participants for existing 
capacity.333  A recent settlement among stakeholders, approved by 
FERC, sets the terms for this secondary market, and the first round of 
bidding occurred successfully in 2006.334  The design of this complex 
market, at least in New England, does allow demand response to bid 
into the market.335  This market successfully commenced operation in 
2008, and the first auction has been held.  This approach, however, 
will mean the operation and supervision of two separate, complex 
markets.  Each will require monitoring and regulation.  The 
administrative and regulatory efforts will be substantial and ongoing. 
 
prices to soar, the regulators re-imposed price caps on retail sales and then imposed price 
caps on wholesale transactions.”). 
330 Libby, supra note 97, at 242.  (“Finally, in December 2000, FERC dismantled the 
CalPX and allowed utilities to make long-term contracts.”). 
331 Id. at 246 (“Despite the problems with the deregulation process, the market approach 
has shown enough promise that many states are willing to move forward with 
deregulation.”). 
332 See supra note 318 and accompanying text. 
333 PETERSON ET AL., supra note 117, at 21 (“Regional stakeholders have questioned 
whether some of these changes may be over lapping [sic], that is, provide redundant 
compensation for a single service.”). 
334 See Clinton A. Vince et al., What Is Happening and Where in the World of RTOs 
and ISOs?, 27 ENERGY L.J. 65, 91 (2006) (citing Explanatory Statement of the Settling 
Parties in Support of Settlement Agreement and Request for Expedited Consideration, 
Devon Power LLC et al., Docket Nos. ER03-563-000, ER03-563-030, ER03-563-055 
(FERC Mar. 6, 2006)) (describing ISO New England’s Forward Capacity Market and 
Settlement Agreement). 
335 See id. at 90–92.  Companies bid in the market to reduce power demand through 
contracts formed with industrial sources allowing the companies to turn off processes upon 
request.  See supra note 171 (discussing EnerNOC). 
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F.  The Wholesale Market Will Require Design and Investment in an 
Expanded Grid 
Restructuring and FERC’s free market approach placed a 
substantial additional burden on the grid.  In the traditional 
environment, the transmission system operated largely to transmit 
power from native generation to native load via lines of vertically 
integrated utilities, which owned the generation and served the local 
customer.  In the restructured environment, a national set of economic 
actors use transmission to wheel power to destinations determined by 
factors related to contractual, strategic, corporate, and economic 
considerations unrelated to transmission system design or efficiency, 
increasing the volume of transactions.336 
The competition induced by the increasing number of supply 
options available to any given site was supposed to reduce prices.337  
That did not develop; restructuring failed to deliver the expected 
reductions in the price of power.338  Recent studies confirm the 
anecdotal experience of ratepayers.  Overall, power proved more 
expensive in restructured states than power in states that continued to 
employ traditional cost-of-service ratemaking.339  In sum, to operate 
 
336 See Libby, supra note 97, at 238–39 (providing a history of public utilities including 
how they came to provide the generation and the transmission of electricity); id. at 242 
(describing the factors determining transmission including, for example, the “stagger[ing] 
basis” of choice of supplier given to customers). 
337 Id. at 242 (“When consumers were given a choice of suppliers, they would 
presumably choose the supplier that had the lowest rates.  This power that the California 
legislature sought to shift onto the consumer would create competition in the market, 
causing firms to drive down their costs to compete to provide the lowest priced electricity.  
The end result of the process was supposed to save consumers money.”). 
338 Id. (“Before long, a heat wave settled on California, and demand for electricity 
increased as air conditioning units were turned on across the state.  However, unlike the 
previous month, electricity rates were not capped at a maximum price.  Now that the price 
cap had been lifted, the rates that customers were paying were being determined by the 
bids offered on the CalPX spot market.  In July 1999, California electricity customers saw 
their bills increase by as much as 200 percent from June, with the average residential bill 
rising from $50.59 to $101.58 per month.  By the time the summer of 2000 rolled around, 
the problems with AB 1890 were becoming more apparent. California electricity 
customers paid more than $1.2 billion for power during the week of June 14, 2000—three 
times more than they had paid a year earlier.” (footnote call numbers omitted)). 
339 See BLUMSACK ET AL., supra note 31, at 2 (“Our research shows that there is no 
evidence that restructuring has produced any measurable benefit to consumers or to the 
systems which have restructured.”); see also U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 294, 
at 66 tbl.7.4 (charting the average cost of electricity in 2007 for all sectors from 
unregulated retail service providers as $11.03 per kilowatt-hour—compared to $9.13 in all 
sectors for the total electricity industry).  Note that a price differential between states 
existed before restructuring, and this differential derived primarily from differences in the 
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wholesale markets and to manage the hybrid remainders of 
restructuring, strong regulatory efforts will be needed at the state and 
regional levels. 
CONCLUSION 
As much as some have desired to reduce the role of government, to 
make government more efficient, to substitute free markets for 
“command and control,” the United States needs government to act 
collectively in the coordinated and national effort necessary both to 
modernize our electricity system and to control carbon emissions.  
The effort to control carbon emissions must be defined and led by the 
President and Congress, but this mission cannot be carried out 
without increases in capacity at the state and local levels.  The 
provisions of proposed federal legislation, such as a carbon tax or a 
cap on emissions, will not operate in the real world to reduce carbon 
emissions without viable alternatives to fossil fuel-based systems.  In 
the short term, our best option is efficiency services and demand-
response systems implemented primarily at the state and local level.  
Any national carbon legislation therefore needs to fund and to set 
standards and policies that encourage the development of state and 
local governmental capacity to address energy efficiency and other 
demand-side management activities.  The national effort must be 
designed to motivate those states that have failed to develop this 
capacity to change their course for ideological, fiscal, or historical 
reasons.  Reliance on markets in the electricity sector, it turns out, 
increases rather than decreases the need for a sophisticated 
governmental presence at the national and state level and attentive 
nonprofit governance at the regional level. 
 
price of fuel.  States relying primarily on inexpensive coal generation—inexpensive given 
the lack of charge for environmental externalities—experience relatively less costly power 
and states relying on expensive natural gas, higher costs.  That differential has survived 
restructuring. 
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